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This study investigates the relationship between the media and politics by 
analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the 
New York Times and the Asahi. This dissertation reveals that these two print media, 
although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. 
First, it quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in their choice of main 
topics. During the run-up period to the war, the Asahi put more focus on the role of 
the United Nations while the majority of the stories appearing in the New York Times 
addressed U.S. decisions about Iraq.  
Second, the dissertations qualitative analysis of editorials reveals that a 
different emphasis on who the evil doers in the war are. While the New York Times 
treated the oppressive Saddam Hussein regime and terrorists as the evildoers, the 
Asahi portrayed the U.S. as the big evil doer. Further, content analysis of articles 
written by embedded journalists who were with coalition forces in Iraq revealed that 
  
the two newspapers articles showed significant disparities in the degree of sympathy 
they showed to the forces. 
Numerous background factors have influenced this media content. Interviews 
with Japanese journalists and scholars revealed that the cultures of anti-militarism 
held by Japanese that originated from Japans defeat in World War II remain firm 
within Japanese news organizations. Anti-militaristic sentiments and cultural factors, 
such as religion, appear to have influenced how their organizations portrayed the war 
in Iraq. 
Further, this dissertation statistically shows that the medias impact is 
significant in shaping the political agenda and public opinion. Poll data of Japanese 
sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the 
United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi 
rose. In addition, the Asahis critical assessments of the Japanese governments Iraq 
policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. 
Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times 
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Chapter 1: Introduction---Difference in the Media Cultures of 
the U.S. and Japan 
This study investigates the relationship between the media and politics in 
the case of the Iraq War by extensively analyzing the contents of both U.S. and 
Japanese leading print media. The purpose of this research is not only to analyze 
the difference across the Pacific in media content pertaining to the Iraq War, but 
also to explain how background factors, such as different media cultures and the 
politics-media relationship, have influenced media content. This study also 
focuses on how the difference in media content of the war affects public opinion.   
My personal experiences reporting on news from within Japan and the 
United States influenced my choice of research topics. I was a staff writer in a 
major newspaper company in Japan where I was in charge of reporting on U.S.-
Japan trade frictions during the early 1990s. After this, I was assigned to report on 
the Enola Gay controversy in 1995 on behalf of the Japanese media while I was in 
the United States. The impact of these experiences is worth briefly reflecting upon.  
 
Section 1 Reporting U.S.-Japan Trade Frictions 
Soon after finishing my undergraduate studies, I started to work for the 
Chunichi newspaper company. The newspaper company uses three different 
names, the Chunichi, the Hokuriku Chunichi, and the Tokyo, in different regions 




largest mass media companies in Japan. During my five years of experience in the 
early 1990s as a staff writer of the company, I worked in three sections: 
economics, social affairs, and life style. All of these sections provided me with 
frequent opportunities to handle foreign and international issues.  
When I was at the economic section in early 1991, I was in charge of 
issues concerning U.S.-Japan trade frictions. The trade issue was, without a doubt, 
the hottest issue between the two countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Japan was perplexed by the changing trade relationship with the United States--- 
the biggest trade partner of Japan since the end of World War II. I interviewed a 
wide variety of Japanese citizens, both in the public and private sectors, related to 
this issue. One of my daily beats at the time was the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), which was in charge of formulating and implementing 
Japans international trade policy. Automobile exports and rice imports were the 
most serious issues then. Once I reported on the restructuring of the Toyota 
automobile company. The company had just started to move several sections of 
the company from the Koromo and Tahara plants in Aichi, Japan to Georgetown, 
KY, United States. The company had just built its first wholly owned United 
States plant. I also often had the chance to interview rice farmers who faced a real 
threat to their livelihood if the Japanese rice market were opened to American 
imports. The Japanese rice market was completely closed until the Japanese 
government accepted the 1993 decision by the GATT Uruguay Round to partially 




When I reported on these issues, I often found differences between 
Japanese and U.S. reporting. For example, even in cases where the same 
development in relation to trade frictions occurred on a particular date, American 
papers, such as the Washington Post and the New York Times, presented different 
perspectives than did Japanese newspapers. In some cases, these papers presented 
completely opposite views from what I was writing. In political communication 
terminology, I realized that the news frames used across the Pacific were quite 
different. Typical Japanese news frames about the U.S.-Japan trade frictions 
during the early 1990 were as follows: America was threatened by the rising 
Japanese economy and became very impatient with the existing trade and even 
social customs of Japan. Americans were anxious about their future, and 
especially that their economic superpower status might be taken over by the 
Japanese. Trade friction between the two countries became severe because of 
Americans irritations and anxiety. The wane of the American economic power 
was the symbol of the end of the American Century; the 21st century would be 
the Asian Century. Japanese journalists, myself included, often reported on 
daily developments related to U.S.-Japan trade frictions using these frames.  
The international sections of the Japanese print media, including the 
Chunichi, were preoccupied with the issue of U.S.-Japan trade frictions. The issue 
was so important that it was often the top news in the section. American 
newspapers, on the other hand, did not feature the issue as often as Japanese 
media organizations did. U.S.-Japan trade friction was on the political agenda in 




international sections of major U.S. papers. Instead, the end of the Cold War and 
Central American political developments were very frequently written about; 
U.S.-Japan trade frictions seemed to be less important to the U.S. media than were 
the human rights problems in China. This was certainly partly because the 
Tiananmen Square Protest in1989 was still vivid then. Another alarming factor for 
me was that the American media frames were completely different from those of 
the Japanese media. The typical storylines of American papers about the trade 
issue focused on the fact that Japanese trade practices were not fair enough and 
the Japanese market was not as open as those of Western democracies. American 
papers reiterated their views that the Japanese government protected its domestic 
market by imposing high taxes on imports, while Japanese automobile and 
electronic companies freely exported their products to the United States.  
These American media frames were backed by quotations from a group 
of hard-line critics. These critics were called the "revisionists." These revisionists 
included Karel van Wolferen and James Fallows. Van Wolferen suggested that 
Japanese power was so diffuse that no official will accept responsibility for 
governmental actions. According to van Wolferen, the Japanese economic success 
was the result of the workings of a mysterious System in which Japanese power 
is so diffuse that it is difficult to determine where the buck steps, that is who 
should be held accountable for governmental actions(van Wolferen 1990). James 
Fallows went a step further and asked Americans to change their view of Japan: 




was Containing the Japanese, a name obviously borrowed from George 
Kennans famous 1947 article about the Soviet Union (Fallows 1989). 
Although there were several differences in their focus of criticism, these 
revisionists arguments were similar in their acerbic critique of Japanese trade 
practices. They proclaimed that the Japanese are not only mercantilist in their 
trade policies, but that they are different from Western democracies. Japan is not 
committed to democracy and free trade, they asserted, and as a result, there is an 
inevitable conflict between Japanese and American interests and long-term goals 
(Prestowitz 1982 and 1990). The arguments of the revisionists originated from the 
opinions of Chalmers Johnson. In his seminal book, MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle, Johnson argued that Japan is not a state that respects the principle of 
free-trade, but rather is a "capitalist developmental state" along with other newly 
risen Asian countries, most notably, Taiwan and South Korea. A "capitalist 
development state" is a state in which governmental commitment to economic 
growth exerts a strong influence over the normal market behavior of the economy 
(Johnson 1980). Thus, Johnson concluded that the United States must treat Japan 
differently from other Western nations. 
Interestingly, the Japanese media often emphasized the frame that 
America is irritated by the rapid growth of the Japanese economy.  They quoted 
this American news frame and featured the revisionists. Also, just as the 
American media frequently quoted the revisionists, the Japanese media often 
featured Japanese critics of America. The typical arguments of these critics were 




superpower that will be surpassed by rising Asian power. The most quoted book 
taking this line of argument is The Japan That Can Say No ( Nou To Ieru 
Nippon) published in 1989. The book was co-written by Shintaro Ishihara, a 
novelist-turned-politician (Ishihara is now the governor of Tokyo and was a 
Lower House Representative when the book was written) and the founder of the 
Sony Corporation, the late Akio Morita. At the center of their book is the 
argument that the trade deficit was the result of the unpopularity of American 
products. According to the authors, America was becoming lazy, and weakened 
by social conflicts and a failing system of education. Thus, Ishihara and Morita 
concluded that Japan should stop bowing to the United States and take an 
independent stance (Ishihara and Morita 1989, Ishihara 1991).  
Perhaps an American journalist reading these Japanese articles on U.S.-
Japan trade frictions, and especially quotations from critics such as Ishihara and 
Morita, might feel the exact same feeling I did: Realities are in the eyes of the 
beholder. The same issues were reported differently when the reporters 
backgrounds (countries, cultures, and societies) were different. 
 
Section 2 Reporting on the Enola Gay Controversy 
My experience as a public policy researcher in the United States also 
influenced my views on media coverage. Soon after I started to study for my 
Masters degree at Georgetown University, I started to work at a small American 




Japanese, many clients are from the Japanese public and private sectors. Many of 
the companys assignments were about reporting developments in American 
polices that were related to Japan. Most of my assignments at the company dealt 
with telecommunications and environmental policies, but because of my journalist 
background, I often engaged in reporting on American social issues on behalf of 
Japanese media organizations.  
In the summer of 1995, I reported a series of news stories about the 
Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space 
Museum. The Enola Gay is the airplane that dropped an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, Japan in August 1945, just before the end of World War II. The 
Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum decided to display the 
wartime icon permanently in 2003. Prior to that decision, the museum for the first 
time in the summer of 1995, commemorating the 50 year anniversary of the 
bombing, exhibited the partially restored silver body of the Enola Gay along with 
a model of "Little Boy," the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.  
The exhibition created a controversy in both Japan and the United States. 
The centerpiece of the controversy was whether the A-bomb was a savior or a 
devil to the people in Japan, East Asia, and the United States. Even before the 
exhibition started, the Enola Gay was unlike other museum pieces. The display 
raised the anger of U.S. veterans because the original plan had been to exhibit 
photos of the victims and other related materials including a lunch box containing 
charred food, a burned uniform, melted glass, and a watch that stopped ticking at 




Veterans suggested that these displays were not politically correct, that these 
displays deflated the important role the bomber played in facilitating Japans 
surrender, and could leave people with the impression that the U.S. soldiers, as 
opposed to the Japanese, were the ruthless aggressors. 
Because of the harsh response from veterans, in the end the exhibit not 
only excluded these objects, it also had no clear explanation of the number of 
causalities, no pictures of ground zero in Hiroshima, and many other related 
materials. The director of the museum had to resign in the face of all the 
controversy (Funabashi 1995).  
On the other side of the Pacific, the exclusion of some displays outraged 
atomic bomb survivors in Japan and some anti-war groups in the United States. In 
response to the efforts of those groups, the American University in Washington 
DC, hosted an exhibition focusing on victims of the blasts. The alternative version 
of the exhibition provided a sharp contrast to the Enola Gay exhibition at the 
Smithsonian Institution. The exhibition included a detailed explanation of the 
causalities of the bomb and the burned uniform, melted glass and a watch that was 
stopped by the blast. All of these items had originally been planned to be shown at 
the Smithsonian (Nuclear Bomb Exhibition at the American University in 
Washington, DC, The Asahi, July 11, 1995).   
I was personally involved both in the first Smithsonian display and the 
alternative exhibition at the American University as a reporter for a television 
crew from Hiroshima in the summer of 1995. At that time, I was surprised that the 




Japanese journalists, including myself. I wondered why the same issue was 
portrayed so differently by the medias of different countries.  
The Japanese media reports on the Enola Gay controversy suggested that 
many Americans simply do not want to know what the A-bomb did to its victims, 
and that U.S. hardliners distorted the facts of the great atrocity (Funabashi 1995). 
According to the Japanese media, the Enola Gay was an icon of mass killing and 
one of the most brutal war events of the 20th century. Many stories referred to the 
victims who still suffer 50 years after the A-bomb was dropped. There were also 
several emotional feature stories by the Japanese media about the survivors who 
actually visited the Enola Gay display (e.g. Atomic bomb victims visit the Enola 
Gay exhibition in U.S., The Yomiuri, July 12, 1995). 
In contrast to those portrayals, many stories, if not all, in the U.S. media 
emphasized the view that the dropping of the atomic bomb terminated the war and 
saved the lives of many soldiers. The general American medias standpoint was 
that the use of the atomic bombs were justified because they abruptly ended the 
long and bitter war and saved many more lives ---Japanese, American and other 
East Asian --- than were lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus, the bomber was 
portrayed as the plane of saviors (Burchard 1995). It was a righteous part of the 
memories of The Good War (Terkel 1984, 2004). 
My impression at that time was that the different portrayals did not only 
come from the difference of the definition about what is and is not moral and 
ethical in wartime, but also from more fundamental differences in world views. In 




particular issue was reported differently and why the difference was created and 
developed. This was the original point of this dissertation.  
A few years later when I actually started to think about a dissertation topic, 
I considered several topics for international comparison. There were many 
possible subjects for comparison, but I believe that a big issue which affected both 
the U.S. and Japan would be most suitable. My original choice was the Asian 
Economic Crisis of the late 1990s. Thus, I started to compare the U.S., Japanese, 
and South Korean newspaper accounts of the Asian economic crisis. I found 
through my pilot study that there was a stark difference among the U.S., Japanese 
and South Korean print medias portrayals of the economic crisis, similar to the 
differences in reporting on U.S.-Japan trade frictions and the Enola Gay 
controversy. While I was conducting my pilot study on the crisis, the Iraq War 
began. Since the war appeared to be a much more important issue for the 
international community, I switched topics. Still, the differences in media 
portrayals of international issues were further attested to by my pilot comparative 
content analysis as is explained in the next section. 
 
Section 3 A Pilot Study: Comparing articles about the Asian Economic Crisis 
Asian economic problems have raised international political and 
economic concerns. Beginning in the early 1990s, Japan and South Korea 
experienced profound economic downturns. Scholars wondered whether the 
collapse and reorganization of some of the once-mighty South Korean chaebols 




the Asian miracle (Woo and Sachs 2000).  There have been contending diagnoses 
as to the causes of the crisis, most centering on government and policy failures, 
regional financial instabilities, and more deeply, the crony capitalism of Asian 
markets (Wade 1998, Kang 2002, Pempel 1999). The media in the U.S., Japan 
and South Korea attempted to analyze the crisis, pinpoint its origins, explore 
possible reforms, and recast "the Asian miracle," the term used to trumpet the 
shining stars of the East Asian model viewed as Western capitalism in Asia. 
Touted as a model for the developing world not so long ago, the "East Asian 
model" was brought into question---at least in the U.S. media.  
My study compared how major American, Japanese, and South Korean 
newspapers portrayed the economic downturn of Japan and South Korea and their 
subsequent economic reforms (1997-1999) and investigated how the same 
issues were portrayed by these countries. The pilot study limited the period of 
analysis to three months: December 1997; June 1998: and January 1999 and 
compared how major American, Japanese, and Korean newspapers constructed 
images of the Asian economic crisis and the following reforms. The pilot study 
limited the newspapers to be analyzed to the New York Times and the Washington 
Post for the U.S.; the Kyodo News Service for Japan; and the Chosun Ilbo and the 
Korea Times for South Korea. 
 Except for the Chosun Ilbo, all articles were from the Lexis-Nexis 
database and written in English. Articles of the Chosun Ilbo were analyzed from 
the daily American edition of the paper (written in Korean). After excluding 




analyzed were as follows (December 1997; June 1998: and January 1999): The 
New York Times (19,5,2) and The Washington Post (19, 7, 2); the Kyodo News 
Service (48, 27,19); and South Korea: the Chosun Ilbo (102, 53, 39), The Korea 
Times (66, 20, 16). From this we can see that the South Korean papers paid most 
concern to this problem and American papers the least. Obviously, South Korea 
was the center of the economic downturn; thus, the South Korean media showed 
the most concern. The Japanese media also showed interest in the news, partly 
because the economic impact on Japan was huge, and partly because Japan is in 
close proximity to South Korea.  
Also, this pilot study found that the same issue was portrayed 
differently. According to my study of the Washington Post and the New York 
Times coverage, the American medias view of Japanese economic problems 
appears to have reflected the position of the American government. The American 
media reported the Japanese economic reform mostly in terms of its influence on 
the U.S. economy, thereby justifying quick rescue packages, including increased 
spending on public works and a series of tax cuts. At the same time, one of the 
frequent themes of the articles was the inefficiency of the Japanese economic 
system and inappropriate policy maneuvering by the Japanese government. 
Another major theme was a challenge to the belief in the "Asian economic 
model," suggesting that the Asian model is no more than "crony capitalism."    
The Kyodo news in Japan responded to the economic reform from a 
different standpoint from that of the U.S. media. While Japan's medias coverage 




support the idea of investing on spending on public works and a series of tax cuts 
as strongly as the American newspapers. More significantly, the Japanese media 
frequently framed the news of the economic reform in terms of economic 
conflicts between Japan and the United States. Typically, the Kyodo News Service 
suggested that the Japanese government was being reactive to and controlled by 
gaiatsu (U.S. foreign pressure). This "gaiatsu schema" was very salient at the 
time of the "bridge bank" policy discussion in the summer of 1998. Using this 
schema, the hegemonic image of the American economic superpower dominated 
over an extended period of reporting (the functions of "gaiatsu" will be further 
explained in Chapter 2) 
In a quite different vein, Korean newspapers (the Chosun Ilbo, the Korea 
Times) frequently constructed "self-reflective" images, criticizing the impractical 
business practices of the chaebols and corruption in the government. The Korean 
media portrayed their nation as positively and resolutely accepting the IMF 
imposed mandatory economic reform. Along with hopeful reports on the advent 
of the new political leader, Kim Dae Jung, the Korean media frequently framed 
the issues in terms of a "metamorphosis" of the nation. 
Section 4 Overview of the Dissertation 
My two personal experiences and the pilot study I conducted on the 
Asian economic crisis suggest that the same issues are often portrayed 




conclusions (Chang and Wang 1998, Soesilo and Wesburn 1994). These studies 
and other related works will be explained in detail in Chapter 2.  
 This dissertation explores news stories about the war in Iraq. 
Specifically, the study investigates the relationship between the media and politics 
in the case of the Iraq War by extensively analyzing the content of two leading 
U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi Shimbun 
(henceforce, the Asahi).. I choose them because the two print media have similar 
status in their own countries. Both newspapers arguably are the most respected in 
their country. They have the reputation of quality papers among their countries 
news media and are widely read by decision-makers. Also, both are leading 
newspapers whose circulations are one of the largest in their respective countries. 
Further, it is a well-known fact that both papers are considered to be politically 
liberal in relation to other papers.  
 The study employs both quantitative and qualitative content analysis 
methods, and uses an interdisciplinary approach, combining insights from 
political science and media studies. Because comparative media studies are a 
relatively new field, it is necessary to draw on theory coming from multiple 
academic disciplines. 
This dissertation asks whether the same realities (developments about 
the war in Iraq) are portrayed similarly, and if not, what kind of factors influence 
a papers characterization of events. There are three main research questions. 
First, how similar or different are the articles about the Iraq War in the Asahi and 




similarities in the articles about the war between these two liberal papers? Third, 
what are the ramifications of the differences and similarities in media content? 
Especially how much is public opinion in both the U.S. and Japan influenced by 
the differences and similarities in media content?  
 
This dissertation consists of eleven chapters. The first chapter is the 
introduction to the whole study, explains the goals of this project, and provides an 
overview of each chapter. The second chapter covers the foundations on which 
this dissertation is built. It clarifies the basic approaches used in comparative 
media studies and explains findings from related studies. The chapter first stresses 
the importance of cultural sensitivities in conducting comparison across cultures. 
It examines studies by Peter Winch and debates over positivism. Since the area of 
study of this dissertation is political communication studies, this chapter also 
clarifies a range of theories of political communications. A major focus is on the 
contributions of earlier comparative analyses in the field of political 
communication. In this chapter, the relationship between the media and politics is 
also explored in detail. The chapter first briefly reviews timelines of the Iraq War. 
Then, the chapter explains political communication during the Iraq War. Special 
focus is placed on the role of the media in the process of making foreign policy 
and during the Iraq War as both cheerleader and watchdog of the war.  
Chapter three explains the research design, research questions, hypotheses, 
and the goal of this study. This chapter also explains the methodologies used to 




Overall, 4624 Asahi and 4320 New York Times articles were selected from both 
newspapers.   
The main methodology used was content analysis, one of the most 
frequently used methodologies in political communication research to make 
generalizations about the content of the news in newspaper and electronic media. 
The chapter explains both quantitative and qualitative content analysis, 
complementary methodologies. Quantitative content analysis is a powerful tool 
for revealing certain trends and tendencies in articles because they can be clearly 
displayed in numbers. Qualitative content analysis focuses on the background of 
the texts. Qualitative analysis of newspapers sheds light on the untold portions of 
the quantitative content analysis.  
In order to systematically analyze the stories in the two newspapers, a 
code system was developed. The coding and other important aspects of content 
analysis used are fully explained in this chapter. The chapter also explains the 
basic strategies of the interviews. This dissertation uses interviews in determining 
the reasons for differences and similarities of the news content in the two papers.  
After clarifying the above-mentioned three research questions, the 
hypotheses of this research are explained. The content analysis in the following 
chapters reveals that the two media presented quite different accounts of the Iraq 
War. Three hypotheses are presented to explain the reasons for the difference 
between the two medias coverage. The first hypothesis focuses on the difference 
in the relationship between the media and politics in the two countries. The 




and public opinion. Finally, the research goals and possible contributions of this 
work are presented.  
Chapter four summarizes the results of the content analysis and compares 
the basic tendencies between the two papers. This chapter corresponds to the first 
research question of this dissertation and provides the explanation for the 
differences and similarities of the two papers accounts of the Iraq War. I use 
several figures and examples in order to illustrate the findings. There are six 
points of comparison. First, the major topics and key concepts of the war are 
explored. The main topics are literally the most important ingredients of the 
newspaper articles. Second, major actors are analyzed from the two papers 
articles. Third, positive-negative portrayals of each actor are examined. Special 
attention will be paid to the two papers positive-negative portrayals of the U.S. 
decision to initiate the Iraq War. Fourth, the sources and quotations of the articles 
are explored.  
This chapter reveals that the New York Times and the Asahi present fairly 
dissimilar news content. In the analysis of negativity of particular actors, for 
example, the Asahi was very negative toward the U.S. invasion into Iraq in most 
articles throughout the period of examination. Positive articles toward the U.S. 
decision are almost non-existent. In contrast, the New York Times position 
changed overtime. The New York Times first carried more positive articles than 
negative. Only over time did the coverage converge in tone with that found in the 





Chapters five to seven focus on specific topics and periods, and types of 
articles. Chapter four specifically focuses on the run-up period of the war. This 
chapter reveals that the two allies media have quite distinctive treatments of the 
war, especially their rationalization of the cause of the Iraq War, the role and the 
power of the United Nations in relation to the war, and the degree of intensity in 
the coverage of civilian causalities and anti-war movements, among other things. 
This chapter concludes that even the same or similar phenomenon are sometimes 
quite differently portrayed by the two media. 
Chapter six extensively compares editorials of the two papers during the 
period of the actual battle. Editorials are regarded as the best place to look at the 
qualitative similarities and differences of the two papers because editorials 
express opinions rather than attempts to simply report news. According to the 
content analysis, it seems that the Asahi believes that starting a war is the worst 
and most sinful action that can be taken by humankind. This is because many 
innocent lives are lost and the livelihoods of families are destroyed. By contrast, 
the New York Times regarded the threat posed to international security by Saddam 
Hussein as almost sinful. Saddam Hussein, the despotic leader who might have 
weapons of mass destructions, was portrayed as an evildoer. Although both 
papers notion of sin and evil gravitates around the possibility of endangerment of 
people, the Asahi focused more attention on the killings that were occurring as a 
result of the war while the New York Times paid more attention to the prevention 




Chapter seven specifically analyzes the articles written by embedded 
journalists, both from the U.S. and Japan during the actual major battle (from 
March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003). This chapter concludes that while embedded 
journalists produced articles that are sometimes similar in their personal and 
realistic descriptions of the events they saw and in their focus on daily activities in 
the field, there were nevertheless significant disparities in their formats and the 
degree of sympathy they showed the coalition forces. 
As discussed in chapters four to seven, the results of the content analyses 
of the Asahi and the New York Times during the period of the Iraq War reveal that 
the major liberal newspapers in both Japan and America have quite different 
portrayals of the U.S. policies over Iraq. Both previous studies suggest that even 
the same or similar phenomenon are sometimes quite differently portrayed by the 
two media. While the Asahi was always strongly negative, the New York Times 
was supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, the New York 
Times also became gradually critical of U.S. government actions. Nevertheless, 
even in this later stage, the two papers were quite different in the degree of their 
negativity and in terms of the topics they focused on. 
This suggests a real puzzle. The United States and Japan have one of the 
most close alliances in the world.  Japan cannot survive without the protection of 
the U.S. military in East Asia. Because of the US-Japan security treaty, Japan has 
been protected by the military umbrella of the United States. Thus, the Japanese 
government has been reluctant to oppose the United States on foreign policy 




government had only one choice: It supported the war from the beginning and 
become part of the coalition of the willing. The two countries have strong 
economic ties as well. Also, U.S. popular culture, such as movies, television 
programs, and music, have tremendously influenced Japanese psyche. 
Considering the political and economic proximity between the United States and 
Japan one would expect more similarity in their media portray of issues.  What 
explains the major differences that have been found? A major portion of the 
remainder of this dissertation deals with this puzzle.  
Chapters eight to ten examine the reasons for the differences of the two 
papers coverage of the Iraq War. These three chapters address the second 
research question of this dissertation and explore why the accounts of the two 
papers have the particular tendencies that are discussed in chapters four to seven. 
Why at times were the differences in coverage so large? Do the 
disparities reflect the different public opinions of the two countries? Or, should 
they be attributed to the different organizational characteristics of the Asahi or the 
New York Times? Is it a possibility that their governments different positions on 
the war led to dissimilar accounts? Do differences in the relationship between 
politics and the media, including those that have emerged to do historical 
experiences with media censorship, generate particular styles in reporting? Are 
there any factors that may be rooted in these countries cultures or traditions? 
Chapters eight to ten examine each of these questions based on data, findings 




Chapter eight clarifies the differences between American and Japanese 
political communication systems. First, the chapter discusses differences and 
similarities in the relationship between the media and politics in the two countries. 
Both the media in Japan and the U.S. have strong impacts on their countries 
politics; the media and political worlds have interdependent relationships in both 
nations. There are, however, several dissimilar points. One of these is the 
difference in the political system itself. Japan has a parliamentary system versus 
the U.S. strict separation of powers. There is something almost akin to one party 
rule in Japan versus a competitive two-party system in the United States.  
Beyond this, this chapter compares the national security policies and 
public relations activities of the two countries. Japans and the United States 
roles in the international order are, of course, quite different. Since the end of 
World War II, Japan has been the closest ally of the United States in the Pacific 
Rim. Their military powers, however, are quite dissimilar. The United States is 
the only remaining hegemon; Japanese military annual expenditure is less than 
nine percent of that of the United States. Further, media ownership rules are 
different between the two countries, thus, the public relations activities by their 
government is quite different in terms of military strategies. 
Along with these differences, this chapter focuses on the historical 
experience of the Japanese media during and after World War II, examining how 
the concept of war has come to be negatively perceived and anti-militarism has 
come to be shared by both the media and the public. Especially, it demonstrates 




jingoistic government during World War II. This proved to be a traumatic reality 
for them after Japans defeat. Large parts of the argument in this chapter are based 
on interviews with Japanese scholars. 
Chapter nine focuses on cultural differences between Japan and the 
United States. The main claim in this chapter is that the cultural differences about 
the notion of warfare may create a different perspective among the two countries 
journalists and citizens. This chapter uses the concept of social construction and 
suggests that the different accounts of the war by the two papers can be attributed 
to the fact that different realities of evilness are socially constructed between 
the two countries. First, this chapter explains the theories of social construction of 
realities. Then, I refer to C. Fred Alfords study about South Koreans notion of 
evilness and apply his findings to the difference between Japan and the United 
States about the concept of the Iraq War. Third, this chapter discusses the 
different notions of evilness that are portrayed in the articles of the Asahi and 
the New York Times. After reviewing the results of this content analysis, I 
conclude this chapter by suggesting that the notion of evilness is socially 
constructed in the two countries. I reach this conclusion after conducting several 
interviews with Japanese scholars and journalists. 
Chapter ten quantitatively analyzes the difference in public opinion 
between the two nations. Drawing data from public opinion polls, I use statistical 
methods to analyze the congruence between the trends of news about the war and 
changes in public opinion. Chapter ten also touches on the third research question 




news content about the Iraq War across the Pacific. Finally, this chapter explains 
the so what? question: Why is it important that two representative print media 
organizations in Japan and the U.S. portray different realities in the Iraq War? 
And how does the difference affect governments and citizens in each country and 
the international community? The difference in media portrayals of the same 
issues matters because it creates different reactions from the public and this 
eventually can affect the public policy process.  
This chapter responds to these questions mainly by exploring the media's 
agenda-setting functions. The media is generally assumed to be an important 
factor in shaping public opinion. At the same time, the contents of the media are 
presumed to be reflective of public opinion: the media in this view is tantamount 
to public opinion. Also, the influence of the media on the policy process is 
enormous. To those who are involved in politics, public opinion polls send signals 
regarding new policies. Thus, the difference in portrayal of the war can potentially 
have a very important impact on public opinion and the political agenda. This 
chapter explores the connection between the media agenda (the main topics 
covered by the media) and public opinion using various polls. This chapter finds 
that there is a strong connection between the media agenda and citizens attitudes 
toward their governments, as well as governments overseas. At the same time, the 
chapter explains that it is not easy to determine the medias impact on public 
opinion because there are many other factors that also shape public opinion. 
Chapter eleven summarizes the whole work. This chapter first argues the 




study shows that the two allies major print media have quite distinctive 
treatments of the war, especially their rationalization of the cause of the Iraq War, 
the role and the power of the United Nations in relation to the war, and the degree 
of intensity in the coverage of civilian causalities and anti-war movements, among 
other things. Moreover, the content analyses found that both the New York Times 
and the Asahi have different characterization of the actors involved in the war. 
The New York Times portrayed that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as an 
embodiment of evil and the United Nations as an incompetent organization, which 
could not stop this evildoer from potentially using weapons of mass destruction. 
According to the paper, the United States, therefore, had to actively engage in 
Iraq. In contrast, the Asahi portrayed the United States as a warmonger whose 
bellicose desires threaten the world. According to the Asahi, the United Nations 
had extended its full-fledged efforts to halt Americas pugnacious attempts to 
invade Iraq, but to no avail. According to the Asahi, Hussein is a dictator, but the 
paper defined the United States as a bigger evil than the Iraqi President. The stark 
differences are attributable to the different notions of evilness in the two 
countries. The chapter also emphasizes the fact that the medias impact is 
significant in shaping public policy, the political agenda, and public opinion. 
Along with reviewing the major findings of the previous chapters, this 
chapter discusses possible future research related to this dissertation. Further 
analysis will be needed to fill in the gaps of my arguments as well as extending 




Chapter 2: Literature Review: Comparing Different Cultures, 
Comparative Analysis of Political Communication, the Iraq 
War and the Media, and U.S. and Japanese Foreign Policies 
 
This chapter reviews theories and studies related to this dissertation. The 
chapter addresses a wide range of literature because this dissertation is 
interdisciplinary. The chapter explores the difficulty of comparing different 
cultures. Then, it considers major theories and conducts a literature review of 
relevant works from political communication, including comparative studies. In 
addition, this chapter reviews the relationship between the media and politics 
during the Iraq War. The chapter first briefly reviews the timeline of the Iraq War. 
Then, special focus is given to the role of the media in the process of making 
foreign policy and explores the medias role during the Iraq War both as 
cheerleader and as watchdog of the war.  
 
Section 1 Difficulties in Understanding Different Cultures: Peter Winchs 
Arguments of Cultural Sensitivities 
Since societal factors are one of the major agents of social construction, 
cross-cultural comparison faces the very fundamental and difficult question about 
the role of culture in language. The question is centered upon language and its 




exists in the language being compared. Even if an individual finds a similar 
concept or word in another language, there is always the possibility that the word 
has quite a different cultural context and its meaning may be different. Thus, it is 
imperative to be sensitive in understanding the usage of words in a specific 
culture. A scholar who attempts to compare cultural artifacts needs to have 
sensitivity to the culture of the societies from which those artifacts come; the 
same is true for words. 
 
Subsection 1 Peter Winchs Criticism of Positivism 
Cultural sensitivity toward a different society has been a matter of heated 
discussion. One of the most significant arguments about cultural sensitivity is 
Peter Winch's criticism of positivism in the social sciences. Winch claims that 
social science will fail to successfully understand human actions as long as it 
employs the same kind of justification as the natural sciences, such as setting 
certain criteria to judge human actions in other cultures. Winch, whose analysis is 
based on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, argues that we should not view a 
society through our own pre-set standards of judgment. Thus, Winch suggests that 
the best way to avoid misunderstanding a society that seems quite different from 
our own is to try to approach the society from the inside and to establish rational 
criteria that are specific to that culture.  
In his seminal article, Understanding a Primitive Society (1964), 
Winch explains this argument by critiquing E. E. Evans-Pritchard's 




people living in central Africa (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 1976). The centerpiece of 
Winchs argument is a critical analysis of Evans-Pritchard's findings related to the 
Azandes alien practices of witchcraft, magical medicine, and oracles.  
The scientific method of investigation used by Evans-Pritchard led him 
to argue that there are no relations of cause and effect in the beliefs and practices 
of the Azande. Evans-Pritchard critically pronounced that their belief in the 
existence of witches is false, magical medicine is illusionary, and oracles are 
ineffective. Winch claims, however, that this conclusion was not fair to Azande 
society, and that Evans-Pritchard is crucially wrong. This is because of the 
difference in the concept of objective reality between Western and Azande 
societies.  Winch elucidates: 
 
Evans-Pritchard, although he emphasizes that a member of scientific 
culture has a different conception of reality from that of a Zande believer 
in magic, wants to go beyond merely registering this fact and make the 
scientific conception agree with what reality actually is like, whereas the 
magical conception does not. (308) 
 
Winch challenges the philosophy of the social sciences. According to 
Winch, Evans-Pritchard applies a criterion which is appropriate to the evaluation 
of technology in relation to social practices, but which does not play a 




Pritchards preoccupation with a positivistic approach. Winch questions the 
dogma of the social sciences:  
 
We may ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with reality 
and test this by observation and experiment. Given the experimental 
methods, and the established use of the theoretical terms entering into the 
hypothesis, then the question whether it holds or not is settled by reference 
to something independent of what I, or anybody else, care to think. But, 
the general nature of the data revealed by the experiment can only be 
specified in terms of criteria built into the methods of experiment 
employed and these, in turn, make sense only to someone who is 
conversant with the kind of scientific activity within which they are 
employed. . . . What Evans-Pritchard wants to be able to say is that the 
criteria applied in scientific experimentation constitute a true link between 
our ideas and an independent reality, whereas those characteristic of other 
systems of thought---in particular, magical methods of thoughtdo not.  
(309)  
 
Winch holds that the reason why a Western scholar, such as Evans-
Pritchard, often regards magic as an irrelevant form of technology is that the 
scholar draws his explanations from his own culture. According to Winch, 
Western culture is a culture whose conception of reality is deeply affected by the 




In order to remove the stereotypes derived from our own culture, Winch 
suggests that the conception of reality must be applicable outside the context of 
scientific reasoning. Although concept of witchcraft, oracle, and magic in 
Western culture is a perversion of other orthodox concepts both in religious and 
scientific sense, it has, according to Winch, reality in Zande culture. Winch 
notes, A Zande would be utterly lost and bewildered without his oracle. The 
mainstay of his life would be lacking. It is rather as if an engineer, in our society, 
were asked to build a bridge without mathematical calculation, or a military 
commander to mount an extensive coordinated attack without the use of clocks. 
(311)  
Comparing them with Western society, Winch suggests a different role 
for primitive practices in Zande life. Winch implies that Evans-Pritchard may 
underestimate the religious depth of traditional mystical practices of the Azande.  
Winch sees Zande magic, like Christian prayer, as expressing certain attitudes 
about the contingencies of life: 
 
I do not say that Zande magical rites are at all like Christian prayers of 
supplication in the positive attitude to contingencies, which they express. 
What I do suggest is that they are alike in that they do, or may, express an 
attitude to contingencies, rather than an attempt to control these. (321) 
 
Winchs answer to the intelligibility of religion and of cross-cultural 




is because language usage in a society has its own methods and standards. In The 
Idea of Social Science (1958), Winch stresses the importance of language. In 
Winchs view, language is not only a tool of analysis, but also the indispensable 
access to reality. This is because in discussing language we are in fact discussing 
what counts as belonging to the world. Our idea of what belongs to the realm of 
reality is given for us in the language we use (11-12). 
Winchs assertions are not completely free from problems. I believe 
cultural relativism may hinder his view. However, it is true that cultural 
sensitivity toward different societies is a very basic requirement for a scholar 
conducting any kind of cross-cultural study.  
 
Subsection 2  Debates between Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Others 
It is important to note that Winch's work continues to be seen as seminal 
and that his critique of positivism and especially its emphasis on scientific 
methods still holds true. One of the most famous and most heated discussions 
over positivism is observed between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. In his major 
work, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, originally published in 1959 (2002), 
Popper suggests that the principle of induction cannot be purely logical like a 
tautology or an analytic statement because inductive inferences are only 
probable inferences (28, 29). Thus, Popper argues that the true aim of the 
scientist should not be to prove hypotheses as true, but to prove them false. 




rejected. Falsification also requires a hypothesis. According to Popper, knowledge 
grows not through simple observation, but through the imaginative formulation of 
a hypothesis and its test. Popper believes that falsification emerges as the point of 
demarcation between science and non-science, and that only empirical tests can 
play a role in the development of knowledge (57-73). In this way, Popper holds 
that scientific advancement is achieved. His doctrine of falsifiability is important 
to a post-positivist view of scientific activity, and it has a particularly noticeable 
influence on research methods in the social sciences, including political science.  
Although Popper rejects simple inductivism in science, his assertion is 
based on traditional views of positivism (or so-called post-positivism) in 
comparison with Kuhn (Fuller 2004; Ruddock, 26-36, 2001). Like other 
positivists, Popper believes that truth exists out there, and that it is available as 
a basis for a genuine scientific theory, if approached correctly. In his major work, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 1996), Kuhn suggests that scientific 
advancement does not occur the way Popper explains it, but rather results from a 
series of paradigm shifts. Kuhn argues that scientific advancement is not 
evolutionary, but rather is a "series of peaceful interludes punctuated by 
intellectually violent revolutions," and in those revolutions "one conceptual world 
view is replaced by another" (10). Instead of seeing the history of science as a 
natural progression towards ultimate truth, Kuhn regards it as a long series of 
conflicts between different and competing ways to process data and explain 
results. The transformations resulting from the conflicts are gradual as old beliefs 




With regard to the theory of a paradigm, there is a parallel between 
Winch and Kuhn. There is a clear resemblance in Winch and Kuhns views about 
societal impacts on the formation of a concept. Winch illustrates with the 
conceptual development of the theory of disease. Winch argues this 
development:  
 
involved the adoption of new ways of doing things by people involved, in 
one way or another, in medical practice. An account of the way in which 
social relations in the medical profession had been influenced by this new 
concept would include an account of what that concept was. Conversely, 
the concept itself is unintelligible apart from its relations to medical 
practice (Winch 1958, 122).   
 
Just as Poppers idea of falsifiability has wielded a huge influence on 
research methods, Winch and Kuhns notion of scientific development affected 
many scholars ideas about how to conduct research. Many scholars, both in the 
social sciences and humanities, have followed strikingly similar approaches to 
that of Winch. Especially in the field of cultural anthropology, many studies are 
conducted from viewpoints similar to Winchs. One example is a series of studies 
by Clifford Geertz. Geertzs famous observation of a Balinese cockfight is based 
on the investigation of the language-game of the society that Winch emphasizes 
as so important (Geertz 1972). In order to properly understand the cultural 




a part of the Balinese culture. According to Geertz, the only way to understand the 
meanings of various expressive forms is to observe them in a particular context. 
Using this methodology, Geertz finds the cockfights vital meanings for the 
Balinese. For example, cockfights are well attended events by men only, which is 
significant to their notion of masculinity. Also, bets are taken on these events, 
although the money isnt all that is at stake. Further, Geertz discovers Balinese 
conceptions of the State and divinity based on the cockfight. Geertz concludes 
that the fight is a central symbolical structure of Balinese society. 
In the field of social science, several research methodologies, mainly 
qualitative methodologies, follows the notion of scientific development advocated 
by Winch and Kuhn. One of those most typical research methods is participant 
observation. Participant observation is a popular and widely used research method 
and requires close involvement with a given group of individuals and observation 
of their activities in their natural environment. An observer should immerse 
his/herself in the culture of a given society as fully as possible over extended 
periods of time. Participant observation originated in cultural anthropology, but 
because of its recognized validity, social scientists, including political scientists, 
use the same method. An example of participant observation in contemporary 
political science is a seminal study by Richard Fenno. Fenno has studied members 
of Congress by following them around on their visits to their states and districts, 
trying to blend in with the members environments (Fenno 1978). Fennos 
description of his work as soaking and poking (Fenno 1978, 249) has became 




Glaser, who undertook participant observation, have utilized some of the lessons 
from Fennos projects, such as the know-hows of establishing and developing 
rapport, and keeping intellectual distance from the object observed (Fenno 1978, 
1990; Glaser 1996). 
 
Section 2 Political Communications 
As a theoretical framework, it is necessary to review previous studies of 
political communication. Political communication is an emerging subfield of 
political science. The widening of the subfield can be attributed to the gradual 
change surrounding our political process. Specifically, the media has come to be 
more and more involved in virtually all aspect of the political process; thus, the 
relationships between the mass media and political actors have been undergoing a 
transformation over the past few decades. Looking at the transference of political 
models and theories across political systems, researchers of political 
communication as well as other subfields of political science have broadened their 
perspectives.  
Political communication is defined as the process by which a government, 
the media, and citizenry exchange and confer meaning upon messages that relate 
to a wide scope of politics and society (Perloff 1998, 8). To put it differently, 
political communication is a transactional process of messages among political 
actors. The messages are concerned broadly with the governance or the conduct 




The study of political communication analyzes the construction, sending, 
receiving, and processing of political messages (Arota and Lasswell 1969). The 
message senders may be journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, members of interest 
groups, or private unorganized citizens. The recipients can be citizens as well as 
political actors, such as politicians. Since the senders can be the message 
recipients, and vice versa, political messages always create interdependent 
relationships between the message senders and recipients. 
A distinguishing characteristic of a political communication study is that a 
political message is the center of attention. Political communication scholars 
investigate political messages which provide political effect on the thinking, 
beliefs, and behaviors of individuals, groups, institutions, and whole societies in 
which they exist. The impact may be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed. 
Direct messages may relate to political activities, such as an appeal for votes, or 
an appeal for support of a particular policy. In the indirect mode, messages may 
create images of reality that affect political thinking and action by political elites 
and the public at large. The impact of messages can be manifested quickly by 
instant public opinion polls conducted after a televised political debate (e.g., 
Jamieson and Birdsell 1988). The power of messages, however, may be latent and 
observed later. In a series of famous cultivation analyses, George Gerbner 
argues that political messages from the media have gradually shaped our political 
orientationswhether we pay particular attention to the messages or not. 
According to Gerbner, this is because people consume vast amounts of 




such thing as a light viewer of television in terms of the medias impact (e.g., 
Gerbner et al. 1982). 
Although political communication is one of the oldest areas of political 
studies, as a sub-disciplinary area of political science it is one of the youngest. 
Nimmo and Sanders (1981) suggest in their seminal Handbook of Political 
Communication that political communication emerged as distinctly cross-
disciplinary in the 1950s. Despite its newness, it has made remarkably fast 
progress in exploring a variety of topics, such as analyzing communication by 
political leaders, examining images created by the mass media and other sources, 
and probing how people process information. The relevance of political 
communication in particular has emerged with the rapid growth of the media, 
especially television. Nowadays, it is perhaps an understatement to declare that 
mass media plays a pervasive role in political life in industrial nations. 
It might be a common misunderstanding that political communication is 
concerned only with elections. This is because political communication research 
has developed with the growth of election studies. Elections provide unique 
opportunities for political communication scholars to analyze the relationship 
between the media, politics, and society. Specifically, each election produces 
numbers of significant panel studies and other kinds of surveys, many of which 
satisfy the demands of scholars who seek an ample amount of data to analyze the 
impact of political messages.  
 Indeed, the history of political communication research is akin to the 




mid-1940s in the United States, they were based largely on the hypodermic 
(needle) hypothesis In contrast to the view that audiences are active, 
hypodermic hypothesis, also known as the bullet hypothesis, was predicated 
on the notion of audience passivity. Exposure to media messages were equated 
with its absorption by the receiver in its original form (Greenberg and Salwen 
1996, 64-65). 
Armed with the hypodermic theory, political scientists began to 
investigate the impact of mass media stories on voting decisions. They expected 
media impact to be profound. Unfortunately for the progress of political 
communication research, the voting studies, including epoch-making works by 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), Berelson et al. (1954), and Campbell et al. (1960) did not 
find the expected effects. Consequently, hypodermic theory became discredited 
and "minimal effects" theory came into fashion. According to minimal effects 
theory as applied primarily to mass media messages, election news was 
insignificant, compared to other choice criteria such as party identification or 
group allegiance.  
Studies of mass media influence on elections have rekindled since the 
1970s. This is largely because the notion of media impotence in election contests 
was contradictory to the "minimal effects" theory (Patterson and McClure 1976, 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987). The investigations into media influence, rather than 
looking for universal effects, tried to discover under what conditions effects might 
occur. For instance, interested voters and political experts might be more and 




This new approach to research, which confirmed such differential effects, 
coincided with major social and political changes that affected the interaction 
between media and politics (e.g. Owen 1991).  
 When questions arose about the impact of political advertising during 
elections, numerous researchers turned their attention to this long neglected array 
of messages (Diamond and Bates 1988). Advertising content has been examined, 
with particular emphasis on the balance between issues and images and on the 
messages conveyed by visual images. Political commercials also appear to be an 
important source of information for disinterested, poorly informed voters (Owen 
1991, Maeshima 2005).  
Although political communication research has centered on election 
studies, the subfield has become more and more inclusive in its scope and 
methods. Political communication has become increasingly interdisciplinary 
because the questions raised by it require political scientists to draw on sister 
disciplines, such as political psychology and comparative politics, as well as to go 
outside the field of politics, for example to rhetorical communications and 
journalism theories. Thus, the conceptual underpinnings of political 
communication studies are diverse and largely borrowed from these sister 
disciplines.  
Psychological analysis has been used by political communication scholars 
since the early 1980s. How human beings process political information is their 
main concern. Media stimuli are transformed by audiences who bring their own 




content. The psychological approach is grounded in a variety of information-
processing theories. Among them, schema theories are currently enjoying the 
broadest support. According to these theories, people develop mental models 
about various aspects of their world on the basis of direct experiences and 
information transmitted by the mass media and other sources. Such schemata 
guide information selection, provide the framework for assimilating new 
information, and furnish the basis for developing repertoires of inferences (Graber 
1988).  
Political scientists and communication scholars disagree about whether 
media content is shaped primarily by proponents reflecting the right or left side of 
the ideological spectrum. Scholars like Robert and Linda Lichter and Stanley 
Rothman (1986) have argued that media elites who work for the leading news 
media lean to the political left, relying on sources holding biased views. Scholars 
like Lance Bennet (1988) and Benjamin Ginsberg (1986) consider media to be the 
minions of big business and right-wing politicians. They suggest news selections 
by the media have strengthened white middle class values and suppress 
competing left-wing views. Some critics, most notably Noam Chomsky (1988), 
contend that these choices are made deliberately to perpetuate a capitalist 
exploitation of the masses in line with the ideological preferences of media 
owners.  
Relating to these ideology issues, the normative gatekeeping role of 
journalists is also a matter of scholarly concern. The notion of gatekeeping or 




been widely used to describe the process by which selections are made in media 
work, especially decisions whether or not to admit a particular news story to pass 
through the gates of a news medium and into the news channels. As a 
gatekeeper, reporters select the sources and news stories according to their 
criteria of newsworthiness and the degrees of fitness to the stories they believe 
ought to be reported. 
The medias normative role of watchdogs or gatekeepers, however, has 
been changing. As discussed later in Section 3, Larry Sabato suggests that the 
"watchdog" function of the media has significantly waned. According to Sabato, 
the media in the United States changed into "junkyard-dog" journalism since the 
1980s. In the "junkyard-dog" journalism, the media often relies on rumor and 
gossip or focuses on irrelevant subjects (Sabato 1993).  
Also, the media organizations arguably have been much influenced by their 
business motives. The media in the United States is increasingly owned by a few 
very large multinational corporations. Media organizations have to compete 
harder to reach their audiences in order to survive. The merger and acquisitions of 
the whole U.S. media has created a media monopoly, as Ben Bagdikian calls it. 
According to Bagdikian (2004), America's daily newspapers, magazines, radio 
and television stations, book publishers, and movie companies dwindled at first 
from 50 down to 10 to now stand at only 5. Because of business interests, Kurtz 
(1994, 1997) argues that the distinction between traditional journalism and 
entertainment became very blurred in the United States. Media organizations in 




the needs of their owners. In Japan, traditional journalism has turned more and 
more into an entertainment infotainment entity as well. Also, office holders and 
their aides have increased their capability to do their own spin. They 
deliberately manipulate the media and attempt to control political reactions. 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman (2006) argue that medias ability to 
report stories are very limited as opposed to the spin control of the politicians. 
Because of the changing environment between the press and politics, the 
journalists normative role of watchdogs or gatekeepers may be in peril. 
 
Section 3 Comparative Analysis of Political Communications 
One of the more exciting developments in recent years is that the political 
communication subfield has become more intercultural and has adopted new 
theories and methodologies to compare political communication systems across 
countries. Until the 1980s, most political communication scholars conducted their 
research only within one set of societal boundaries. Now, political communication 
researchers conduct more comparative research, examining the differences of 
media content and media systems that exist between or among nations.  
Comparative political communication studies examine political messages 
in diverse societies and study its effects and ramifications cross-culturally. It goes 
without saying that it is important to examine political communication systems 
from various cultural perspectives. Examining the relationship between politics 




alternatives and illuminates the virtues and shortcomings in our own political 
system. By taking us out of the network of assumptions and familiar arrangements 
within which we operate, comparative analysis helps expand our awareness of the 
possibilities of studies in political communication (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990). 
This is because it is assumed that different countries have different political and 
mass communication systems. Mass media reporting is closely associated to a 
countrys politics, society, culture, and public opinion.  It is widely believed that 
differences in political communication systems produce different media coverage 
(e.g., Blumler and Gurevitch 1975). 
Comparative analysis of political communication started with elections 
studies. Election messages and depictions of public officials have been compared 
in various countries (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, Semetko et al. 1991, Swanson 
and Mancini 1996). That literature paid particular attention to four key elements 
of the modern U.S. model of election campaigning that many countries have 
adopted in recent years. The four key elements in the U.S. model are: 1) the 
perpetual dependency (interdependency) of the mass media, 2) the personalization 
of campaigns (U.S.-style candidate-centered campaigns, as opposed to party-
centered traditional elections), 3) the frequent use of public opinion polls, and 4) 
a general professionalization of campaigns, such as the advent of election 
consultants. Looking at the four elements, scholars have examined the extent to 
which electoral politics in a particular country have been affected by the U.S. 
model (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, Semetko et al. 1991, Swanson and Mancini 




The comparative analysis of political communication has focused on other 
areas than elections as well. Regarding the government-media relationship, 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1996) point out that the media systems in different 
nations can be classified as more or less subordinate to, or autonomous from, 
political institutions, depending on the degree of state control over mass media 
organizations, the degree of media/political elite integration, and the nature of the 
legitimizing creed of media institutions (Blumler and Gurevitch 1996).  
Hallin and Mancini (2004) examine the principal dimensions of variation 
in media systems and the political variables based on a survey of media 
institutions in eighteen West European and North American countries. They 
develop three major models of media system development to explain why the 
media have played a different role in the politics of each of these systems: the 
Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist, and the Liberal models.  
According to Hallin and Mancini, the Liberal Model in Britain, Ireland 
and North America is characterized by a relative dominance of market 
mechanisms in media industry. In the Democratic Corporatist Model found in 
northern continental Europe the commercial media coexist with organized social 
and political groups. There is a relatively active but legally limited role for the 
government. The Polarized Pluralist Model found in the Mediterranean countries 
of southern Europe is characterized by a weak commercial media and a very 
strong government; the media tends to be integrated into party politics.  
Along with these theory-generating studies, many comparative case 




test the above-mentioned theories. Most of these studies are comparisons between 
the content of coverage of a specific event in two countries' representative media. 
Notably, many of these comparative case studies suggest that the government-
media relationship may significantly influence the differences and similarities in 
media content.  
Soesilo and Wesburn compare the accounts of the "Crisis in the Gulf" 
constructed by a leading American newspaper, the New York Times, and a leading 
Indonesian newspaper, Kompas. Their study suggests that the Indonesian 
newspaper discussed the position of the Iraqi government more frequently than 
did the New York Times. Also, it framed the news of the "Gulf Crises" in terms of 
its implications for the political economies of the Third World nations more than 
twice as often as it identified its implications for the West. In contrast, the New 
York Times discussed the position of the American government more frequently 
than the position of the government of Iraq in relation to Iraqs actions as a threat 
to the political economy of the West and, more generally, as a threat to world 
order, thereby legitimizing American policy--- at least in some Western eyes. In 
addition, both countries' leading newspapers exhibited their own patterns of 
selective omissions: While the Indonesian newspaper failed to cover alleged 
human rights violations and made no reference to the principle of sovereignty of 
nations in explaining the "crisis," The New York Times paid little attention to 
expressions of dissent over U.S. policy in the Gulf region prior to the outbreak of 
war. Soesilo and Wesburn attribute these differences to the relation between the 




and Iraq led its government to adopt a neutral position in the unfolding conflict. 
According to the scholars, Kompas, as a developmental press normatively 
committed to supporting the policies of its government, reported the crisis in ways 
that helped legitimate this stand (Soesilo and Wesburn 1994).  
Another intriguing study is about the comparison between Chinese and 
U.S. leading network news. Tsan-Kuo Chang and Jian Wang compared the 
television network news content between the United States' ABC World News 
Tonight with Peter Jennings with CCTV (China Central Television) News. 
According to these scholars, the domestic news on CCTV tended to be ritualistic 
and progressive in that events and issues often revolved around current national 
efforts and governmental activities or achievements in moving the country 
forward, including collective concern and action against such natural disasters as 
flood and drought. In contrast, ABC's domestic news avoided the trappings of 
dignitaries and civic boosterism, focusing instead on telling stories that drew upon 
and reproduced institutional and social structures. Its foreign news, on the other 
hand, exhibited a pattern that persistently built on American ideas and interests, 
especially in the stories about racial problems and homeless veterans. It was 
concluded that the selection and presentation of news by the two networks 
depended not so much on the properties of the event or issue itself, but rather on 
the medias positions in the broader social structure relative to their external 
context (Chang and Wang 1998).   
The methodologies and frameworks of comparative political 




politics case studies. A study by Maeshima (2003) focuses on the impacts of 
government industrial policies to adaptations of new technology in the media. The 
study compares the policies on High Definition Television (HDTV) development 
and standardization between Japan, the United States and Europe. The study 
attempts to analyze and compare the policies on HDTV development and 
standardization between Japan, the United States and Europe. The focus is on the 
degrees of governmental involvement in the HDTV industry and the relationship 
between the government and industry. 
The Japanese government took the lead role in promoting HDTV 
developments. Especially, the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) and the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), 
championed the new technology. Also, NHK, the Japanese public broadcasting 
corporation, played a pivotal role in development of the MUSE, a once-dominant 
analog HDTV standard. 
Japanese HDTV policies provide typical features of a developmental 
state, in which a state pursues a strategic approach to develop its economy. For 
instance, the intimate relationship between the government and the private sector, 
and the intensity of governmental involvement in the market have been clearly 
observed in the HDTV developments.  
In Europe, the European Research Coordinating Agency (EUREKA), 
government-industry consortium, had been the main driving force behind the 
pursuit of the European-originated HDTV standard, MAC. Its EUREKA-95 




characteristic of European HDTV policy is that it produced conflict between the 
European Union (EU) and EU member states and the electronic industries in the 
region. As a result, in 1991, the states and the industries formed Digital Video 
Broadcasting (DVB) Group, a new independent organization to promote digital 
television applications. Since then, the EUs leadership role in HDTV 
development greatly weakened. 
In contrast with Japan and the EU, the U.S. government has been 
reluctant to engage in the HDTV sector. Many government officials and members 
of Congress believe in the free-market approach to industrial development. The 
approach elucidates that governmental support is more effective when focused on 
creating an environment that promotes the competitive forces of the market. 
Nonetheless, in two specific periods, the U.S. government was relatively active in 
promoting HDTV technology. In the late 1980s, numerous calls were made for 
direct United States government initiatives to promote HDTV. Several bills then 
were submitted to Congress for government initiatives to promote HDTV. This 
was the period when international trade competition with Japan was getting fierce, 
and the possibility of military applications of the HDTV technology became 
viable.  
The U.S. government resumed its engagement in the HDTV market 
around 1999. The drastic change in the paradigm of the consumer market, most 
notably, the surge of interactive commerce, took place in this period, and the 
retooling of the existing HDTV policies became necessary. This study concludes 




factors that forced the U.S. government to become involved in the HDTV 
industry. 
As mentioned above, the comparative analysis of political communication 
has expanded its scope to the relationship between the media and governments. 
Also, the influence of media industry on politics has become a subject of analysis. 
Regarding the Iraq War, several scholars have started to analyze the relationship 
between the media and politics (e.g. Schechter 2003, Brandenburg 2005). Yet, 
most of these studies are concerned with situations within a boundary of one 
particular country, chiefly within the United States. There are only a few studies 
about the media and politics in the Iraq War from a comparative perspective 
(Aday, et.al.2005, Dimitrova et.al.2005). The next sections review the relationship 
between the media and politics during the Iraq War, including explanations found 
in the emerging literature on this subject.  
 
 
Section 4 The Iraq War, and U.S. and Japanese Foreign Policies about the War. 
The Iraq War (The war in Iraq, the Second Persian Gulf War, the Second 
Gulf War) was fought between a "Coalition of the Willing," consisting primarily 
of American and British forces, but also including Polish, Australian, and Iraqi 
forces. Approximately 250,000 United States troops, with support from 45,000 
British, and smaller forces from other nations, entered Iraq primarily through a 




of 1991, the U.S.-led forces dominated the early conflict, which officially started 
on March 20, 2003.  
The initial coalition attacks swiftly destroyed strategic targets in Iraq, and 
the entire nation of Iraq was brought under the control of U.S. and British forces 
in just over three weeks, with relatively little initial loss of coalition lives. 
President George W. Bush announced the end of official combat on May 1, 
2003. The official war lasted for 42 days. The announcement, however, failed 
to recognize the many ramifications of the war. The official war was only the 
beginning: Iraqi insurgent attacks dominated the news since then until, at least, 
the fall of 2005, when the content analysis for this dissertation was conducted. 
The official number of U.S. troops who have died in the Iraq war hit 2,000 on 
October 25, 2005 (White and Tyson 2005). According to the Iraq Body Count, the 
civilian death toll was between 26,000 and 30,000 by the end of October 2005. 
Kidnappings and subsequent murders of civilians from the United States and 
other allies, including Japan, have terrified audiences all over the world. The 
revelation of several military scandals, most notably the Abu Ghraib incidents, 
provided an occasion to reconsider the meaning of this war. Prior to the launch of 
the Iraq War, President Bush repeatedly suggested that the U.S.-led military 
actions have two missions: disarming Iraq and transforming it into a free and 
hopeful society. That second goal has yet to be seen as of June 2007.  
The Iraq War is not a popular battle to a large part of the international 
community, partly because the cause of the conflict itself is controversial and 




of the United Nations. According to critics, the Bush administration hastily started 
to attack Iraq without obtaining clear evidence. Husseins preparations for a 
nuclear attack, which was the main justification for the war, have not been found 
to date. Since Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq were not found, public 
distrust over the Iraq policy has grown. Further, the alleged connections between 
Al Qaeda and Iraq turned out to be incomplete and unreliable. Thus, many critics 
around the world suggest that the war was actually a purposeful act of invasion of 
Iraq. Prior to the war, so-called, neo-conservatives (the neo-cons) both inside and 
outside of the Bush administration clearly suggested the need for an aggressive 
military policy toward Iraq in order to secure the national interests of the United 
States. This has led to conspiracy theories that the Bush administration 
intentionally started the war in order to secure its Middle-East military dominance 
and energy security.  
During the period covered by this study, U.S. foreign policy took a new 
direction. After the 9-11 attacks, the Bush administration initiated new sets of 
policies in U.S. foreign relations, the so-called Bush doctrine. The Bush Doctrine 
seeks to retool the global order on the strength of overwhelming U.S. military 
might. The doctrine includes several elements. First is that the U.S. has the right 
to pursue unilateral military action when acceptable multi-lateral solutions cannot 
be found (unilateralism). Second, if the U.S. or its allies are threatened by 
terrorists or by rogue states that are engaged in the production of weapons of mass 
destruction, the U.S. can initiate pre-emptive attacks (pre-emption). Third, the 




societies" (extending democracy and liberty). Fourth, the U.S. intends to take 
actions as necessary to continue its status as the world's sole military superpower 
(expansionism).  
The architects of those new sets of policies are the so-called neo-
conservatives (the neo-cons) in Washington. The neo-conservatives are a small 
group of right-wingers that shaped U.S. foreign policy during the period after 9-
11. At the time of the Iraq War, they were at the center of the Bush 
administration. At that time, Deputy secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz led 
their forces at the Pentagon. Undersecretary Doug Feith and Lewis "Scooter" 
Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, were well-placed hawks, as 
was Pentagon adviser Richard Perle. They orchestrated their voices to present an 
imperial vision of an international order (Mann 2004). 
 Arguably, the neo-conservatives views were so opinionated that several 
scholars see America making a grand historic turn toward imperial rule of the 
world. Among others, Chalmers Johnson, well-known specialist of Japanese 
politics, claims that the emerging American empire is coercive, exploitative, and 
destructive. Johnson suggests that American military alliances during the Cold 
War have been consolidated over the last decade into a new form of global 
juggernautthat of a ruling empire, in which the U.S. exaggerates threats and 
uses its military-industrial complex in self-serving ways (Johnson, 2004). 
Similarly, Benjamin Barber (2004) finds that American foreign policy has gone 
wrong. He suggests that America has become a unipolar power and that unilateral 




operates outside the accepted precepts of international law and policy. Thus, he 
concludes that America's imperial reach will exceed its grasp and destabilize the 
global system.  
Other scholars, such as Niall Ferguson (2004) and Andrew Bacevich 
(2002), also liken the current United States to the British or Roman Empires. 
However, they believe that Americas liberal empire is welcomed by the current 
global system. According to Ferguson, this is because the U.S. provides order, 
security and public goods. His fear is that the U.S. will fail in its imperial duties 
and interests. Ferguson notes that the U.S. should embrace its imperial status and 
work to set up free-market democracies in states stunted by tyranny and anarchy. 
Bacevich also stresses that the U.S. administrations have maintained continuity of 
purpose in achieving the goals of reshaping the world in the U.S. image, through 
free trade, military dominance, and globalization. According to Bacevich, central 
to this goal is a commitment to global openness -- removing barriers that inhibit 
the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Also, he suggests that the 
creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of 
democratic capitalism is Americas ultimate objective. For pursuing these goals, 
he argues, the difference between the Clinton and G.W. Bush Administrations 
foreign policy is not big enough.   
 Unlike these arguments, G. John Ikenberry (2006) suggests that U.S. 
power is neither as great as most claim nor as dangerous as others fear. Ikenberry 
asserts that the notion of empire is misleading because it misses the distinctive 




the United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries, 
but American relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia are different from 
those because these advanced democracies operate within a "security community" 
in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Also, according to Ikenberry, 
the debates over the American empire do not refer to the long peace among great 
powers, which can be explained by both liberal empire views and strong U.S. 
rules.  
Japanese foreign policy, both military and economic, has been closely 
linked to U.S. policy in the Pacific Rim since the end of World War II. A half-
century after its occupation, the United States still garrisons troops in Japan, the 
worlds second largest economy. American relations with Japan have evolved 
over the decades, but Japan is still dependent on American military protection and 
the American market. Although East Asian countries, such as Japan and South 
Korea, are connected by bilateral ties and loose multilateral economic relations, 
the East Asian regional order is organized according to the military presence of 
the United Stated. Indeed, American extended deterrence and regional trade 
linkages are at the heart of Japanese foreign policy.   
Because of its dependence on American military presence, Japanese post-
war foreign policy has been uniquely formed. Renunciation of war is one of the 
most crucial parts of the Japanese post-war Constitution. The re-arming of Japan 
in the 1950s was therefore cast in terms of self-defense. The activities of the Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) were rigorously limited inside Japan. Overseas deployment 




to watch over the first free election. However, Self-Defense Force participation in 
UN peacekeeping missions and relief work has sparked vigorous debate inside 
Japan; even the missions are strictly limited to peacekeeping. This is because 
dispatching SDF troops overseas may infringe on the Article Nine of the 
Constitution, which clearly renounces force as a means for settling international 
disputes and prohibits the creation of an army, navy, and air force. The debate has 
not ended in Japan. Asian countries, especially nations that were victims of 
Japanese aggression in World War II, opposed the revised role of the SDF. 
As regards Iraq issues, the Koizumi Administration (2001-2006) 
supported the U.S. policies towards Iraq. In July 2003, the Japanese legislature 
passed a special bill that allows the SDF to help to rebuild Iraq. This bill enables 
the Japanese government to deploy the SDF to Iraq without an UN agreement as 
long as the area of deployment is in a non-combat zone. This bill also met 
serious opposition both in Japan and overseas.  
The United States has wielded substantial influence on economic and 
defense policy-making in Japan. Several authors, such as Prestowitz, suggest that 
the Japanese policy-making process has a familiar pattern: Japan promises to 
make changes that would harm some special interest group within its society, but 
only after loud and insistent U.S. demands. This process is known as "gaiatsu." 
Although "gaiatsu" originally means "foreign pressure" in Japanese, it chiefly 
connotes foreign pressure from the United States or multinational corporations 
headquartered mainly in the United States. Although some argue that pointing out 




very effective. Prestowitz states that Nothing can happen in Japanese politics 
without foreign pressure (the International Herald Tribune April 17, 1998). 
Interestingly, the U.S. pronouncements are often used as an excuse for taking 
politically unpopular actions and as a justification for instituting policy changes 
(Stockwin 1999). 
Since Japanese politics has been vulnerable to gaiatsu, Kent E. Calder 
suggests that the concept of the "reactive state" is useful in understanding the 
foreign policy making process and behavior of Japan. According to Calder, 
Japanese reactive state behavior is the result of both domestic institutional 
characteristics and the structure of the international system. Domestic features 
such as bureaucratic fragmentation, political factionalism, and the lack of a strong 
central executive have played an especially important part in Japanese policy 
formation. Also, certain other middle-range powers are becoming deeply 
integrated in the global political economy and particularly during the periods of 
economic turbulence when international regimes do not fully safeguard their 
economic interests (Calder 1990).  
 
Section 5 The Iraq War and the Media: A Cheerleader of a Watchdog? 
The Iraq War and its aftermath is, without a doubt, one of the biggest 
news events in this decade. The war was probably the most media-centered 
conflict in history. More than 1500 journalists from around the world, including 




on the battlefront, analyze developments, and explore the new world order after 
the demise of Saddam Husseins regime. Some 600 were actually embedded 
within the coalition forces during the combat. Moreover, unilateral independent 
journalists joined the camps of journalists (Kurtz, 2003). During the war in Iraq, 
small video camera revolutionized war reporting. Not only newspapers and 
television, 24-hour cable and satellite networks, but also an internet blog became 
a tool for a citizen who wants to participate in debates over Iraq issues. Numerous 
internet blogs reported the latest developments and delivered their analyses.  
As in the case of all warfare, the media has played a controversial role in 
reporting on the Iraq War (Harllin 1989, Knightley 2002, Kinoshita 2005). There 
are significant and interesting aspects in the relationship between the media and 
politics that revealed themselves during the war in Iraq. Especially, the U.S. 
medias role in the war has been a matter of concern for scholars and the media 
organizations themselves. Since the war ended, a great amount of literature has 
been produced to critique the medias role in the war ---much has been written 
about the media by media critics, and many critical self-examinations have been 
done by journalists themselves. Mea culpas have been abundant, particularly 
after David Kay, former U.S. chief weapons inspector, announced in early 2004 
that we were almost all wrong about Iraqi weapons of mass destructions 
(Achenbach 2004). 
Some critics argue that the U.S. media played a cheerleading role to the 
Bush administration and promoted the war without serving as a watchdog of the 




mass deception, because the media put an emphasis on supporting the war effort 
of the Bush administration over reportorial objectivity (Schechter 2003). Not only 
in the U.S., but also in Europe and Asia, including Japan, this literature has cast 
doubt on the functions of the media during the Iraq War (e.g. Ishizawa 2005). 
One obvious example is the controversial role of a New York Times 
reporter Judith Miller. Millers serial reporting on weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq helped garner public support for the initiation of the Iraq War. The reports, 
however, were later shown to be false. Millers coverage had depth, but the depth 
was based on a series of propaganda statements of the Bush government. Also, in 
relation to the Bush administrations Iraq policy, Millers staunch defense of 
confidential sources related to the Valerie Plame scandal, which became widely 
publicized in 2005, made her name synonymous with an unhealthy relationship 
between the media and politics (Van Natta, Liptak and Levy, 2005).  
As shown by Millers case, objectivity is one of the most difficult issues 
in war reporting. Since the attacks of 9-11, there has been an active discussion 
over manipulation of the media by the Bush administration (Cole, 2005). Karl 
Rove of the Administration and his media team worked a great deal on public 
relations. Especially during the run-up period of the Iraq War, many critics argue 
that the Administration was very skillful in emphasizing the need and urgency of 
attacking Iraq. The Administration superbly presented the dichotomous arguments 
between us and them or good and evil. These presentations of the 
Administration include the contrast between the despotic and Al Qaeda-related 




and with loopholes UN inspections and U.S.  serious attempts to end the terror 
network. Since the Bush administration was more skilled in providing these 
images than their counterparts, such as the Hussein Administration or the UN 
inspections teams, the U.S. media constantly resorted to the Bush administration 
as the primary source of the news. Thus, not only the people in the United States, 
but also relatively large portions of the international community, came to believe 
such self-serving presentations. 
On initiating attacks in Baghdad, the Administration also introduced 
another method to control the content of the media in the battlefield. The 
Administration allowed journalists to embed in specific military units in the war. 
Arguably, this practice of embedding was the most controversial aspect of 
political communication during the Iraq War. The practice of "embedding" 
reporters makes for compelling journalism; however, some warn of the dangers of 
losing independence. 
"Embedding" was not an invention of the Iraq War. It is a conventional 
practice of the media to report a very real image of the battleground for audiences 
in the U.S. and around the world. During the war in Vietnam, however, the 
images from photographers and television broadcasts of war brought the horror of 
the situation into the home of Americans. Thus, the U.S. government has 
attempted to control the news media's coverage of the hostilities as the war 
dragged on, especially since the Tet Offensive in 1968, which is believed to have 
been a turning point in the Vietnam War. Similarly, the media complained that 




War of 1991 (Davis, 2001, Chap. 19). After decades of battling reporters who 
demanded access to frontline troops during combat operations, the Pentagon 
finally allowed journalists to join a military unit involved in an armed conflict 
during the war in Iraq.  
What is unique about embedding during the Iraq War is the fact that the 
Pentagon systematically resumed the old convention in order to appease the 
media. The Pentagon found that embedding was not only a way to ease decades of 
hostility and mutual suspicion within the media, but also was a pubic relation 
strategy designed in large part as a means of waging information warfare against 
Saddam Hussein.  
The U.S. government allowed about 500 reporters and photographers from 
around the world, both print and electronic media to embed in the military during 
the war in Iraq. They were indeed given unprecedented direct access to the battle 
frontline. These so-called "embedded" reporters were on the ground in Iraq, ate 
and slept alongside soldiers and reported on firefights and artillery onslaughts first 
hand. The world was getting an unprecedented look at war as it happens. 
Among the 500 embedded reporters, many were from the American press. 
Major U.S. media organizations, such as the New York Times and the Washington 
Post, were allowed to send dozens of journalists. The international press also 
received certain slots for embedding. The BBC from the UK had 16 embedded 
reporters in Iraq. The Japanese print media organizations had six slots: three from 
the Kyodo News Service, two from the Asahi, and one from the Yomiuri Shimbun, 




two from Fuji Television and Nippon Television Network (NNN) (Nojima, 2003, 
22).  
Although journalists experienced unprecedented access to the battlefield 
and their stories were as a result very real, there were concerns about the cost of 
embedded journalism. First, there were numerous restrictions on reporting; 
embedded journalists had to sign a contract restricting when and what they could 
report. Although the Pentagon claimed that there was no censorship, there were 
several rules about reporting set by the U.S. forces: the details of military actions 
could only be described in general terms and journalists were not allowed at all to 
report possible future missions or about classified information they might find. 
Journalists could not give specific details about the locations or outline the future 
plans of their unit. Also, the commander of an embedded journalist's unit could 
declare a 'blackout' in filing stories via satellite for security reasons. Thus, some 
critics feel that the level of media censorship by the Pentagon was too strict, and 
that media organizations struck a Faustian bargain by agreeing to become embeds 
and consequently losing their objectivity (Brandenburg, 2005). 
More importantly, some suggest that embedded journalists made reports 
that were so sympathetic to the American side of the war that the objectivity of 
their story might be endangered. There is a strong possibility that sympathy was 
likely to develop between embedded journalists and soldiers since journalists 
were protected by the soldiers in the field (Schechter, 2003). Also, embedding 
reports may increase the respect of the military for journalists who are prepared to 




to be sympathetic toward the coalition forces, even if they are not conscious of 
this or necessarily want to be. This is because embedded journalists lives were at 
the mercy of the fate of his or her troop, and as a result were subject to the 
Stockholm syndrome.  The Stockholm syndrome describes how an onlooker 
becomes part of that group. The embeds are protected by the U.S. forces and 
their lives are in the hands of the forces (Brandenburg 2005). Thus, objectivity 
may be lost under such extraordinary conditions.  
Since the end of the war, scholars and critics have attempted an empirical 
examination of the media content of embedded journalists in order to define the 
impact of embedding journalism, but the results about how much embedding 
affected the contents are mixed. These studies are in the preliminary stages. Some 
suggest that coverage of the Iraqi conflict by embedded journalists is problematic 
when it is subjected to closer analysis (Schechter, 2003). While Pfau et al.s 2004 
study finds that the embedding experiment actually distorted the media content, 
Aday, Livingston and Hebert (2005) conclude that the impact was relatively 
small. Scholarly debate over the impact of embedding will not end for some time. 
The Bush administration also attempted to affect the language being 
heard in the media. There were always plenty of euphemisms about the Iraq War. 
One of the most widespread terms emerging from the Administration during the 
war was "shock and awe," a bombing campaign by the coalition forces designed 
to terrify an enemy into submission. Also, other jargon of the Pentagon came to 
be frequently used in the media during the war. One example is to decapitate. 




'decapitate' the Iraqi regime," to describe the concept "it tried to kill Saddam 
Hussein." In addition, the more familiar term 'collateral damage' was frequently 
used to indicate Iraqi civilian casualties. There are acute criticisms about the new 
phrases that the government crafted to describe actions in the war. Critics argue 
that some reporters were quick to adopt the Administrations new terminology 
that simplified the complexities of the war and sanitized the battle. These terms 
present a reality that lacks an understanding of the impact and scope of the 
military actions. Consequently, the media may eventually mislead the public 
(Bowers, 2003). 
This battle euphemism was one of the legacies of the First Gulf War of 
1991. During the first Gulf War, the military supplied attractive battlefield 
pictures that journalists found difficult to refuse. The military also could bar press 
access to potentially embarrassing scenes and persuade the public that such 
restraint was necessary for national security. Critics suggest that the war became a 
picture-book war that glorified skills of military leaders and largely concealed the 
bloody realities of the combat. Along with videos, new terms were created by the 
senior Bush Administration during the First Gulf War. These terms include 
pinpoint attack or smart bombs. These technological terms disguised plenty 
of botched bombings that lacked in accuracy. However, because of the 
technological superiority of the United States, audiences came to believe that 
smart meant precision attacks with a minimum amount of civilian damage 




Although the media in the United States functioned as a cheerleader of 
their government during the initial stage of the Iraq War, the media turned more 
critical as time progressed and after major combat operations were over. The 
media became more of a watchdog checking governmental actions related to Iraq. 
As far as I know, there are no scholarly studies about the U.S. medias regaining 
its watchdog function. This dissertation explains in later chapters that negativity 
toward U.S. Iraq policies in the New York Times articles significantly increased 
after major combat operations were over and that the surge became clearer as time 
progressed.   
  Reporting on war makes explicit the differences that exist between 
the media of different countries. The Iraq War was not an exception. There is an 
interesting article in the New York Times written by Paul Krugman (Behind the 
Great Divide February 18, 2003) regarding the media reporting and international 
perceptions of U.S. policies over Iraq. Krugman argues that media reporting of 
the pre-war period was partly responsible for the different ways in which 
Europeans and Americans see the world and are suddenly at such odds. 
According to Krugman, the United States and Europe have different views partly 
because we see different news. He provides two possible explanations for the 
great trans-Atlantic media divide: either the European media present pervasive 
anti-American bias or the U.S. media takes it as their assignment to sell the war, 
evading the role of watchdog. His explanation is plausible because as discussed 




At the time Krugman wrote this piece, he was not certain whether the 
European media distorted the news or the U.S. media failed to present a mix of 
information that might question the justification of the war. However, Krugmans 
analysis turned out to be correct (at least during the time I wrote this dissertation). 
Many critics, including American ones, suggest that the U.S. media may have 
played a cheerleading role in order to help start the war. In contrast to this, 
European media have been more reputable in their reporting of the war (Aday, 
Livingston, and Hebert 2005).  
In the vein of Krugmans great trans-Atlantic media divide, the U.S. 
and Japan media have reported differently on the war in Iraq. This study explores 
the trans-Pacific media gap over Iraq.  
 




Chapter 3: Research Designs: Methodologies, Research 
Questions, Hypotheses and Goal of This Project 
 
This chapter explicates the methodological concerns in this work. 
Specifically, it discusses the methodologies, research questions, hypotheses, and 
goals of this project. The most important methodology for this work was content 
analysis. In order to systematically investigate the New York Times and the 
Asahis news content, I employed both quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis of newspaper articles. Since this project aims at multi-disciplinary 
theories and works, mainly from political science and media studies, the 
methodologies were selected for their broad and inclusive approaches. The goal of 
this work is to contribute an international and multi-disciplinary study of media 
reporting on war to the political communication literature. Also, this study will 
provide an international viewpoint in the discussion of the interactions between 
the media and politics, both in academia and in journalism.  
 
Section 1 Newspapers to Investigate 
Two newspapers were selected for this study: the Asahi and the New 
York Times. There are three reasons why I choose these two papers for 
comparison. First, both papers are arguably the most respected in their countries. 
Both newspapers have the reputation of quality papers among their countries 




that both papers are considered to be politically liberal. Third, both are leading 
newspapers whose circulations are very large, if not the largest in their respective 
countries. The Asahi has the second biggest circulation of any paper in Japan after 
the Yomiuri, with 850 million daily subscribers. The New York Times has the 
fourth largest circulation in the U.S. after U.S.A Today, the Wall Street Journal, 
and the Los Angeles Times.  
Since both papers have positioned themselves as liberal or left of center, 
it may be assumed that they will be critical of their governments actions and 
those who hold power. However, since this study compares the leading liberal 
papers from the United States and Japan, the liberal bias of these papers relative 
to others in both countries are at least kept constant across the study.   
For the sake of analysis, this research limits its comparison to only print 
media. The comparisons of electric media is, however, very significant, and I 
would like to conduct analysis of television programs, including their visual 
aspects in future research. 
Articles were collected from two databases, the Asahi Shimbun database 
(Kikuzo), and the Lexis-Nexis (the New York Times). Although the Asahi has five 
different regional editions, this study uses the Tokyo edition, which is circulated 
in the metropolitan Tokyo area. Also the Asahi has morning and evening daily 
editions except on Sundays and holidays, and both versions are examined. Thus, 
as is clear in the later section notes, the Asahis total number of articles about Iraq 






Section 2 Methodologies (1): Content Analysis Strategies for This Work 
Two methodologies are adopted by this research. One is content analysis 
of newspapers, the other is interviews.  First, this section fully reviews both 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis methodology. Qualitative and 
quantitative analyses mutually complement each other. Second, specific content 
analysis strategies used in this work are explained. Third, the coding strategies 
that were used for the content analysis are documented. Finally, this section 
discusses the interviewing strategies that were used for this research.    
 
Subsection 1 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a research methodology that utilizes a set of 
procedures to make valid inferences from text (Weber 1985). Content analysis 
methodology has been frequently used in studies of political communication to 
determine generalizations of the content of recorded instances of communication, 
such as newspaper articles, speech texts, and academic textbooks. The chief 
strength of content analysis---both quantitative and qualitative---is that it enables 
us to study messages that occur in the media. Both methods were employed for 
this study.  
Quantitative content analysis can provide a systematic method for 
understanding the particular traits of media messages or news content. 
Quantitative content analysis counts frequencies of particular words to identify 




reveal trends and tendencies in the content of articles because they can be clearly 
displayed in numbers.  
There are numerous quantitative content analysis methodologies that 
have been demonstrated by various scholars. A central approach to content 
analysis classifies the many words of a text into fewer content categories. Some 
scholars (Riffe, Lacy Fico 1998, Krippendorff 1980, Weber 1985) believe that 
content analysis must follow several standard procedures of quantitative 
methodologies. First, content analysis research must follow a systematic 
analytical procedure. It requires identification of key terms involved in a 
phenomenon, specification of possible relationships among concepts, and 
generation of verifiable/ falsifiable hypotheses. Second, content analysis is 
supposed to be a working replicable examination of symbols of communication. 
Ideally, different coders even when working under different circumstances will 
yield the same content analysis results. Also, content analysis must be objective in 
order to maintain the reliability of research. Third, results of content analysis are 
accepted as valid inferences from text.  
However, quantitative content analysis cannot examine the tone and 
intensity of particular types of descriptions or the images of photographs or 
cartoons. This is, obviously, because such content cannot be counted. Thus, 
quantitative content analysis sometimes misses the impressions of texts. In order 
to avoid this problem, this work uses qualitative analysis as well. 
Qualitative content analysis literally investigates the texts of the media 




and impressions of texts. Content analysis permits a scholar to scrutinize the 
nuances of a particular article or of even a particular sentence. Furthermore, 
qualitative content analysis permits one to investigate the underlying content in 
the text or to define the purpose of the text the author intentionally (or 
sometimes unintentionally) wants to deliver to the readers (Hofstetter 1981). In 
this way, qualitative content analysis can be used to comprehensively inspect the 
hidden intentions of the writers of the texts.  
The object of qualitative content analysis can be any of a wide range of 
recorded texts. It is common with qualitative content analysis to examine themes, 
main ideas, and major storylines of a text. 
One of the strengths of qualitative content analysis is that media 
frames can be identified. A particular media frame consists of accounts of the 
construction of news stories and interactions with various antagonists in reporting 
particular types of news events. One of the most famous media frames is the 
horse race perspective of U.S. presidential campaigns. Thomas Patterson argues 
that the dominant theme for the reporters who cover the presidential campaigns is 
a strategic game, in which a journalist tends to interpret new information within 
a schematic framework according to which candidates gain advantage from the 
information (Patterson, 1993). 
This dissertation first extensively explores the key concepts and main 
topics (major storylines) related to the Iraq War and its aftermath as they appeared 
in the Asahi and in the New York Times. Along with analyzing the two papers 




storylines and media frames will show such differences in perspectives that at 
times one might be led to believe that two separate wars were being reported 
on. 
Media frames are the narrative structures the news media provide 
(Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The media presents frames by providing readers with a 
fairly common view of the major actors, events and themes. Understanding each 
particular media frame provides a clue to figure out ways of constructing news 
stories. 
Since the media delivers reports in order to fit those frames and portray 
events with certain viewpoints, reports tend to have certain storyline(s). These 
storylines are sometimes hidden and difficult to observe in ordinary news stories. 
They are, however, likely to become very clear in big news events. This is 
because the news media does not want its audience/readers to be inundated with 
numerous, but unconnected new findings. Big news events continuously generate 
an abundant number of articles or television newsfeeds, and the media 
unintentionally or intentionally present the news with familiar storylines. Also, for 
the purpose of satisfying its audience/readers, the media often features human 
interest stories in big news events. These stories are likely to be about common 
episodes that most audiences have often heard about. Since the war in Iraq is, 
without a doubt, a big news event, there is ample data for media frames and media 
storylines in reporting. This research categories the major thrust of stories along 




casualties, and Japanese SDF commitment, and so on. Each article was coded 
based on criteria which will be explained later in this chapter.  
Another important part of the content analysis is the identification of the 
sources of news, which presents clues to understanding the flow of information. 
In war reporting, flows of information are crucial to revealing propaganda of 
the government. The identification of sources determines who is in charge of 
disseminating information, and also who wants to propagate their own 
perspectives of the war. Also, it may highlight the power relationship among 
political actors and reveal who the agenda-setters of policies are. A critical 
question at the heart of news coverage is, indeed, whose perspectives will be 
heard. It is also important to consider the absence of certain facts in reporting and 
whether or not coverage favors certain interests (such as particular sources).  
 
Subsection 2  Three Content Analysis Strategies 
In conducting content analysis, I attempt to pay attention to the real 
meaning of each word, phrase, and sentence. As discussed in chapter 2, cross-
cultural comparison faces the very fundamental and difficult question about the 
role of culture in language. A scholar who attempts to compare different culture 
needs to have sensitivity to the language. Even if I find a similar concept or word 
in both the Asahi and the New York Times, there is always the possibility that the 
word has quite a different cultural context and their meanings may be not the 




(1964) suggests that the conception of reality must be applicable outside the 
context of scientific reasoning (311). It is imperative to be sensitive in 
understanding the usage of words in conducting content analysis. 
Specifically, this dissertation used three strategies in content analysis. 
First, several key concepts were qualitatively chosen from each article. The 
number of key concepts depended on the article. Some had only one concept, 
others had more than five. On average, about three to five concepts were extracted 
from an article. Each key concept was recorded as a phrase which explicitly 
describes an idea in the article, such as 1.) neo-conservative commentators 
criticisms on the UNs nuclear inspection in Iraq or 2.) the Iraq wars growing 
impact on Iraqi citizens, especially their lifelines. These key concepts were further 
analyzed in both quantitative and qualitative ways. In the quantitative analysis, 
major key concepts were tabulated so that their frequencies could be observed. 
The counts are presented chronologically for the purpose of comparison.  
Second, qualitatively examining the key concepts obtained by the first 
part, the main topic or storyline of the article was determined. The main topic or 
storyline is literally the most important ingredient of the newspaper articles. They 
are the core of the journalists views about what is news. They also provide 
crucial indications for comprehending basic trends in comparing newspapers. In 
qualitative investigations, the key concepts become crucial earmarks in probing 
the whole storylines of an article. In most cases, the main idea corresponds with 




main idea was recorded with a full sentence as opposed to the title, which 
sometimes consists of only a phrase.  
 Third, the author specifically investigated the portrayals of five issues and 
examined whether an article was negative toward actors and their actions. The 
actions considered were: (1) U.S. policies of Iraq (including President George W. 
Bushs views of Iraq); (2) Japanese government support for U.S. policies toward 
Iraq (including Prime Minister Koizumis views on Iraq); (3) the United Nations 
role related to Iraq; (4) Saddam Hussein; (5) French policies on Iraq. This part of 
the analysis required both qualitative and quantitative analysis partly in order to 
both catch a tone (e.g. the negative portrayals of particular issues) and the 
frequency of a particular tone. If an articles general tone about U.S. actions in 
Iraq was critical, the article was recognized as N (negative). If the tone of an 
article was neutral or supportive on the actions, the article was regarded 
respectively, as M (middle-ground) or S (Supportive). Unless an article was very 
short or focused on a particular actor, the article usually contained more than one 
actor.  If an article contained more than one actor, all actors in the article became 
objects of analysis.  
The number of articles is not an accurate indicator of an articles slant in 
and of itself. This is because there are huge discrepancies in the numbers of 
articles during the 26 month period of analysis. The numbers of articles peaked 
when the war in Iraq was started, the number became much smaller during the 
period of rebuilding Iraq. Thus, the negativity of each issue is tabulated in ratio to 




explored (e.g. stories about the U.S. and Japanese policies on Iraq). Also, for the 
purpose of comparison, the negativity is tabulated monthly.  
 
Subsection 3 Coding 
The coding of articles is an important factor in content analysis. In order 
to systematically analyze the stories in the two newspapers, a code system was 
developed in this study. Coding must be reflected in an accurate analysis of the 
newspaper contents. I first attempted to read as many articles in both the Asahi 
and the New York Times as possible and filter out a common theme, key 
dimensions, and key words from them.  
However, I had to modify coding strategies occasionally when a 
significant news event was additionally found. Each time latent concepts came to 
be visible in a later period of analysis, I had to return to the initial section and 
check the coding of each article again. Thus, coding of these large data sets was 
time-consuming. 
In a separate sheet of note paper, the main topic and key concepts of each 
article were recorded. Also, other noticeable descriptions, including the tone of 
the language and sources of the news were noted. Key words and concepts were 
examined for the seven periods covered by this analysis. Several key concepts are 
consistently found throughout the analysis. Some, however, appear in only a 
certain period. Obviously, this is because some events are frequently discussed in 




In addition to myself, I asked different coders to analyze the text. This is 
because the data is supposed to be replicable. I asked two coders for help. One is 
Professor Yoshimi Nakamura, who is a colleague of mine at Keiwa College, 
Japan, and is in charge of both Japanese (the Asahi) and English (the New York 
Times) articles. He received an MA degree from Georgetown University and 
taught Japanese several years at Howard University in Washington, D.C. Another 
coder is Hyunsook Kim, who was in charge of coding the New York Times 
articles. Ms. Kim is a good academic friend of mine while we were students at 
Georgetown University, and later became my wife.  
 
The coding used for key terms and concepts in this study are as follows:  
 
(1) actors and sources 
Sources for articles influence news content. Journalists are often reliant 
on sources, especially authoritative sources. Their superiors and peers provide 
feedback; thus, news organizations counterbalance pressure from sources by 
reinforcing journalists notions of quality. Even so, the power of sources in 
deciding news stories is large. As Leon Sigal has written sources make the news 
as sources have a strong influence on the decisions journalists make in choosing 
topics (Sigal 1986). In other words, sources are very influential agenda-setters for 
the media.  
The choice of sources also is influenced by the particular tendencies of 




certain interests. Also, the absence of a source may reflect the ideology of an 
organization. 
I coded and categorized news actors and sources by role and looked at 
patterns of who was in the news, who was speaking, and whose perspectives were 
being heard in debates. Examples of the actors and sources include U.S. officials, 
military officials, citizens, anti-war movements, reactions from the international 
community, UN officials, the Japanese government, Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces, and so on. 
 
(2) causes of the war 
There are several well-publicized explanations for the war in Iraq. These 
explanations fall into two broad categories, those with supportive and critical 
views of the war. First, one of the most published explanations is that Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction and the weapons inspections by the United Nations 
had failed. Another explanation is that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda. This view 
suggests that since Iraq had strong connection with Al Qaeda terrorism, the 
terrorist network had to be destroyed. The third explanation is the dictatorship in 
Iraq. According to this explanation, Saddam Hussein needed to be removed to 
liberate and democratize Iraq. Fourth is the American expansionism. From this 
view, the U.S. wanted to control Iraqi oil and thus, the war promoted its 
expansionism and imperialism.  
This study tracks these various reasons for the war in the two 




York Times and in the Asahi. At the same time, this study attempts to find 
differences between the two, especially because some of the reasons may be more 
clearly stated in either one of the papers than the other to create a sense of 
justification for the invasion. 
 
(3) UN visibility 
I coded each story for UN visibility, whether the UN appeared in an 
article, who was talking about the UN and how the UN was described. One of the 
most frequently published analyses of the Iraq War is that the Bush administration 
effectively marginalized the role of the United Nations. Many critics suggested 
that multilateral political solutions to the Iraq crisis were not possible because of a 
series of public relations propaganda efforts by the administration. The 
administration had a carefully planned, tightly controlled and brilliantly executed 
media war (Schechter, 2003, 15). This study investigates how the Japanese and 
U.S. media presented the UN and its role in this crisis, and how they approached 
the possibilities of international diplomacy. 
 
(4) civilian casualties and anti-war protest movements 
I coded each story for Iraqi civilian casualties and anti-war protest 
movements, whether they appeared in an article, and how they were described. 
Compared to the casualties in the coalition forces, Iraq civilian casualties have 




Asahi featured both civilian casualties and anti-war protest movement very 
frequently.  
 
(5) Others  
This study also tracked other specific topics of news stories related to the 
war and its consequences. This is because I wanted to find out if there were 
important differences in the issues that the different national media see as 
important. These include the role of religion, culture and history of Iraq, ethnicity 
in Iraq, international views on the war, embedded journalists, the similarity 
between the occupation of Iraq and Japan by the United States after World War II, 
and so on. 
Also, technical and strategic language in the military operations are 
covered. It came to my attention that several insider terminology and language 
was presented by the U.S. media. One typical example for this is the use of the 
term "collateral damage" to describe civilian deaths. Such usage of military jargon 
and inventions of new military words may be an effort to sanitize the battle and 
the meaning of the war.  
 Criticism toward the Bush administrations handling of the war was 
tracked. The media, especially the Asahi, has been strongly critical of the 
diplomatic hastiness and warmonger nature of the Bush administration. Compared 
with the Asahi, the New York Times attitude toward the Administration was not 
as cynical, at least until the end of the period of official combat. The New York 




were not actually found. In addition, critics often blamed media for their 
cheerleading role during the war in Iraq. Also, both the American and Japanese 
media have been critical of their own roles. This criticism by the media of their 
own war reporting is also analyzed.  
Subsection 4  Time spans 
The content analysis is not limited to the period of actual battle (from 
March 20 to May 1, 2003), but rather covers October 1, 2002 to December 31, 
2004. Specifically, the comparison over these two years is divided into the 
following seven periods: (1) from the U.S. Congressional approval of the Iraqi 
attack (October, 2002) to the beginning of the Iraq War (March 20, 2003); (2) 
from the beginning of the Iraq War to the presidential announcement of the 
ending of the major combat (May 1, 2003); (3) from the end of major combat 
to the passage of the Iraqi Special Law in Japan (July 26, 2003); (4) from the 
passage of the Iraqi Special Law in Japan to the first arrival of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces in Samawa, Iraq (Feb. 4, 2004); (5) from the first arrival of the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Samawa, Iraq to the release of the three captured 
Japanese civilians in Iraq (April 20, 2004); (6) from the release of the three 
captured Japanese civilians in Iraq to the murder of the first captured Japanese 
civilian (October 30, 2004); (7) the murder of the first captured Japanese civilian 
to the extension of sending Japanese SDF to Iraq (December 31, 2004). 
It is not an easy task to divide one political and historical event into 




be arbitrary. Also, especially if the event is an international one, divisions are 
dependent on the views and positions the analysis explores.  
These seven divisions are created from the view of the Japanese side. 
Although the first two periods and their divisions are clear for both the U.S. and 
Japan, the latter five periods are made based on the Japanese view of the Iraq War 
and its aftermath. Until the end of major combat in Iraq, to most Japanese the 
Iraq War was a battle taking place in a distant part of the world. Indeed, except for 
the oil industry in Japan, no Japanese seems to have been a serious stakeholder. 
This situation changed after the end of major combat. In order to reconstruct 
Iraq, the Japanese government has had to contribute funds and personnel. 
Especially, sending Japanese Self-Defense Forces to rebuild Iraq became 
a wedge issue in Japanese politics. This is because of the pacifist constitution that 
effectively bans the use of military force except in self defense and natural 
disasters. It was no wonder that when the bill passed to send Japanese troops to 
Iraq to help U.S.-led reconstruction efforts, the opposition movement, both by the 
lawmakers and citizens reached its peak.  
Also, during periods five to seven, several Japanese civilians were killed 
in Iraq. These murdered civilians included journalists, volunteer helpers, and 
security guards at a private company. These killings brought the Iraq War much 
closer to ordinary Japanese citizens and drastically altered their views of the 
battle. 
Both newspapers produced numerous stories about the war in Iraq during 




articles that contained the word Iraq in this period. The Asahis total number of 
articles about Iraq exceeds that of the New York Times because the Asahi has both 
morning and evening editions. 
These articles include stories where Iraq issues are not the primary focus 
of the article, such as stock market forecasts or sports page news. Stories were 
selected for analysis based upon the criteria that the news focused on Iraq. 
Overall, 4624 Asahi and 4320 New York Times articles were selected from both 
newspapers. 
 
Section 3 Methodologies (2): Interviews 
Although most are not incorporated in the main body of this work, 
interviews of officials and journalists were a crucial part of the formulating of 
research questions and hypotheses. Also, the interviews provide background 
information of the relationship between the media and politics in Japan. These are 
quoted as explanatory analysis of this work, especially, in chapters four and five.  
I interviewed with officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, staff 
writers of the Asahi, the Yomiuri and the Tokyo Shimbum. The questions during 
the interviews ranged from the analysis of the reasons for the 
differences/similarities of media content to the policy stance of the U.S. and 
Japanese governments, the press-government relationship, the mass media 
organizations, journalists' political orientations, notions of objectivity; and to the 
news bias during the war in Iraq. Nineteen individuals were interviewed, mostly 




Shimbum as a staff writer. Some were introduced by other interviewees. 
Interviews were conducted from April 2002 to the end of 2004. Also, I conducted 
interviews with two U.S. journalists stationed in Japan. The interviews of the U.S. 
journalists were conducted in English. Other interviews were conducted in 
Japanese.    
Since I wanted to draw out their honest opinions and develop trust with 
my interviewees, before each interview, I told the interviewees that their names 
would not be publicized in this work, and only their genders might appear when 
quotations are needed. I followed the method of anonymity utilized in Richard 
Fennos seminal work Homestyle (Fenno, 1978). I hope that anonymity lends 
effectiveness to my interviews.  Indeed, the interviewees sometimes gave very 
frank opinions, especially about their jobs or colleagues. Most of the interviews 
were used for the foundation of this work. For example, several interviews 
provided me an opportunity to notice the importance of articles by Richard 
Armitage in agenda-setting in Japanese policy. Although only parts of the 
interviews are utilized in this dissertation, the interviews added important 
perspectives for this project. 
 
Section 4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 






Research Question 1:  Have the U.S. and Japanese news media portrayed similar / 
different realities of the war in Iraq? 
 
Research Question 2:  What are the possible causes of the similarities 
anddifferences between the two countries medias reporting on the war? What 
are the relationships between the media and politics, both in the United States and 
Japan? Are the relationships between the media and politics reasons for any 
differences or similarities in reporting? How does the relationship between the 
media and politics affect media content? Does a cultural aspect affect media 
content of the two liberal print media? How about the impact of public opinion? 
 
Research Question 3: What are the ramifications of the differences and 
similarities in media content?  Especially how much is public opinion in both the 
U.S. and Japan influenced by media content?  
 
The following chapters reveal that the two media presented quite 
different accounts of the Iraq War. Three hypotheses are offered to explain the 
differences: 
 
Hypothesis1: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about 
Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the different war-time 





Hypothesis 2: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies in Iraq 
in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by differences in the notion of 
evilness in their societies. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies toward 
Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by differences in the degree of 
support for the war by their publics.  
 
In addition to these hypotheses, chapter ten tests several hypotheses to 
specifically clarify the relationship between media content and public opinion. 
The details of the hypotheses will be explained in that chapter. 
 
 
Section 5 Goals and Contributions of this Research Project 
The goals of this study are two-fold. First, is to compare the U.S. and 
Japanese media coverage of the Iraqi War over a two year period. Second, this 
study not only compares and analyzes the two countries media, but also it 
analyzes interactions among policy-makers and the public in setting the media 
agenda. Especially, the role of gaiatsu will be analyzed in the Japanese foreign 
policy and the medias agenda.  
One of the most significant contributions of this project is its 
comparative media analysis between the United States and Japan. As discussed in 




agenda is a rising field of study for political communication scholars. 
Nevertheless, most political communication studies are conducted in only one 
region or on one country, and there is not enough study of the medias agenda role 
setting across cultures and beyond national boundaries. This seems to be because 
comparative political communications is a relatively new field.  
Since this work is a comparative analysis over the two countries media 
systems that produce media content, there is, I believe, a certain contribution for 
the development of political communication studies. According to Blumler and 
Gurevitch, international comparative media research is an essential antidote to 
naive universalism since mass communication research was pioneered by 
American scholars and American models of communication and society have 
dominated the field for many years (Blumler and Gurevitch 1990). This is, of 
course, not to argue that these models were "incorrect" or misleading, but that 
they reflected American society and its communication processes. I am sure that 
my study will contribute to the literature of political communication studies and 
expand the horizons of the field.  
 
Section 6 Possible limitations of the Research 
This research itself may not be perfectly free from bias. Since the author 
is not a U.S. citizen, his perspectives may not have been completely neutral 
toward the U.S. governments positions. No matter how objective I attempted to 




New York Times standpoint and accepted the Asahis view. The coders were also 
not U.S. citizens. Although they are competent in English, one is Japanese, and 
the other is a South Korean national. These facts might raise some issues of 
objectivity. However, the main focus of this study is a comparison of the content 
between the U.S. and Japanese leading print media over Iraq issues, and not a 
political critique. Thus, I believe, the above-mentioned possible biases, even if 
they existed, are not significant. 
Also, this research limited its comparison to the print media. Of course, 
the electronic media is also very important. In fact, television has penetrated more 
deeply into our daily lives than have newspapers. Also, the wide spread internet 
use, especially the impact of blogs, has altered the traditional political 
communication system. Yet, do to limitations of time and finances, it was 
necessary to put boundaries on what I studied. As discussed above, I would like to 








Chapter 4: Content Analyses (1): General Findings 
This chapter presents the general findings of the content analysis of the 
war in Iraq as covered by the Asahi and the New York Times. Especially, this 
chapter reviews the results of five different category analyses, each of which 
shows the basic differences in the portrayals of the Iraq War. The five categories 
are: the main topics of the articles (media agenda), key concepts, actors in the 
Iraq War, positive-negative portrayals of each actor, sources and quotations of the 
news. 
Although this chapter puts more emphasis on the quantitative side, the 
chapter presents findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
First, the coder (mainly myself) extensively scrutinized and categorized the object 
of analysis (qualitative analyses). Then, the frequencies of the objects were 
tallied. 
The results of the content analysis reveals that articles of the New York 
Times and the Asahi had quite different portrayals of U.S. policies toward Iraq: 
While the Asahi was always strongly negative, the New York Times was 
supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, the New York 
Times also became gradually critical of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the 
degree of the two newspapers negativity was not exactly the same. The two 
papers are quite different in the degree of their negativity, and the topics they 





Section 1 Main Topics (Major Storylines) and Key Concept 
Analyzing main topics is the first step in understanding the differences or 
similarities of the two papers news about the Iraq War. The Asahi and the New 
York Times sometimes show quite distinctive differences in their choice of main 
topics. The main topics of the Iraq War also varied in the periods of analysis.  
Main topics are the most important ingredients of newspaper articles. 
They are the core of journalists views on what is news. They also provide 
crucial indications in comprehending basic trends in comparing newspapers. 
Analyzing main topics is the first step to understanding the differences or 
similarities in media coverage. Thus, this work started with an investigation of the 
main topics covered by news articles. 
In this study, I refer to main topics as the media agenda. There are two 
reasons for this. First, I want to identify agenda-setting mechanisms in the 
articles. In the next section of this chapter, the actors involved in the war and 
news sources are analyzed. Their frequencies may explain their agenda-setting 
role in newspaper articles.  
Second, news articles are not only created based on information itself, 
but also by a number of factors specific to a medias organization. For this reason 
I feel that media agenda may be a more suitable word to use when referring to the 
main topic of an article. Journalists face questions of what is and is not news (let 




always follows established rules and routines in deciding the value of information. 
Rather than recognize news by preexisting characteristics of events, journalists 
define what is news by the processes they used to come up with their stories. 
Thus, Tuchman suggests that journalists must routinize the unexpected to 
decide newsworthiness (Tuchman, 1973, 1978).  
During the run-up period of the war (from October 1 2002 to March 19, 
2003), two topics were dominant in both papers: the role of the United Nations 
and U.S. decisions on Iraq. However, the two papers have stark differences in the 
ratio of attention paid to the two topics. While the Asahi puts more focus on the 
role of the United Nations (49 percent of all stories on the Iraq War), the New 
York Times spends 65 percent of its stories on the U.S. decisions about Iraq. The 
two papers key concepts are even more distinctive. The New York Times main 
concern is how well the Bush administration prepared for the war. Other New 
York Times key topics are that the United Nations is a dysfunctional organization 
that Saddam Hussein can manipulate to pursue his scheme to build Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. One of the concepts that most frequently appeared in the Asahi, 
on the other hand, is the hasty American preparation for the war. Based on my 
analysis, the Asahi is often very critical about the half-baked rationality for the 
war and the self-righteous attitude of the United States. Therefore, another key 
concept of the Asahi is that the United Nations must play a key role to stop the 
actions of the United States.  
The difference of the two papers is manifested ever more clearly during 




to appear most frequently are the same (the development of the war and U.S. 
strategies), the Asahi has more diverse topics than the New York Times. The 
Asahis topics include reactions from the international community, including 
Europe and Asia, and Iraqi civilian casualties and anti-war protests. Key concepts 
of the two papers are also more different. The New York Times focuses on the 
view from the United States. For example, repeated key concepts of the New York 
Times include in-detail stories about the strategies of the Bush administration, the 
lives of the troops in Iraq and the opinion of U.S. citizens. The families and local 
towns of those who were sent to Iraq and were participating in the war are often 
featured in the paper. The key concepts of the Asahi are more varied. 
After the end of the actual battle of the war in Iraq (May 1, 2003), the 
Asahi and the New York Times feature a greater number of different topics and 
key concepts. The Asahi articles contain numerous stories about the Japanese 
involvement in Iraq. The vast number of topics and key concepts are about 
developments concerning Japanese engagements in Iraq, such as the Japanese 
contribution to the rebuilding of Iraq and captured Japanese civilians. The top five 
most discussed topics as well as most recurrent key words from May 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2004 are as follows: 1) the Iraqi Special Law in Japan (July 26, 
2003); 2) the first arrival of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Samawa, Iraq 
(Feb. 4, 2004); 3) the release of the three captured Japanese civilians in Iraq 
(April 20, 2004); 4) the extension of sending Japanese SDF in Iraq (December 31, 





Just as in the Asahi, in the New York Times the largest share of main 
topics and key concepts is on U.S. strategies for rebuilding Iraq, including 
governmental actions and coverage of the daily lives of the military, and captured 
U.S. civilians. Interestingly, the newspaper pays more attention to the lives of the 
Iraqi civilians than in the previous periods. Recurring key concepts include 
civilian casualties of the war, sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunni 
Muslims, and various topics such as education, female liberation, and rebuilding 
infrastructures.  
Both the Asahi and the New York Times are very critical of scandals. Two 
prominent scandals during the post war period are the fabrications of heroic deeds 
of U.S. Army private Jessica Lynch and the torture of captured Iraqis in the Abu 
Ghraib jail. Both incidents appear as main topics in both papers around the time 
the scandals were revealed (spring 2003, fall 2003, respectively). However, the 
Asahi focused on these subjects in their articles for a longer period of time than 
the New York Times.  
 
Section 2 Major Actors of the War 
I examined the frequencies of appearance of major actors in the 
newspapers coverage of the war in Iraq. There are several key actors: the United 
Nations, the U.S. government, European governments (France, Germany, and 
Russia), the Iraqi government, the Japanese government, anti-war activists, and 




 Since these actors are potential major agenda-setters for each paper, 
comparing their appearances reveals some basic tendencies in the reporting of the 
two papers. First, both papers have different patterns in their treatment of U.S. 
policies toward Iraq. As Figure 1 (Negativity of the U.S. Policies about Iraq) 
suggests, the basic trends of the negativity of both papers are not exactly the 
same. The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New 
York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, the 















Upper line: Percentage of negative articles about U.S. polices out of all stories on 
Iraq in the Asahi; Lower line: Percentage of negative articles about U.S. polices 
out of all stories on Iraq in the New York Times. 
 
The negativity of each issue was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative 
articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored. 


































































The two papers are different in the peak periods of negativity and in their 
degree of negativity. During the run-up period of the war, for example, the Asahi 
is much more negative than the New York Times. While the degree of negativity 
among articles in the Asahi rises sharply toward the end of the actual battle (May 
2003), the percentage of negative article do not increase much in the New York 
Times during the same period. Both papers, however, become more negative after 
the end of the actual battle. The Asahi continues to be more negative than the New 
York Times until the fall of 2003. The point of departure is the end of 2003. The 
New York Times, however, became very harsh toward the Administration when 
Weapons of Mass Destruction were not actually found. In some months, the New 
York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap 
between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004. 
Other actors are not fully covered by both papers or are featured only for 
a limited period. During the run-up period of the war, both the United Nations and 
France often appeared in both papers. While the portrayals of these two actors are 
very positive in the Asahi, the New York Times contains more negative than 
positive stories. Neither the United Nations nor France is consistently reported on 
by the two media organizations. I assume that Frances different treatment by the 
two papers derives from that fact that the country was publicly opposed to the U.S. 
invasion into Iraq. Studies in later chapters find that the Asahi portrayed the 
United Nations as the last possibility to halt the war; thus, the papers coverage of 




Saddam Hussein is quite frequently reported on by both papers, although 
the number of articles decreases as time progresses. While his portrayals were 
constantly negative in the New York Times, the Asahi was much less negative. 
Interestingly, the negativity against Hussein in the Asahi was greatly alleviated by 
the U.S. invasion into Iraq and the capture of Hussein (December 13, 2003). For 
example the Asahis negativity against Hussein was found in almost 55% of all 
articles on Iraq in October 2002. However, the number dropped significantly to 
11% at the time of the U.S. invasion into Iraq (March 20, 2003). 
The Asahis portrayal of the Japanese governments Iraq policies has 
been continuously negative. Apparently, a part of the reason for this is that Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his cabinet members were very supportive of the 
U.S. actions. Since the Asahi is critical against the U.S. policies toward Iraq, the 
paper was also very vocal in its criticism of the Prime Ministers decisions about 
Iraq. The paper was especially unhelpful to the government soon after Prime 
Minister Koizumi announced his support for the U.S. action to start the war 
(March 20, 2003) and his Cabinets decision to send the Self-Defense Forces to 
Iraq (June 13, 2003). The New York Times did not contain many articles about the 
Japanese governments Iraq policies, but when it did most of the reports were not 
negative. 
It may be logical to surmise that differences in public opinion between 
the United States and Japan may be one of the significant causes for the different 
portrayals of the war. This may be because media organization is supposed to 




New York Times are among the largest newspapers in their countries, the articles 
in both papers reflect the public in Japan and the United States, respectively. 
 
Section 3 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarized the basic trends of the Asahi and of the New 
York Times about their articles of the war in Iraq. The analysis of this study finds 
that the Asahi has been strongly critical of the diplomatic hastiness and 
warmongering nature of the Bush administration. Compared with the Asahi, the 
New York Times attitude toward the Administration was not as cynical, at least 
until the end of official combat. The New York Times, however, turned into a very 










Chapter 5:  Content Analyses (2): Prelude to the Iraq War （
from October 1, 2002 to March 20, 2003） 
 
This chapter compares between the U.S. and Japanese media coverage of 
the Iraqi Crisis and its aftermath and investigates how the U.S. and Japanese 
media differ in their reporting on the war in Iraq.  
 
Section 1 Research Design 
The period analyzed is from the U.S. Congressional approval of the Iraqi 
attack (October 1, 2002) to one day before the beginning of the Iraq War (March 
19, 2003). The-six-month period before the war in Iraq was crucially important 
not only for determining the course of the conflict, but for also providing the basic 
ground of several international schisms, such as the break between the U.S.-UK 
alliance and some continental European countries. During this period, the New 
York Times had more than 4000 articles that contained the word Iraq, and the 
Asahi had more than 3000 with the word Iraku (Iraq in Japanese). Those articles 
included unrelated stories such as ones appearing on sports or entertainment 
pages. This study analyzed articles that featured Iraq war issues. In total 1242 
New York Times and 990 Asahi articles were selected for analysis that actually 




During the run-up period to the war, the United States related to 
international affairs from a crisis mode. The United States continued to fight the 
war against terror, a consequence of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Although the alleged links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Husseins regime were 
not proven, the war in Iraq was prepared based on the perceptions that Iraq was on 
the side of the terrorists. 
There are several important developments during the run-up period. First, 
the U.S. Congress authorized an attack on Iraq on October. 11, 2002. Second, the 
UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1441, which imposed 
tougher new arms inspections on Iraq on Nov. 8.  After 2003 began, war became 
more and more inescapable. On January 28, President Bush announced in his 
State of the Union Address that he was ready to attack Iraq even without a UN 
mandate. Although only Spain and Bulgaria supported the idea, the United States 
and Britain seriously lobbied to garner support for a strike on Iraq among UN 
Security Council members. Finally, at 5:30 a.m. Baghdad time on March 20 (9:30 
p.m. U.S. Eastern Standard Time, March 19), the United States launched 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The war in Iraq began.  
This work does not include events prior to this period. Critics suggest, 
however, that the Bush administration had been steadily preparing for the war. 
Bush stated in his State of the Union Address that Iraq was part of an axis of 
evil (January 29, 2002). Also, Bush publicly introduced the new defense doctrine 
of preemption in a speech at West Point (June 2, 2002). Based on this preemption 




September 12, 2002. Bush also stressed that if the UN did not follow his 
suggestion, the United States would have to act on its own. 
 
Section 2 Major Results of the Content Analysis 
There are significant differences in media reporting in the United States 
and Japan in the five months prior to the war in Iraq. During this period, the two 
countries media show sharp distinctions in many ways, especially in the degree 
of support for U.S. governmental decisions and how much power the United 
Nations has. Also, the two newspapers have different accounts as to whether the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq is imminent or not. One of the major storylines of the New 
York Times is that a second Gulf War was near at hand because Saddam Hussein 
was not cooperating with United Nations nuclear inspections. By contrast, in the 
Asahi the dominant storyline is that the United States must not rush to start any 
military action, although Saddam Hussein was not cooperative and a terrible 
despot. Also, a striking difference is found between the two media in their 
description of certain incidents would occur in the war, such as civilian casualties. 
As a result, the two countries leading media have portrayed different realities 
of the war in Iraq, as if two different wars were developing at the same time. In 






Subsection 1 U.S. Policies toward Iraq 
The two media organizations emphasize different storylines. The New 
York Times features articles on U.S. policies toward Iraq. For the Asahi 
international relations is the most common storyline during this period. While 
65 % of the articles of the New York Times contain some reference of the 
American policies toward Iraq, only 32% of the Asahi articles refer to the U.S. 
actions. Instead, 49% of the Asahi articles refer to UN diplomacy or the 
relationship between the UN and other countries, such as France, Germany and 
Japan.  
During this period, the New York Times uses large portions of the Iraqi 
stories to discuss the next possible actions by the Bush administration. Compared 
with the Asahi, it is very noticeable that the articles of the New York Times 
attempted to deliver to their readers a very concrete analysis of the 
administrations actions. This may, however, raise the question of objectivity 
during the war. As mentioned before, objectivity is one of the most difficult tasks 
in war reporting. To a staff writer at the New York Times, these stories were 
written based on correct information from their news source. However, the 
problem is that the more they had to follow accurately their particular news 
sources that happened to coincide with the governments perspectives, the closer 
their stories came to being government propaganda. As a consequence, often the 
New York Times writer whether consciously or not played the role of a 
cheerleader to the administration even if the writer wanted to be as objective as 




perspective of the Bush administration. Accordingly, the stories of the New York 
Times present a relatively favorable view of the pre-emptive attack on Iraq. 
In contrast to the New York Times, the Asahi was consistently critical of 
the Bush administrations policy over Iraq. Yoichi Funabashi, one of the most 
famous editors in the newspaper reiterates during this period his disagreement 
with U.S. policies. Writing in an article named An Open Letter to the Bush 
administration (October 8, 2002), he presents his argument against the 
Administration. Funabashi says, [I]f the United States overreacts militarily, there 
is also the fear that it could lead to more war. Thus, he believes that the United 
States should not rush and act on the Iraq crisis in light of long-term national 
interests.  
Also, it is clearly noticeable that the Asahi reports much less information 
about the American side. While the Asahi frequently quotes comments of the 
officials of the Bush administration, the paper does not share large portions of the 
U.S. governments views on Iraq issues. Significantly, regarding the Bush 
administrations contemplations about going to war, the Asahi did not report the 
possible plans of attack or the degrees of preparation for an attack.  
The Asahis anti-Bush media frame became obvious in November 2002 
when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announced his decision not to join 
the coalition forces as a way to oppose the Bush administrations policies over 
Iraq. Both the New York Times and the Asahi featured Schroeders decision in 
several articles. The New York Times articles focus on the loss of the help of 




somewhat laudatory. The Asahi indicates that the decision by the Schroeder 
Administration appears to be rational while it seems to find that U.S. polices have 
become too bellicose.  
It is important to suggest that the Asahis frame of news does not reflect 
the Koizumi administrations official positions at all. The Koizumi administration 
supported U.S. policies toward Iraq. During the run-up period to the war, Prime 
Minister Koizumi publicly expressed support for the U.S. effort to fight against 
terrorism and criticized Husseins unwillingness to cooperate with UN weapons 
inspections. Koizumi also quickly announced his support for the U.S.-led 
coalition fighting in Iraq when the war actually started, saying that he expected 
people in Japan would understand the decision of the Bush administration.  
In the Asahi, there is a clear anti-U.S. tone in the news stories. There are 
several possible reasons for this. First, the Asahis U.S.-based foreign 
correspondents, mostly stationed in Washington, D.C. and New York, reported 
the latest actions of the Bush administrations policies over Iraq. It seems that 
those correspondents implicitly or explicitly selected the news they felt was 
appropriate for their Japanese audience. Thus, relatively simple content, such as 
that obtained from official press conferences, were often selected out of the 
information they could obtain in the United States.   
Second, the Asahi included many opinions by commentators and editors. 
They often criticize U.S. expansionism in their commentaries. These 
commentaries openly criticize U.S. expansionism and imperialism after the 9-11 




new foreign policy strategy including the right to launch pre-emptive war and to 
pursue unilateral military action, if necessary. These commentaries often deliver 
relatively simple plots. For example, one commentary suggests that after the 9-11 
attacks, the United States turned into a warmongering nation that rushed into a 
war, not for the elimination of the terrorist networks, but to benefit their own 
country, by securing oil interests in the Middle East. 
There are commonalities among the commentators the Asahi chooses. 
They appear to share similar points of view about Iraqi to that which the Asahi 
often presented in its stories and editorials. For example, an interview article with 
Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and one 
of the most famous scholars of international relations in Japan, presents her 
remarks, many of which sound familiar to readers of the Asahi. She basically 
points out that the way the United States prepared for the war in Iraq is 
problematic because although Hussein has been dictatorial, the link between the 
War on Terror and the overthrow of the Hussein regime is not firmly established 
(December 11, 2002).  
Third, the Asahi features the U.S. actions possible impact on Japanese 
politics. This includes reactions from Japanese legislatures, officials, and the 
public and disputes over the possible dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces to Iraq. Since the Asahi has been very negative toward both the Bush 
doctrine and the overseas dispatch of the SDF, these articles usually accentuate 





Subsection 2 Imminence of the War with Saddam 
It is essential that the two media differently recognize the feasibility and 
the imminence of the war with Saddam Hussein. While the New York Times 
reported in this period that the war is imminent, the Asahis major storyline is that 
the war is only a possibility. Especially, after the U.S. Congressional resolution to 
use force against the Iraqi regime, the New York Times storyline indicated that 
the question is not whether to start the war, but when to start it. In contrast, the 
Asahi often suggested that the most important agenda is to find the weapons of 
mass destruction, not to rely on further discussions over sanctions towards Iraq.  
One conscious media frame that the New York Times employs is that 
war is imminent and inevitable. An article (The Hazardous Path Ahead, 
October 11, 2002) suggests that information gathered by the Central Intelligence 
Agency made clear how difficult it will be to manage an escalating crisis in Iraq 
in ways that assure a constructive outcome. Also, even before the Congressional 
resolution to attack Iraq was passed, this article reports about the Bush 
administrations post-war governance of Iraq. According to the story, Washington 
must be mindful to establish a postwar Iraqi government that does away with 
Saddam Hussein's weapons programs and reflects the desires of Iraq's diverse 
population. The story also suggests that the administration has already warned 
Iraqi military officers that they risk prosecution for war crimes.   
Another article appearing in the New York Times (Testing Iraq on Arms 
Inspectors, October 1, 2002) suggests that the problem is that Iraq has never 




or enforcement provisions beyond the continuation of increasingly porous 
economic sanctions. Several articles of the New York Times op-ed page are 
more clearly framed stating that the war is imminent and inevitable. A typical 
article is written by a conservative columnist, William Safire. He calls for ousting 
Saddam Hussein in an article (Saddams Last Ploy, October 7, 2002). 
According to Safire, without the regime change, the destruction of all potential 
weapons of mass destruction is impossible. Although not explicit, many New York 
Times articles, including the Safire column, imply that the evil is the Iraq 
regime and that the good is the United States. This good vs. evil dichotomy is 
the frame that the Bush administration employed and it was the most basic 
storyline of the New York Times during the run-up to the war period. 
In contrast, the Asahi basically maintains its assertion that there must be a 
way not to initiate a military conflict, even though the United States believes that 
the war is inevitable. The Asahis standpoint is that it is still possible to eliminate 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction before resorting to military intervention. The 
Asahi seems to insist that renunciation of war is the fundamental strategy for 
achieving world peace and that there are no better alternatives for maintaining 
international security. Because of this fact, many, if not most articles in the Asahi 
had very strong anti-war sentiments.  
In the last minutes before the war started, the anti-war rhetoric of the 
Asahi became very emphatic. The editorial dated one day before the war began 
(There is No Justification for the War, March 20, 2003) suggests that there is 




about Americas motives. Also, the article argues that the Bush administration is 
rushing into war unilaterally at the cost of the authority of the United Nations. 
Thus, the paper repeatedly suggests that there is no reasonable justification for the 
war in Iraq.  
Regarding the urgency of the war, another pivotal difference between the 
two papers is how much the anti-war protests are covered in their papers. The 
Asahi frequently refers to more anti-war activities around the world than the New 
York Times does. In an article regarding the human shield in Iraq, the Asahi 
reports  Japanese civilian volunteers anti-war tactics to deter the coalition forces 
from attacking Iraq (March 13,2003). Although the paper quotes a Japanese 
officials warning not to enter Iraq for safety reasons, many articles are more 
sympathetic to the anti-United States activists position.  
 
Subsection 3 Roles of the United Nations 
Another crucial difference in reporting between the two media during 
this period is about the role and the strength of the United Nations. The gap 
regarding the UN stories between the two media is supported by quantitative 
analysis. In terms of frequency, the United Nations was mentioned in 36% of the 
articles from the Asahi, but in only 15% of the articles from the New York Times 
during the run-up period.  
Frequent storylines that the New York Times adopts is that UN 
inspection is not effective enough to rectify the deeds of Saddam. The New York 




inspections in Iraq are reiterated in the New York Times stories. Eventually this 
leads to the newspaper emphatically pointing out the impossibility of any peaceful 
solutions. While the paper often refers to the importance of diplomatic solutions 
to prevent a conflict, the calls for such a deliberative policy are frequently 
juxtaposed to the fact that Saddam Hussein procrastinated in his reform of his 
administration for a long time after the First Gulf War. In addition, it is interesting 
that in the New York Times articles most of the quotations from the Iraq officials 
are framed as phony. Especially, Mohammed Saeed al-Shahaf, the Minister of 
Information of Iraq, is often the subject of derision by the paper.  
What is characterized as even more different is the degree to which the 
UN is effective. The Asahis stories have a tendency to refer to the UN as if the 
organization can decide the fate of the world. According to the Asahi, the UN is 
a very powerful organization, which seems to be an ultimate, omnipotent police 
regarding world order. In contrast, the New York Times has more focus on 
domestic actions toward Iraq. In the New York Times articles, the UN is also 
portrayed as having a strong impact on international security and the ability to 
decide on the direction of the inspections and sanctions. The UN, nonetheless, is 
characterized in the articles as simply a place to negotiate, and as a body whose 
decision making regarding sanctions is perennially dragging. 
In an article, the New York Times admits that the United States cannot 
defeat Al Qaeda without the help of dozens of other nations, and stresses the 
deliberation not to give way to the use of force until peaceful paths to Iraqi 




the articles position about the use of powers is based on a very realist worldview. 
The article says, [w]e are not under any illusion that Mr. Hussein is disabling his 
missiles simply because he likes the idea. . . The U.N. must realize that whatever 
success it has achieved of late in getting Iraq to abide by its directives has come 
only because of American military might. Here we find that the New York Times 
basic perspective regarding the use of military forces is quite different from that 
of the Asahi. While the New York Times is relatively realist in its views on Iraq, 
the Asahi seems to believe that denouncing military attacks is a starting point 
toward resolving the tension among nations. 
Moreover, the basic frames of the issue are quite opposite between the 
two media. One of the Asahis major storylines is that the evil doer may be the 
United States, and the do gooder is the international community, most notably 
the United Nations. This is in sharp contrast to the New York Times which has as 
one of its basic storylines that the evil doer is the Iraq regime and the gooder" 
is the United States. 
 
 
Subsection 4  Civilian Casualties 
In the run-up period to the war, it is interesting to compare the two media 
regarding how they refer to civilian casualties and damages. While 39 articles in 
the New York Times contain some reference to civilian casualties and damages, 




the impact on civilians. Also, the Asahis emphasis on civilian suffering is 
demonstrated not only by the number of articles but also by their content.  
A wars potential impact on the people in Iraq seems to have been of 
little interest to journalists in the New York Times. Only four of the articles focus 
on Iraqi casualties as their main topic during this period. Nine articles feature 
coalition casualties as their main topic. A lack of attention on the victims of war 
is one aspect of a neglect of another countrys culture and society, as well as a 
dehumanization of an enemy. Since the war had not started yet in this period, 
many of these references to casualties are assessments of possible numbers of 
casualties should a war begin.  
Instead of featuring Iraqi casualties, the New York Times features the 
Bush administrations preparation to conduct an ethical war. Many of the New 
York Times articles explain the Bush administrations attempts to reduce 
collateral damage, the terminology the Pentagon uses to refer to civilian 
casualties and damages which are unavoidable accidents (or by the military) 
in the war. Several articles report new weapons to reduce collateral damage 
(e.g., Talking Aim at an Enemys Chips February 20, 2003). Another 
interesting article (Battle Plan: Spare Iraqs Civilians February 23, 2003) 
explains in great lengths that damage control has become a standard part of 
mission planning, unlike the war in Vietnam. According to the article, the Bush 
administration has designed an air campaign that tries to avoid destroying bridges, 
roads and other public works so that the country can be rebuilt quickly, and 




instructed its planners to select targets where homes, schools and mosques are 
least likely to be damaged and even required them to calculate whether bombs 
that drift off target might hit civilian targets.  
In another article in the New York Times (Ethical War? Do the Good 
Guys Finish First? March 8, 2003), the paper also suggests that there are 
limitations to an ethical war. The article points out that the problem is that 
collateral damage control becomes so important for every aspect in military 
operations that military personnel sometimes cannot effectively attack the enemy. 
According to the article, since American military policy requires legal advisers to 
approve combat targets in advance, clearance delays and denials allowed 
important Taliban and Qaeda members to escape unscathed during the War in 
Afghanistan. Also, the article emphasizes the difficulty of distinguishing between 
civilians and military personnel in an actual battlezone. 
While the New York Times articles present the vague possibility of 
civilian damages, the Asahi describes more seriously, sometimes emotionally the 
impact with which the war affects civilians in Iraq. An Asahi article ( There is 
No Reasonable Justification for Iraq War March 20, 2003) suggests "Even if the 
war ends quickly, as America hopes, it will still have to bring Iraq and its capital 
to submission with quite a different outcome from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
Many innocent civilians will be killed or harmed in the process. This conflict may 






Subsection 5  News Sources 
Also, in the run-up period to the war, the content of the two media are 
quite different in light of their news sources. While the New York Times often 
quotes from officials of the Bush administration as well as members of Congress 
and scholars, the Asahi largely depends on a U.S. government spokesperson, such 
as the press secretary. Also, it is notable that the Asahi features one government 
official more frequently than others. Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of 
State, who is famous as a Japanese specialist. Although the New York Times 
quotes Armitage as well, the presence of Armitage in the Asahi is very 
conspicuous. Each time Armitage appears in public lectures, the Asahi seems 
never to fail to feature him. The Asahi seems to believe that Armitages remarks 
are trustworthy sources for understanding the Bush governments official views 
on Iraq and to assess future U.S. policies over Iraq.  
Also, the newspapers choice of commentators differs sharply. As 
mentioned above, the Asahi mostly features scholars. The New York Times 
commentators are however, more varied from scholars and former military 
personnel to technology analysts of weaponry. 
 
 
Section 3 Findings and Analyses 






Finding 1: The U.S. and Japanese news media framed quite differently the war in 
Iraq. 
Finding 2: The U.S. and Japanese news media show quite different patterns of 
sympathy and antipathy toward the U.S.-led forces in the Iraq War.  
Finding 3: The Japanese medias approach to the Iraq War is less military-strategy 
centered and more diplomacy oriented than the U.S. media. 
Finding 4: The Japanese news media put more importance on civilian casualties in 
Iraq than did the U.S. media.  
 
Regarding Finding 1, it is concluded that the U.S. and Japanese news 
media quite differently framed the war in Iraq. Since mass media reporting is 
closely associated to its own countrys politics, society, and public opinion, there 
are significant differences in how the media tended to frame the issues related to 
the justification for war, the progress of the war, and the outcome of the war. 
Also, Japan is not the part of the coalition forces and distanced itself from this 
conflict, although the Koizumi Government supported U.S. government positions. 
Thus, the U.S. and Japanese news media show quite different patterns of 
sympathy and antipathy toward the U.S.-led forces in the Iraq War (Finding 
2).The Japanese medias approach to the Iraq War is more focused on diplomatic 
relations, especially in the United Nations, and less military-strategy centered than 




show significant differences in the U.S. and Japanese media because there is a 
more sympathetic view of Iraq and Arabs in the Japanese media (Findings 4). 
 
Section 4 Conclusion 
This comparative study of prewar reporting suggests that in time of 
crisis, the New York Times and the Asahi provided different realities even 
though they were reporting the same events. The main finding is that the contents 
of the two media are quite different both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
especially on the question of UN weapons inspections. 
Also, it is interesting that the two leading liberal media show completely 
different reactions toward their respective governments. Compared with the 
Asahi, the New York Times is less critical of the U.S. governments policies 
toward Iraq. Critics often suggest that the absence of critical reporting in the 
American media allowed the Bush administration to dominate the foreign policy 
agenda (e.g. Schechter, 2003). During the run-up period to the war, the United 
States continued to fight the war against terror. Although the alleged links 
between Al Qaeda and Saddam Husseins regime were not proven, there was a 
consensus in the United States that the link was plausible. Many critics suggested 
that media reporting in the United States implicitly catered to the predominant 
consensus that appeared to take the links for granted.  
Although the Japanese government officially supported U.S. Iraq 




administrations. The Asahi basically maintained its assertion that there must be a 
way to avoid a military conflict.  The frame of the Asahi may reflect the liberal 
ideology of the paper. In general, the Asahi keeps its distance from the American 
media such as the New York Times. Arguably, the consistent use of liberal 
commentators and perspectives from other countries and international 
organizations helps the Asahi maintain more diverse views than those found in the 





Chapter 6:  The Different Notion of Evilness in the war in 
Iraq between the U.S. and Japanese Media: A Content 
Analysis of Editorials 
 
This chapter compares the editorials between the two major print media 
organizations during the period of actual combat of the Iraq War (from March 20, 
2003 to May 1, 2003). Specifically, this chapter selects three memorable moments 
during the combat and qualitatively compares them: Marching into Iraq, tearing 
down Husseins statue in Baghdad, and President Bushs mission accomplished 
address. These moments represent important developments in U.S. Iraq policies 
and military strategies. Articles about these moments are a good reference point 
for understanding the differences and similarities between the two papers.  
 
Section 1 Research Design 
This section qualitatively compares typical editorials of the Asahi and the 
New York Times, written in similar periods during the Iraq War. The editorials 
compared are: (1) immediately after the launch of the war (March 20); (2) ten 
days after the war was initiated (March 31); (3) The fall of Baghdad (April 9); and 
(3) President Bushs mission accomplished speech (April 30). Editorials are the 
most visible outlets of the political position of a newspaper. These editorials 




research question asked in this chapter is whether the papers characterizations of 
evil differ, even when both papers report on the same or similar news. Are there 
differences in the way they construct realities of evilness related to the Iraq 
War? After presenting the major finding of the comparison (subsection B), 
detailed illustrations will be explained using editorials that appeared immediately 
after the launch of the war (subsection C) and the fall of Baghdad (Subsection D). 
 
Section 2 Major Findings 
The two print media portrayed the war in Iraq quite differently. The 
biggest difference in the results of the content analysis of this work is that the two 
leading liberal papers constructed evildoers differently. 
 
Subsection 1 The Asahi 
Contrary to the New York Times, the Asahi depicts America as the bigger 
evil, the country which initiated an unjustified war. The Asahi also indicates 
that the United Nations is the organization that should halt the American 
invasion. Unlike the New York Times, French actions about the Iraq War are, in 
the Asahi, portrayed as noble. In the Asahi, Americas evilness is more 
conspicuous than that of Hussein.  
In every editorial, the Asahi firmly suggests that the U.S. action to start the 
war is wrong and that U.S. attacks on Iraq are immoral acts of invasion. It is 




views about evil in Christian terminology. It seems that the Asahi believes that 
any actions to start a war are the worst and most sinful action that can be taken by 
humankind. This is because many innocent lives are lost and the lives of families 
are destroyed during war. Also, President Bushs us vs. them and good vs. 
evil dualism are targets of the Asahis criticism. Several editorials analyzed in 
this chapter imply that in the eyes of the editors anyoneeven those with a decent 
cause---who starts a battle are evil. The Asahi seems to define evil as the U.S. 
side, which committed a sin for the peace of the world by initiating the war.  
 
 
Subsection 2  The New York Times 
The New York Times portrays Saddam Hussein as the personification of 
evil. In the newspaper, Hussein is described as having supported terrorists 
activities and tormented Iraqi citizens who want to have freedom. Indeed, Hussein 
is described as Americas archenemy. The paper repeatedly indicates that the 
United Nations is a powerless organization that cannot stop Husseins plot. 
French opposition is one of the main reasons why the United States was not able 
to obtain full support from the United Nations. Thus, a series of French actions 
are also portrayed rather negatively in the New York Times.  
While the New York Times treated the war as a hasty invasion without UN 
mandate, the papers editorials sometimes shed light on aspects of liberating Iraq 




importance of ousting Hussein for the sake of American national security and 
peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, the New York Times devoted a relatively 
large portion of its editorials to the daily activities of the coalition forces, 
consisting mostly of U.S. and UK forces.  
Along with their strategies and actions, the soldiers daily lives are fully 
depicted. These articles include anything from mundane chores, such as the way 
to dig a foxhole and to eat and sleep in the desert, to soldiers relationships with 
colleagues, and to the families they left at home. Also, there are a number of 
editorials which referred to soldiers interactions with local residents, which the 
coalition forces liberated These articles provide an image of common people 
like us making efforts to save innocent people who were suffering from the 
tyrant regime. 
In contrast with the Asahi, it appears that the New York Times regards the 
threat to international security of Iraq as evil in a Christian sense. Thus, Saddam 
Hussein, the despotic leader who might have weapons of mass destruction is an 
evildoer. Although both papers notion of evil gravitate around the possibility 
of endangering a number of people, the Asahi focuses more on the action of 






Section 3 The Editorials of Both Papers on the Beginning of the Iraq War 
As an illustration of the above-mentioned findings, the editorials of both 
papers appearing immediately after the launch of the war need to be thoroughly 
explored.  
 
Subsection 1 The Asahi 
Regarding the Iraq War, the Asahi has been unequivocally anti-war. In the 
editorial immediately after the beginning of the Iraq War, the Asahi declared its 
firm opposition to the war. This is because the paper seems to believe that 
military intervention was preventable. The editorial on March 22, 2003 is titled 
End the conflict swiftly: The 21st Century's War Must not be Religious War. 
This article suggests: Even when it was still possible to eliminate Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction short of resort to military intervention, the Bush 
administration chose to use force, despite widespread opposition to war. We do 
not support this war. The Asahi disapproves of the U.S. choice to use force 
because it was still possible to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction short 
of resorting to military intervention.  
The Asahis major concern that any conflict must be avoided seems to 
have originated from the fact that damages to Iraqi civilians would be huge 
because in any conflict, those who suffer most are those who are ruled, not those 
who rule and many people, civilian and military, are being killed or wounded 




casualties is essential now that the war was initiated. The editorial asserts that: 
considering the realities [of the fact that the war was started], the next challenge 
is to determine what course would be best for the people of Iraq and the world. 
Above all, the challenge is to bring the war to a swift conclusion with minimal 
casualties. According to the article, the best practical measure after the launch of 
the war is a swift conclusion with minimal casualties. 
For the welfare of Iraqi citizens, the paper hopes U.S. and British 
military strategies would be citizen-friendly. According to the Asahi, the attacks 
must be narrowly focused upon military targets and facilities related to weapons 
of mass destruction and must not use hugely destructive new weapons, as was 
the case during NATO air strikes upon Yugoslavia or in the U.S.-initiated assault 
upon terrorist targets in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Asahi demands that 
Saddam Hussein not sacrifice the people of Iraq for his own honor and especially 
demands that chemical and biological weapons not be allowed.  
The Asahi further notes the importance of offering assistance to the people 
of Iraq. The paper asserts:  
 
The United Nations anticipates 10 million people will be short of food 
within six weeks. The United States is said to be committed to continuing 
to provide food and medical supplies. We hope arrangements will be made 
as soon as possible to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Iraq from the international community. The flood of refugees can be 




best to secure the safety of the refugees, in cooperation with Iraq's 
neighbors. 
 
The Asahis basic assertion has been that the United Nations should 
dictate Iraq policies even once the war had been started. This editorial put an 
emphasis on the role of the United Nations rebuilding efforts in postwar Iraq. 
Since it is not easy to maintain peace in postwar Iraq because of ethnic and 
religious complications, the editorial predicts that it is next to impossible for the 
United States to stabilize Iraq without the assistance of the United Nations and 
other countries. The article elucidates:  
 
In the United Nations Security Council meeting just before the start of the 
war, which the American and British foreign ministers chose not to attend, 
their counterparts in France, Germany and other countries opposed to the 
war expressed their readiness to provide cooperation and humanitarian 
assistance in Iraq after the war, even though they criticized Washington 
for the war itself. We hope those nations and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan will pursue diplomacy toward ending the war quickly. 
 
The editorial juxtaposes the televised statement of President George W. 
Bush with those of Saddam Hussein, noting the detached way that the two leaders 
presented their causes in televised statements. The tone of the article is, 




the start of hostilities, American television networks broadcast the unfolding pre-
war developments. The war being waged by the United States is evolving as if it 
were some sort of game. 
An interesting finding is that the Asahi suggests the root cause of the Iraq 
War as the difference in religions and cultures. In this editorial, the Asahi 
analyzes that Christian good and evil dichotomy that lies at the basis of Bushs 
decision on Iraq: 
 
The phrase Arab world also turns up in many references in Saddam 
Husseins address. He said the Arab world is a source of dignity, and 
added, Long live the Arab world. And, he said, since Bush has made 
this American-initiated war a conflict directed at the whole Arab and 
Islamic world, the Arab people would rise up in a jihad (holy war). Since 
the conflict began, the Arab and Islamic nations have come to regard the 
role of American and British troops as a revival of the Crusades of the 
Middle Ages. Some Islamic leaders even go so far as to call for a jihad 
against the infidels. The concepts of good and evil that President George 
W. Bush ascribes to are said to be heavily influenced by fundamentalist 
Christianity. The fact that Bush often quotes the Bible in his addresses 
only adds to the credibility of that observation. Bush is also the president 
who likened war in Afghanistan to the Crusades. Officials of his 




the Middle East as if to ignore the cultures and traditions of the Arab 
world. 
 
Christians and Islam discord is a familiar concept for political scientists. 
The Asahi argues the prime mover of the conflict is The Clash of Civilizations. 
This notion was proposed by Samuel Huntington during 1990s. The editorial 
continues: 
 
Samuel Huntington, the noted U.S. political scientist, noted that with the 
end of the Cold War, there would be a clash of civilizations of 
Christianity, Islam and other religions. The Middle East is already 
afflicted with the unresolved problems of the fate of the Palestinians in a 
dispute that stems largely from religious discord. Depending upon how the 
war develops, there is a danger it will aggravate the clash of civilizations. 
 
Thus, the conclusion of the editorial is that the Iraq War must not be 
shaped as a religious conflict caused by the abhorrence of other religions: The 
Asahi quotes a part of George H. W. Bushs memoir and implies that the current 
presidents father had endeavored not to frame the First Gulf War as a religious 
confrontation between the West and the Islamic world and further argues:   
 
Pope John Paul II has pleaded for peaceful resolution of the Iraqi problem, 




civilizations. In his address announcing the start of war against Iraq, Bush 
said he would pay due respect for its citizens, for their great civilization 
and for the religious faiths they practice. We hope he will clearly 
remember what he has said. War at the beginning of the 21st century must 
not become a religious conflict. 
 
Subsection 2 The New York Times  
At the beginning of the war, the New York Times carried two editorials 
consecutively for two days. One seems to be written simultaneously with the 
launch of the conflict (The war Begins, March 20, 2003), while the other is 
about the initial progress of the war (How to Watch the War, March 21, 2003). 
The editorials of the New York Times clearly present a different perspective of the 
Iraq War. While the Asahi stresses the importance of the lives of Iraqi civilians 
and excludes the concerns of those in the United States and British forces, the 
New York Times attempts to care about both. From the context, the New York 
Times put emphasis on the safety of the American military.  
 
No one who knows the American military doubts that it will do its job to 
the best of its ability and with an unswerving consciousness of the balance 
between opportunity and risk. The lives wagered in this operation belong 




known as well as this one how important it is to have a care for those 
lives.  
 
While the Asahi does not touch upon strategies or new developments in 
the military, the New York Times points out the goal of the mission and the latest 
advancements in military technology, especially as a comparison with the first 
Gulf War: 
 
Many Americans remember the first gulf war all too vividly, and the 
temptation will be to read this war against the backdrop of that one. The 
terrain is the same, but everything else has changed. A military that, even 
a dozen years ago, still found itself shuttling paper battle orders back and 
forth is now electronically linked and coordinated in ways that would have 
seemed unimaginable then. There is no strategic exit in the offing, as there 
was when the coalition forces stopped well short of Baghdad in 1991. 
Now it is Saddam or nothing.  
 
Whereas the Asahi presents a clear opposition to the war, the New York 
Times position is ambivalent. This is partly because the New York Times has 
asserted that the war should be undertaken only with broad international support. 
Also, its ambivalence is reflective of strong supportive sentiments for military 






Our job here is not as transcendently clear as the soldiers' job. Now that 
the first strikes have begun, even those who vehemently opposed this war 
will find themselves in the strange position of hoping for just what the 
president they have opposed is himself hoping for: a quick, conclusive 
resolution fought as bloodlessly as possible. People who have supported 
Mr. Bush all along may feel tempted to try to silence those who voice 
dissent. . . . If things go as well as we hope, even those who sharply 
disagree with the logic behind this war are likely to end up feeling 
reassured, almost against their will, by the successful projection of 
American power. Whether they felt the idea of war in Iraq was a bad one 
from the beginning, or -- like us -- they felt it should be undertaken only 
with broad international support, the yearning to go back to a time when 
we felt in control of our own destiny still runs strong. Of all the reasons 
for this mission, the unspoken one, deepest and most hopeless, is to erase 
Sept. 11 from our hearts. 
 
The conclusion of the New York Times editorial is vague, compared with 
the Asahi. The New York Times suggests only that debate over what comes next is 
imperative because we have scarcely begun to talk about how it should be 





As a nation we have scarcely begun to talk about how it should be 
accomplished. Even as we sit here at home, worrying about the outcome 
of the fighting, we must start to debate what comes next. That public 
discussion has to start soon, even tomorrow. But for now, all our other 
thoughts have come to rest. We simply hope for the welfare of those men 
and women -- sons and daughters -- who will be flinging themselves into 
the Iraqi desert. 
 
In the next editorial after the initial attack, the New York Times position 
on the war becomes more noticeable. The editorial is very supportive of American 
actions in Iraq (How to Watch the War, March 21, 2003). The tone of the 
editorial is almost jingoistic; the results of the initial attack were described as 
breathtaking: 
 
The war's opening barrage was a bold effort to kill Saddam Hussein and 
other top leaders of his regime even before a large-scale invasion had 
started. Reacting quickly to intelligence that Iraqi leaders were holed up in 
a bunker, American ships fired nearly 40 cruise missiles from the Persian 
Gulf and Red Sea, and stealth fighters dropped bombs on the compound 
shortly after. It was a breathtaking example of coordination and precision.  
 
Whereas the Asahis major concern is the lives of Iraqi citizens, the 




attacks. The editorial argues that success of the initial attack of the Iraq War 
remains uncertain. This is because the effectiveness of high-tech weapons was 
exaggerated by the media during the 1991 Gulf War---even when that war was a 
real victory for America. Thus, the editorial proposes four benchmarks that can be 
used to measure the progress of the ongoing military campaign. These proposals 
are: command of the air, protection of the oil fields, speed, and most importantly, 
creating a welcoming attitude among Iraqi citizens. These pieces of advice are 
stated to help obtain the ultimate prize: the control of Baghdad. The article 
argues that wise handling of the end game will be the final measure of allied 
success. 
The four benchmarks proposed in the editorial are constructed through 
the eyes of military commanders. First, the editorial claims that command of the 
air is important because allied planes will need to sweep Iraq's feeble air force 
from the skies and suppress its air defenses, a more difficult task. Second, the 
article urges that ground forces must protect the oil fields quickly because Iraq 
has already set oil wells on fire before they fall into American hands. It further 
notes: failure to do so will risk the loss of an asset important for rebuilding the 
country. The third proposal is quick action, aiming to contain the conflict inside 
Iraq. The editorial claims that speed is very critical in preventing Iraqi missile 
attacks on Israel. Once Israel retaliates, the article suggests, the anger of the 
Muslim world will be gravely incited and tough diplomacy will be needed by the 
United States. Also, the article notes that quick action will keeps Kurds and Turks 




airborne troops will need to establish a presence quickly before the north 
disintegrates into chaos. Fourth and most crucial the editorial notes, is the 
creation of a welcoming attitude to Iraqi citizens. To Asahis editors, the fourth 
benchmark that the New York Times editorial offers must sound very 
controversial. The New York Times editorial provides only a neat public relations 
idea for U.S. forces among Iraqi citizens, whereas the most important concern of 
the Asahis editorial is protecting Iraqi citizens. Furthermore, the New York Times 
suggests having a good package to control the images of the forces in order to 
justify the war. The New York Times editorial states: 
 
Nothing could make this invasion look better around the world than 
evidence that it is welcomed by the Iraqis themselves. So mass defections 
by Iraqi soldiers and crowds of joyous civilians hailing the invaders as 
liberators would be very good signs. If that is going to happen, it will most 
likely be in the south, where morale is said to be low among Iraqi troops 
and where Shiite Muslims have long been in conflict with the Hussein 
regime. By the same token, nothing could damage the justification for this 
war more than extensive "collateral damage," harming great numbers of 
civilians. Precision-guided weapons will be relied on to keep the damage 
limited to military targets, and military leaders have pledged to avoid 





Section 4 The Editorials of Both Papers on the Fall of Baghdad 
The fall of Baghdad was a symbolic incident: the toppling of a statue of 
Saddam Hussein at a square in central Baghdad. This incident was a most crucial 
media spectacle as it marked the genuine overturning of the long-standing ruler in 
Iraq. 
 
Subsection 1 The Asahi 
The Asahis portrayal of this incident is very cynical, to say the least. The 
editorial on the U.S.-led forces control of Baghdad is filled with pessimistic 
perspectives of the U.S. actions in Iraq (After the war in Iraq Might Makes 
Right not the Road to Real Progress, April 21, 2003). As this title indicates, the 
editorial seeks fundamental change in U.S. polices in Iraq. 
The editorial first cites the statement of President Bush made soon after a 
statue of Saddam Hussein was removed from the streets in central Baghdad. The 
Asahi regards the statement Human beings yearn for freedom. That is a God-
given doctrine as a self-congratulatory remark without understanding the 
ramifications of the war.  Then, the article refers to the fact that the some of the 
American media is jubilant about the fact that the entire nation of Iraq came under 
the control of U.S. and British forces with relatively little loss of coalition lives. 
Furthermore, the article finds that several Japanese media organizations have 




the situation is not as simple as those media organizations both in the United 
States and Japan think it is. The article continues: 
 
Many media in America praised the victory, with neo-conservative 
magazines making bullish declarations that this victory marks the return of 
a strong America, and that the war against terrorist states had gotten off 
to an auspicious start. The tone of Japanese newspapers and other media 
also tended to argue that the legitimacy of the decision by the United 
States and Britain to go to war was proved. Reasons cited in that argument 
included the easy victory of the coalition forces, as well as upbeat reports 
on the liberation of the Iraq people from Saddam's brutal regime. . . . We 
question, however, whether the situation is really so simple. It would be 
risky to simply forget matters of greater importance. Above all else, this 
refers to the great sacrifices that have accompanied the victory on the 
battlefield. 
 
The rationale of the warning is, among other things, the damage to Iraqi 
civilians. The article notes the suffering of Iraqi people, including Iraqi soldiers:  
 
The number of Iraqi civilian lives lost in the air strikes is estimated in the 
thousands. The ranks of the injured amount to several times that number, 
with many suffering because they cannot obtain adequate medical 




conflict is yet unknown, but must certainly defy any comparison with the 
moderate losses on the U.S. and British side.  
 
The editorial is also concerned with difficulties in reconstructing postwar Iraq 
noting that the task of rebuilding a nation comprised of a complex mix of 
different religious sects and tribes will not be an easy one. Signs of confusion are 
already appearing in the move to establish a working transitional governing 
body. 
The paper points out that the United Nations was a big loser in this 
game, having been summarily snubbed by the United States and Britain, and also 
the organization seems destined for further complications because U.S. leaders are 
reluctant to involve the United Nations in the rule of postwar Iraq, while France 
and Germany still support the role of the UN in its reconstruction. 
The Asahis standpoint remains anti-U.S. The editorial suggests the 
troubled relationship between the United States and Europe has deepened the 
European distrust of America in a wide range of policies such as a ban on nuclear 
weapons testing and solutions for global warming. According to the paper, one 
growing problem is the increasing power of neo-conservatives in the United 
States who may exacerbate the split between America and Europe and bolster the 
belief in the irrelevance of the United Nations. The editorial contrasts the lawful 
UN and the bellicose United States, and provides a prediction that the anti-U.S. 
sentiments in other countries will render a troublesome scenario. It explains: what 




force? One dark scenario is rampant support for the logic of opposing the United 
States with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and any other means available, 
leading to a chaotic and danger-packed world. 
To avoid the problem, the Asahis editorial proposes that one of the 
major tasks that America is facing is reassurance of the United Nations authority. 
It also suggests that the international community has to seek a way to lure 
America back under the reign of the United Nations. This is because there is no 
organization that plays a greater role in working for peaceful solutions to disputes 
than the United Nations. The article, however, considers the effort the 
tremendous challenge of how to truly prevent the spread of terrorism.  
The editorial implies a possibility of reforming the UNs anti-terrorism 
functions, but its emphasis is on the effort of America and its allies because 
regardless of how great a superpower it has become, it [America] cannot 
function alone in the global community. Thus, the article argues that action must 
be taken by U.S. allies to firmly convince America to debate in the arenas of the 
United Nations. The paper brings up an anecdote of Gulliver's Travels written by 
Jonathan Swift: 
 
Taking stock of the current power balance, we wonder if the Bush 
administration does not indeed view the United Nations as being intent on 
stealing away its freedoms-much like the Lilliputians used ropes to tie 
down mighty Gulliver. In fact, that metaphor is currently finding 




were to wrest free of the ropes and go on a rampage, the giant itself would 
also find it difficult to live and prosper in the midst of the chaotic mayhem 
most likely to follow. 
 
Subsection 2 The New York Times  
As opposed to the pessimistic Asahis editorial about the U.S. invasion 
into Iraq, the New York Times editorial on the fall of Baghdad (The Fall of 
Baghdad, April 10, 2003) is jubilant about the demise of the Hussein regime. 
The editorial states that the murderous reign of Saddam Hussein effectively 
ended yesterday as downtown Baghdad slipped from the grip of the Iraqi regime 
and citizens streamed into the streets to celebrate the sudden disintegration of Mr. 
Husseins 24-year dictatorship. The article, indeed, celebrates the ousting of 
Saddam Hussein. The paper claims that the scene in central Baghdad, where 
jubilant Iraqis and American marines collaborated in toppling a huge statue of Mr. 
Hussein, signaled that a complete American military victory in Iraq may be 
achieved within a matter of days, not months. The editorial continues with an 
optimistic tone: 
 
The swiftness of the American advance and the relatively low number of 
American and British casualties reflect a well-designed battle plan and the 




The numbers of Iraqi casualties, military and civilian, remain to be 
determined, but they are likely to be considerable.  
 
The editorial acknowledges the criticism of the U.S. actions in Iraq 
(Opinion about This War Has Been Divided from the Beginning.). The papers 
focus is, nonetheless, different. The editorial suggests that it is important to focus 
on rebuilding Iraq after the dictator is gone. The tone of the description may 
sound hypocritical, compared with that of the Asahi. The paper notes, Now that 
Mr. Husseins rule has ended, there is unity among good-hearted people 
everywhere, a hope that what comes next for the Iraqi people will be a better, 
freer and saner life than the one they had before. Also, the importance of 
peacekeeping is emphasized because cities where the sudden collapse of the 
government have left a power vacuum that invites lawlessness. In the absence of 
civil government, there is an ominous potential for strife and bloodshed in a 
nation ripe with ethnic divisions and hatreds. While the editorial warns of the 
necessity to stabilize the country, it positively summarizes the event by noting 
that the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime can be the opening chapter in a 
positive and historic transformation of Iraq. 
 
Section 5 Conclusion 
My own research on editorials of Japanese and American print media 




Since the scope of my research is limited, further comprehensive 
qualitative and possibly quantitative analyses are needed to understand the notion 
of evil during the war in Iraq. For example, another term may broaden the 
horizons of this comparison of media content across the Pacific. One of these 
terms may be the word invasion. There were some discussions over this term in 
the Japanese media. Although the Japanese equivalent word of invasion is 
shinryaku (entering forcibly); the Japanese word has a stronger connotation 
than the English equivalent. While the Asahi uses the term shinryaku from the 
beginning of the war, some print media, such as the Sankei or the Yomiuri, 
disliked the strong connotation and employed the word shinkou, advancing 
troops, instead. From the beginning of the war, the New York Times used the word 
invasion. It seems that there is no big debate in the United States over the word 
invasion and its connotation.  
Such further examinations will enlarge the scope of understanding of 
difficult cultures. Comparison of the papers of different cultures may make us 
sensitive to differences among cultures. Comparing texts written in different 






Chapter 7: Comparing "the Embedded" Stories of the 
Japanese and U.S. Media during the war in Iraq 
Section 1 Introduction 
This chapter compares articles written by embedded journalists of both the 
Asahi and the New York Times. Also, the difference in articles between those who 
were stationed in Iraq and their colleagues covering the story from back home 
will be examined. Although both papers sent their correspondents to Iraq to 
embed with troops of the coalition forces, content analyses of the articles 
conclude that journalists from the two papers presented quite different views of 
the war, including evaluations on the everyday developments in battalions. There 
were also distinct differences in the journalists level of sympathy with members 
of the units with which they were embedded.  
 
Section 2 Research Design 
The Asahi sent two of their staff writers to embed in the coalition forces. 
One is Tsuyoshi Nojima embedded in the First Marine Division and the other is 
Ishihara Takefumi embedded on the Aircraft Career Kittyhawk. The First Marine 
Division was a ground troop. The Division was assigned to attack Baghdad, 
moving up from the Southern tip of Iraq. The Aircraft Carrier Kittyhawk was 




the smallest possibility of counterattack by the Iraq forces. Since Nojimas 
assignment was in the actual battleground, his reports are more important for this 
analysis. 
The Asahi database Kikuzo identified 24 articles written by Nojima during 
the period in which major combat occurred (between March 20 and May 1, 2003). 
Most are written when he was in the field. Some are memoirs after he left the 
battalion. Nojima was asked by editors of the Asahi to cut his assignment short 
and leave the field in early April 2003, when his troop was heading for Baghdad. 
This is because the editors found that it was too dangerous for him to continue his 
duties in the field after they read Nojimas experience during the assault by Iraqi 
forces in Nasiriyah (Nojima 2003, 87). Because among his 24 articles, three are 
reports on preparations for an interim government in the area where Iraq forces 
were ousted and these were written after he left the field, they are excluded from 
this analysis. 
In the New York Times articles, it is noticeable that almost all the 
embedded stories contain words in their headline such as in the field 101st 
Airboneor With the troopsFirst Marine Division. Also, every headline starts 
with either such phrases as A Nation at War (March 20 to April 20) or After 
Effects (April 21 to May 1). During the period of analysis, the New York Times 
sent fifteen reporters into the field. These writers embedded stories are found in 
the NexisLexis database. In the alphabetical order, they are: C.J. Chivers (twenty-
five articles), James Dao (fourteen), Jim Dwyer (eighteen), Dexter Filkins (thirty-




Judith Miller (twenty-one), Steven Lee Myers (twenty-two), David Rohde (thirty-
four), Marc Santora (eighteen), Craig S. Smith (twenty-five), Patrick E. Tyler 
(twenty-three), Bernard Weinraub (twenty-seven), and Michael Wilson (fourteen). 
Several of them are written by more than one author. Excluding these overlaps, 
two hundred and sixty eight articles are selected for analysis. 
 
Section 3 Findings 
There are mainly four findings that come from comparing articles written 
by the embedded journalists of the Asahi and the New York Times. The two 
leading newspapers articles are similar in their personal and realistic descriptions 
and their focus on the daily activities of the troops in the field. They have, 
however, huge differences, not only in their formats and structures, but in the 
degree of sympathy shown toward the coalition forces. 
 
Subsection 1 Difference in Formats and Structures 
Reports from embedded journalists in both papers are very different in 
their formats and structures. First, the lengths of articles are different. In the 
Asahi, many articles written by embedded journalists are relatively short: 200 to 
1500 Japanese letters (not words), which is equivalent to about 75 to 565 words in 
English. Most articles of the New York Times are between 900 and 2000.  
Another difference in formats and structures may be related to length. In 




general developments in the Iraq War. Six articles among twenty-one of Nojimas 
articles are about the latest developments of the war and are treated as related 
stories to the main news. The most typical example is Nojimas story at the time 
when the U.S. forces moved into Iraq to initiate attacks on March 20. His story 
was one piece among other related stories from Washington, Kuwait, and Jordan 
that came after a short description of the U.S. decision to start a war with 
Husseins regime (March 21). On the other hand, unlike the Asahi, most articles 
in the New York Times are independent of the main stories about the war.  
Perhaps, the most interesting difference in news format is that the Asahi 
clearly notes that the contents of their embedded stories are controlled by U.S. 
forces, and many of Asahis articles have eye-catching disclaimers. Although 
there are several versions of the disclaimers, the main point is the same: This 
story is reported under the rules set by the U.S. military. Contents of this story 
may be affected by the rule. According to Nojima, the disclaimers were 
presented because the editors in the Asahi found that the embedding rules set by 
the U.S. forces could greatly affect reporting of the truth. Interestingly, Nojima 
himself believed that the disclaimers were unnecessary partly because allowing 
journalists to embed their troops in the battleground is considered a great 
opportunity to be closer to the truth. Nojima also suggests that the disclaimers 
might suggest to their readers that the stories are not trustworthy (Nojima, 2003, 
117-123).  
The New York Times does not have similar disclaimers in its embedded 




about the media control of the U.S. government. Instead, articles written by 
several staff writers who were not embedded questioned the objectivity of their 
reports. However, these criticisms appear mostly on electronic media, such as the 
cable news network. For example, an article written by David Carr on March 31 
(Reporters New Battlefield Access Has Its Risks as Well as Its Rewards) 
claimed that television news reports from the battlefield provided striking images 
of the war, but raise questions about their objectivity because these reports were 
based on the information from the coalition forces. 
Although the length and structure of the articles are different in the two 
leading newspapers, there is one clear similarity: every article written by 
embedded reporters has a byline, which carries the authors name. In general, one 
of the well-known practices of Japanese print media is that the authors name of 
an article is not explicitly provided. There is no clear reason for this convention, 
but unlike the print media in the United States, only some articles, mostly 
commentaries, are entitled to have bylines. Thus, in this respect, the articles 
written by the embedded reporters were rather unique within the Japanese media.  
 
Subsection 2 Similarities in Personal and Realistic Descriptions 
Reports from embedded journalists in both papers have one very clear 
similarity: both are very personal and realistic in their descriptions. Since 




lives alongside coalition forces in Iraq, there is no doubt that their stories are very 
personal and realistic. 
Nojimas report in the Asahi became suddenly tense after the troop with 
which he was embedded was attacked by Iraqi forces in Nasiria. He reported this 
incident several times. His first report (March 24) was about the incident in which 
the members of the troops almost panicked at the news that other forces were 
ambushed and more than 50 marines were killed. His second and third reports 
(both articles were on March 26) were more realistic because his own troop was 
involved in a fierce battle with Iraqi forces. The battle lasted about 20 minutes 
and he had to dodge bullets so that he would not be shot. He was amidst the 
smoke of gun power and a shower of bullets and reported I prayed not to get 
shot.  
Reporters of the New York Times also experienced serious battles. Many 
articles of the actual battles chronicled with exact time the actions of the troops 
and recorded further developments in the field. These articles sometimes contain 
raw comments of the excited or panicked troops when they were facing crucial 
moments in the battle. For example, a story written by Steven Lee Myers on 
March 31 featured several changes of strategies and rules of command in the field 
because of an attack by an Iraqi suicide bomber. In his article, Lieutenant Colonel 
Scott E. Rutter bluntly mentioned how to handle Iraqi civilians, Five seconds. . . 
. They have five seconds to turn around and get out of here. If theyre there in five 
seconds, theyre dead. Also in the article Major General Bufford C. Blount III, 




necessary step to ensure the safety of his troops and stating that We went to into 
this hoping to keep collateral damage and civilian casualties to a minimum. . . 
.Theyve not let us do it. 
It seems that personal relationships between soldiers and reporters were 
developed in the course of the action. One of the most personal stories in the 
Asahi is about the death of Jim Cawley with whom Nojima was embedded in the 
same Division. Cawleys death was caused by the mistake of a young Marine who 
ran over Cawley with a humvee, when Cawley was lying on the ground. During 
the time of his embedding, Nojima became very close to Cawley because he was 
fluent enough to converse in Japanese with Nojima. Thus, Nojima wrote a very 
sentimental obituary of him as a close friend (April 9). The article explained that 
Nojima became a very special person for Cawley because it was Nojima who had 
to explain about his death in detail to Cawleys Japanese wife, Miyuki.  
Because of trust, even during the time of non-combat, soldiers in the field 
seemed to talk very frankly with New York Times reporters. For example, an 
article written by Dexter Filkins (April 1) carried the politically incorrect 
comment of Colonel John Pomfret, who referred to a newly captured piece of 
Iraqi territory somewhere close to the south of Baghdad, Were in bad-guy 
country. . . I like it.  
Also, stories of embedded journalists in both papers are full of the sounds 
and smells, they sometimes witnessed in memorable scenes. In an article of 
March 24 written by Patrick Tyler, the New York Times reporter saw American 




them. Nojima of the Asahi reported in detail how the troop searched for Iraqi 
militia members who hid themselves among the civilians (March 31). The 
members of the troop took all the residents from their houses in a small village of 
the Kut Al Hay area and collected weaponry such as machine guns. Among those 
50 residents many were women and children, and the crying of children echoed in 
the area. James Dao in the New York Times (April 14) told how hundreds of 
children and teenagers rushed to the forces and tried to catch food and cigarettes 
given out by U.S. troops.  
 
Subsection 3 Similarities in the Focus on Daily Activities in the Field 
As much as their reports are very personal, both papers report on the 
soldiers daily activities in the field. As mentioned above, both papers differ in the 
length of their articles. Since articles of the New York Times have more volume 
than those of the Asahi, most stories written by embedded journalists of the New 
York Times contain much more concrete descriptions of daily activities. Although 
the details differ in degree, articles of both papers paid great attention to many 
aspects of the military activities.  
In an Asahi article (April 2), Nojima explained daily life in the field in 
great detail. According to him, each package of field food (Meal Ready to Eat) 
was attached with heating pads. Soldiers love beef ravioli and hamburgers, but 
pork chops were their least favorite. Also, Nojima reported how all members of 




 Since New York Times articles were more voluminous, reporters featured 
issues beyond daily activities in the field. The psychology of soldiers was 
especially focused on. A story by Steven Lee Myers (April 13) featured the fear 
of soldiers who might be facing a gas attack. Although it turned out to be a false 
alarm later, sensors of their armored vehicle registered traces of a nerve agent. 
Thus, the brigades soldiers had to wear their gas masks, hoods, and rubber 
gloves. They were very nervous for a while until they found a bird flying over 
them. Looking at the survival of the creature, they became relieved but also 
learned that even the most sophisticated sensors could be wrong. 
 
Subsection 4 Difference in the Degree of Sympathy with the Forces. 
There is a sharp contrast between the two newspapers embedded stories 
in the degree of sympathy toward the coalition forces. Although it is not clearly 
stated, it seems that New York Times articles do not indicate their hesitation to 
report activities in the field through the eyes of the coalition forces. News sources 
are from members of the troops; thus, a large portion of the reports are occupied 
with further military strategies, results of the battle, or human interest stories of 
soldiers, such as their comradely with other members who lost their lives. In this 
way, arguably, it seems that the New York Times articles imply a sympathetic 
view toward the forces.  
In contrast, Nojimas articles in the Asahi are ambivalent toward the U.S. 




embedded, he showed a strong sense of otherness to the forces at other times. In 
the article on April 1, Nojima himself admitted that his articles were ambivalent 
toward the forces. Nojima recalled the time when his troop was fighting with Iraqi 
forces and a 60-milimeter mortar of his troop destroyed the enemy. He yelled with 
joy for the successful attack, but soon realized that he was supposed to be an 
objective observer. He also presented his feeling that he had been constantly 
evaluating whether or not his articles were too sympathetic toward the coalition 
forces. Thus, although a close friendship between Nojima and the members of the 
troop developed, he had to be very aware to screen out information provided by 
the forces because the troop might manipulate him.  
In another article (April 2), Nojima found another occasion for feeling a 
sense of otherness from the members of the troop because his perspective about 
what was important or valuable was different from theirs. He explained to 
members of the forces that the Tigris-Euphrates River area was one of the origins 
of the worlds earliest civilizations, only to find that the soldiers wanted to chat 
about women and food most of the time and many of them looked at porn 
magazines or took pictures of the land where they were located. Also, their eyes 
suddenly turned very beastly, according to Nojimas description, before the 
battle, and Nojima concluded that they were totally different from a Japanese 
civilian like him.  In another article (April 16), Nojima suggested that the 
soldiers seemed to hold a firm belief that the Iraq War was justifiable and that the 




that the soldiers seemed to believe in a simplified idea of the war as one between 
the good guys and the bad guys  
It is interesting that Nojimas stories are different from other articles in 
Asahi on the Iraq War. Many of the other Asahi articles imply more anti-U.S. 
sentiments. Considering this, his articles are more sympathetic with the U.S. 
forces than other Asahi articles. One example of this is the story on March 24. His 
articles several times feature some sort of interactions between Iraqi civilians and 
the troop with which he was embedded. In the March 24article, the members 
faces turned very relieved when many civilians waved their hands and smiled at 
them in Basra, the Southern part of Iraq. According to the story, the members of 
the troop seemed to believe that building up good relationship with civilians, 
especially with those who had anti-Hussein sentiments, might hold the key to 
their future mission in Iraq; thus, they had been very anxious about Iraqi civilians 
reactions.  
Although Nojima witnessed that many civilians were cordial to the troops 
with which he was embedded in Basra (March 24), another story on the same day 
written by another staff writer denied this, citing a telephone interview with a 
civilian from Baghdad. She mentioned, although the U.S. forces announced that 
Iraqi civilians welcomed them in Basra, I believe many Iraqis never welcomed 
them because we have been protecting our country. . . As discussed in the 
previous Chapter, stories of Asahi leading up to the Iraq War period implied more 




the slight but significant discrepancy between the Asahi journalists may be quite 
interesting in understanding the papers position on the war. 
Nojimas articles during his embedding with soldiers were not as anti-
American as those written by other Asahi staff writers. Although his case may be 
an isolated case, it may be that the fact that Nojima established friendly 
relationships with soldiers might have had an impact on his stories. As discussed 
above, Nojimas articles sometimes presented some detachment from the troops. 
This may be because Nojimas is a non-native English speaker and his period at 
the battleground was much shorter than New York Times embedded reporters. 
Even so, Nojimas articles differences from those of his colleague are noteworthy.   
 
Section 4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a case study of comparative political 
communication, between the articles written by Japanese (Asahi) and U.S. (New 
York Times) embedded reporters during the Iraq War. According to the content 
analyses of the articles, the two leading newspaper articles are similar in their 
personal and realistic descriptions and in their focus on daily activities in the field. 
Nonetheless, there are significant disparities in their formats and the degree of 





Chapter 8:  Analyzing the Reasons for Difference in Media 
Reporting (1): Organizational Experiences and Views about 
Warfare. 
Chapters eight to ten explore reasons for why the accounts of the Asahi 
and the New York Times are so distinct. Chapter nine investigates American and 
Japanese media organizations different views about warfare. One of the focal 
points of the discussion in this chapter is on how Japanese media organizations 
influence their war reporting, and especially the Asahis mentality of anti-
militarism. I argue that this anti-military sentiment in the Japanese media partly 
explains the reasons for the differences between the New York Times and the 
Asahi s reporting about the Iraq War. 
Specifically, the chapter first examines how the concept of warfare has 
been negatively perceived and anti-militarism has come to be prevalent in the 
media in Japan. The main argument in this segment of the chapter is that the 
historical experiences of the Japanese media during and after World War II was a 
traumatic one. The memories of the experiences of World War II still haunt the 
Japanese media although more than sixty years have passed. Because many 
Japanese journalists share anti-militarism sentiments, their portrayals of war tend 
to be critical. Large portion of this chapter are based upon my interviews with 




This chapter also investigates how the anti-militaristic sentiments in the 
Japanese media created a different media-politics relationship from that found in 
the United States. Both the media in Japans and the United States have strong 
impacts on politics; the media and politics have an interdependent relationship in 
both nations. Anti-militarism as well as the Japanese political system have played 
a different role than their American counterparts. I suggest that the Japanese 
media has served as a strong opposition voice against the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party and has formed a coalition with the weak opposition parties so 
that progressive issues, such as preventing Japans remilitarization, have been 
brought up effectively in political dialogues. Although the anti-militarism in the 
Japanese media is still very strong, the media organizations uniformity in support 
of progressive issues has gradually waned. Some may argue that the Japanese 
sense of democracy may gradually face a turning point because it was supported 
by anti-militarism.  
 
Section 1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
The research questions and hypothesis for this chapter are as follows: 
 
Research Question 2-1: What is the cause for the differences between the two 
countries medias reporting on the Iraq War? What are the relationships between 
the media and politics, both in the United States and Japan? Is the relationship 




depictions of the Iraq War? How does the media-politics relationship affect media 
content? 
 
Hypothesis1: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about 
Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the different experiences of the 
two countries media in relation to the past wars.  
 
Section 2 Japanese Journalists Perception on Warfare: Different Historical 
Development between the United States and Japan 
One of the biggest differences in political communications between the 
United States and Japan lies in the historical experiences during World War II. 
The different political communication systems during World War II created the 
foundation for Japanese media organizations subsequent critical stance towards 
warfare. Japanese media organizations, include the Asahi, supported the jingoistic 
government that ruled Japan during World War II. This reality left a heavy burden 
that the press had to deal with after the defeat of Japan. 
As Thomas Berger (1998) claims both Japan and Germany have 
widespread anti-militaristic sentiments in their societies. One of the most 
important developments in the post World War II period was the medias 
denouncing of the chauvinistic stance of past regimes. War has come to be a very 
sensitive topic among Japanese journalists. All journalists I interviewed displayed 




prevent war. Journalist A suggests: The reason I became a journalist is to inform 
citizens about atrocities of wars. Wars are the most miserable products that 
humankind has created, but have never been extinct. Therefore, journalists, 
including myself, have to report details of wars and help to minimize the 
escalation of the current wars and stop the possibility of future wars. Journalist B 
refers to a book named The Good War (1984, 2004), which consists of 121 
interviews about World War II, compiled by Studs Terkel, and elucidates: I was 
very surprised when I read Terkels book because so many American citizens 
approved past wars in which their government was involved, although some 
interviewees in the book showed strong concerns about the war. I believe there 
are not such things as good wars. No matter how great the cause may be, wars are 
the worst possible forms of infringement on human rights. Starting to kill others is 
the silliest action. All I can do is to write a story against wars.  Journalist C 
summaries the history of Japan after the Second World War: Because of Chapter 
Nine of the Japanese Constitution (nullification of wars), Japan has enjoyed peace 
for more than sixty years. The current Japan is quite different from Japan during 
World War II. Nonetheless, if we, journalists, stop the effort to be alert against the 
possibility that Japanese government may become involve in the war, I am afraid 
that Japan may become jingoistic again. The peace may be fragile, thus, the role 
of journalists is crucial. 
Anti-militarism of the Japanese media originated in the mea culpa of the 
Japanese media during World War II. It is often noted by scholars that Japanese 




the imperial Japanese government. During World War II, the news media in Japan 
supported the war by propagating the governments jingoistic ideas. The support 
included the forceful propaganda of patriotism.  
The key to the control of the media during World War II was 
governmental censorship. Central to pre-1945 developments in Japanese political 
communication were the limitation placed on the freedom of the press. The early 
Meiji government actively fostered the media and encouraged newspapers to 
reestablish themselves. However, as Gregory Kasza (1988) suggests, the Japanese 
government already early in the 20th century attempted to control the media by 
using draconian measures of censorship. Kasza further shows that, although the 
degree of state control over the content of newspapers in wartime Japan equaled 
that in Nazi Germany, the effectiveness of control was greater in Japan. Without 
using the coercive methods of the Germans, the Japanese bureaucrats produced a 
propaganda network more effective than that of Joseph Goebbels in molding 
public opinion. Although during the so-called Taisho Democracy period (1913-
1925) ---the post Meiji and the pre-World War II period---Japanese media 
enjoyed relative freedom from the government, the imperial government of Japan 
started to control media ownership and ordered the consolidation of many 
newspapers as the war approached.   
Media ownership during World War II was strictly controlled by the 
Japanese government. Kasza argues that this consolidation made it easier for the 
government to censor each paper. If a media organization did not follow the 




journalist did not accept the alteration ordered by the government, the journalist 
had to be detained and, in some cases, physically tortured (Kazsa 1988, Chap. 6). 
During World War II, the Japanese media organization reported the 
official announcements of the government without critically verifying facts; thus, 
the media became like a public relations branch of the government. Many 
anecdotes of war heroes were fabricated during that time. One of the famous 
fabrications is the story of "Our Three Human Bomb Patriots" (Bakudan 
Sanyushi).  This story is about three Japanese soldiers who died while trying to 
blow up enemy camps at Shanghai in 1932. The Asahi and the Mainichi 
immediately featured their patriotic deeds. Within weeks, they became the 
subject of songs, movies and stage plays. The story about the soldiers, however, 
later turned out to be false. They had died in an accident and had not killed their 
enemies. Scholars have revealed that most of the medias patriotic stories were 
fabricated (Maesaka 2004). 
The Allied Occupation (1945-1952), led by the United States, imposed 
another form of censorship on Japanese media organizations. Since the Allied 
Occupation saw the media as vehicles to convey its own policies of 
democratization, it did not hesitate to institute measures of its own to thwart 
criticism of Japanese undemocratic institutions. Given the zeal with which it 
abolished the Japanese militarys censorship apparatus, it is striking that the 
Allied Occupation censored materials. Materials that were censored included 
expressions of jingoistic ideas and traditional undemocratic Japanese notions, 




censorship of all major publications, including newspapers, magazines, books as 
well as radio broadcasting.  
Some of the censored materials later were brought by a U.S. government 
official named Gordon W. Prange to the United States and are now stored at the 
McKeldin Library of the University of Maryland, College Park. Jun Eto (1989) 
who researched the censored materials at the UMD Library claims that the 
censorship and propaganda of the Allied Forces was so effectively entrenched in 
the media and educational system in Japan that even after the occupation period 
ended Japanese society was internally destructive; it had lost its traditional 
cultural roots. In addition to the censorship, the Allied Occupation established a 
new Constitution for Japanese citizens; the Constitution attempted to transplant 
democratic ideas and instill in the Japanese a desire to prevent future warfare by 
any means.  In this way, democratic ideals and the sense of anti-militarism were 
brought into Japan hand-in-hand. 
For Japanese journalists, the memory of the censorship by the imperial 
government during the war was a trauma. Because of their experience, the 
Japanese media in general has been strongly anti-war; the Asahi in particular has 
been most critical opponent of any conflict that might involve civilians. In the 
Asahis case, patriotism is a sin because it led Japanese citizens into war. Also, 
religion was associated with government oppression during the war because it 
reminds them of Japanese government-led Shintoism. The Meiji government 
designated Shintoism as the state religion and abolished many Buddhist and 




Citizens in Japan were under a strong pressure to compromise their beliefs and 
practice the state religion of Shintoism. This was especially true during World 
War II; thus, some citizens in Japan may associate the worship of the emperor and 
Shintoism with the tough memories of the war. 
After the defeat of World War II, the Japanese media manifested a strong 
sense of remorse because of the fact that their reports had been inaccurate and the 
media had acted as a cheerleader of militarism. Their regret was so deep that it 
created an anti-militarism media culture. The anti-militaristic media culture 
remains dominant now. Journalist D claims, Although there are no current staff 
writers who experienced World War II, the sense of remorse is still strong at my 
news organization. Many senior writers seem to believe that one of the reasons 
why the imperial government effectively censored the media was that the media 
lost its watchdog functions and did not stop the censorship. Journalist E claims: 
I often heard terrible stories about the censorship during World War II from my 
senior colleagues. They never went to the military, but they heard the stories from 
their seniors. Most of these stories were very vivid. Some stories were about the 
physical tortures that compelled young colleagues to share the fear of his/ her 
seniors about the resurgence of a militaristic government in Japan. Anti-
militarism has been delivered by word of mouth, from one generation to the next, 
inside the news organizations. 
Another reason why anti-militarism has been strong in Japan is that anti-
military sentiments became closely associated with democracy, the post-war 




Japanese government became democratic because of a number of political 
reforms imposed by the United States. Among them, the creation of the 
Constitution in 1946, written by the U.S. occupation government headed by 
General Douglas MacArthur, symbolized American influence in post-war Japan. 
The new Constitution is considered to be a "brain-child" of American judicial 
principles and reflects basic principles such as the employment of judicial review 
and the separation of powers. Other important changes are the notion of equality 
among citizens and the denouncement of the Emperors involvement in politics. 
Prior to World War II, Emperor Hirohito had been considered a "human God."  
The 1946 Constitution has functioned as the highest law of the country without 
any amendments since its creation (Holland 1991, 301). 
Thus, along with the experiences of World War II, the post-War 
Constitution has impacted how the media in Japan perceives war. Article Nine of 
the Constitution denounces any Japanese involvement in military attack. Mamoru 
Fukuo, a specialist of the judiciary, suggests that except for in cases of self-
defense, Japan can not initiate war under the post-war Constitution. Fukuo claims: 
I believe the media as well as the public have believed that anti-militarism 
promotes the democratic and peaceful ideals the Constitution advocates.  
The Constitution has not only kept Japan from becoming involved in 
another war, but also it gives journalists a rationale for their anti-military stance. 
Journalist D suggests that the medias anti-militarism sentiment was nurtured by 
the Constitution. He emphasizes that there is a connection between the Peaceful 




Japan can be anti-military because Japan has been protected by the United States 
under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty: There is virtually zero possibility that 
Japan can wage a war under the Constitution. Although Japan has not been free 
from dangers in national security terms, a possibility of a war is very unlikely. 
Also, there ware only a few limited occasions that the Self-Defense Forces could 
actually face a foreign enemy. I believe Japan is safer than any other countries in 
Asia. For Japanese journalists, it is easy to criticize other countries war efforts 
because they, including myself, believe that wars are things of a different world. 
Hypothetically, if Japan had to be involved in a war, the attitudes of journalists 
might be different. Thomas Berger (1989, 4) also suggests that part of the reason 
for Japanese anti-militarism is its geostrategic position; Japan focuses on trade 
instead of defense.  
The critical views of the Iraq War by the Japanese media, including the 
Asahi, seem to have been formed by the medias anti-militaristic traditions. 
Journalist C explains the anti-war sentiments: Every time a major war broke out, 
I guess the memory of World War II resurfaced in Japanese media organizations, 
including the company I belong to. When we were watching the developments of 
a new major war, our past experience of censorship was retold, and the tragedies 
of the World War came back. In this way, the anti-militaristic culture became 
dominant in Japanese media organizations even if our generation has not 
experienced war. I believe the Iraq War also has strengthened this culture.  
Indeed, the Japanese media in general have presented very progressive 




involved in, the most severely criticized by the Japanese media was the Vietnam 
War. Arguably the Japanese criticism was even more severe than that of the U.S. 
media. A series of articles condemning the battles in South East Asia dominated 
the Japanese media during the 1960s and the 1970s. U.S. positions and policies in 
the Korean War in the 1950s and the Gulf War in the 1990s were also described 
harshly by the Japanese media (Kinoshita 2005, Ishizawa 2005). It seems that not 
only the Iraq War, but also wars in general are considered to be evil entities by 
the Japanese media. Wars tend to be portrayed negatively, and especially the 
countries that have stronger military power, such as the U.S., are more likely to be 
targets of criticism. Also, the Self-Defense Forces in Japan have often become the 
target of harsh criticisms (Berger 1998, Chap.5). 
As discussed above, the different media cultures and the strength of the 
anti-war sentiments in Japan and the United States can be attributed to Japans 
very bitter past experience with war. All of my interviewees suggest that 
historical incidents affect the media culture of the two countries. For instance, 
Hisashi Tomikawa, a scholar of international politics, agrees with the view that 
America has not experienced large numbers of civilian casualties: Many 
Americans lost lives in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, but they were soldiers. 
Tomikawa asserts: Because of this historical path, American cultural views 
about the military are not as antagonistic as those of Japan. Not only media 
culture, but also political culture in Japan was molded by the severe experiences 
in World War II. History is, I believe, the key to understanding the different 




Anti-militarism in Japan has been institutionalized in the Japanese public. 
Fukuo refers to the Aikokushin debates. As mentioned in chapter 8, the literal 
meaning of Aikokushin is the sentiment of loving ones own country, but the 
connotation of this word is in most cases very negative because of the experience 
during World War II. Fukuo explains: There are still great discussions in Japan 
over the concept of loving our own country.  
In a bid to explain the anti-militarism of the Japanese media, several 
interviewees refer to commercialism: media organizations progressive attitudes 
toward the war may attract many audiences. This is because the public largely has 
shared the same experiences as the media. In my interview with Hiroyasu Komine, 
a political scientist at a think tank in Japan, anti-militarism has not been faded 
despite the passage of time because the media has continuously provided 
information with progressive perspectives about warfare. Komine claims: Every 
summer around August, the Japanese media, both print and electronic, feature 
tragedies about World War II. The media reiterate how civilians went through 
hardships with hunger and the death of families in the massive bombings in 
Tokyo and other major cities by the United States. Also, both nuclear bombings 
the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the major topic in television 
dramas every August. Coincidentally, the traditional Buddhist ancestor ceremony 
is in August.  This ceremony is called obon festival, which is to honor the 
departed spirits of ones ancestors; Japanese anti-war sentiment often reaches the 
peak in the month. In this way, anti-militarism in the public has been continually 




Atsushi Izumi, a scholar of international relations, also finds an interesting 
parallel between mid-August in Japan and early September in the United States. 
Izumi claims explains that the American media portrayals about the terror victims 
of the 9-11 incidents every early September have great similarities to how the 
Japanese media reports citizens experience of the Second World War in Japan. 
Izumi explained in an interview with me: They are very similar because the most 
important topic is how an innocent civilian who once lived happily were suddenly 
at the mercy of fate. In addition, every year the memory about the tragedies is 
refreshed after the bombardment of stories about the tragedies. Just as anti-
militarism becomes stronger at least for a while every summer, anti-terrorism 
sentiments in the U.S. have been recreated every September since 2001.   
 
Section 3  The Japanese Medias Anti-militarism and Its Ramifications on the 
Political Communication System: A Comparative Analysis between Japan and the 
United States 
This section further argues that the anti-militarism sentiments in the 
Japanese media have created a different media-politics relationship compared 
with that of the United States. Specifically, this section first investigates 
differences and similarities between the two political communication systems. 
Second, I argue that the strong anti-militarism as well as the difference in political 





Subsection 1 Similarities between the Two Political Communication Systems. 
Arguably, political communication systems between Japan and the United 
States have many common aspects. According to the Hallin and Mancini 
categorizations (2004) discussed in Chapter 2, Japanese political communication 
system may be categorized as the Liberal Model, same as the U.S. system. The 
political communication systems both in Japan and in the U.S. are similar in the 
sense that both countries media industries are very robust. Both the U.S. and 
Japan are virtually saturated by the media, such as around-the-clock television 
coverage and a wide variety of newspapers, many of which have a circulation of 
millions.   
Along with the United States, Japanese are enjoying one of the highest 
labels of media saturation in the world. Its five national dailies each with a 
circulation of over two million translate into the highest per-capita newspaper 
circulation in the world, some ninety percent of adults read newspapers daily, and 
the average person watches more than three hours of television a day. Given the 
rising importance of the media in all the industrial societies, Japan thus presents 
itself as a laboratory for exploring the role the media plays today in democracies.  
Media independence from politics is protected both in Japan and in the 
U.S. Independence is secured by laws as well as media ownership structures. In 
both countries, freedom of press is included in their Constitutions, and the media 
has enjoyed freedom as a sacred symbol of democratic societies. Reporters 
Without Borders, an international organization for defending freedom of the press, 




countries and ranks each countrys degree of press freedom. Both the United 
States and Japan ranks among top 30 (17th and 26th, respectively) in the list 
(Reporters Without Borders, 2002). 
Except for a few examples, such as National Public Radio or Public 
Broadcasting Cooperation, media organizations in America, both print and 
electronic, are mostly privately owned. Excluding Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan 
Broadcasting Cooperation), Japanese media organizations are also independently 
and internally owned, with the various newspapers and broadcasting companies 
competing against each other (Westney 1996). 
Owing to media saturation and independence, both the American and 
Japanese medias political impacts are strong. The fourth estate is so actively 
involved in government along with the formal three branches of government that 
the relationships between the media and politics in both the United States and 
Japan have been symbiotic. Politics needs the media for the purpose of public 
relations and the advocating of new policies. For political figures, the most 
important interface with their supporters is through the media. The media need 
new political developments, such as new policies or attractive politicians to run 
for office, and sometime political scandals. 
 However, the symbiotic relationship between politics and the media does 
not mean they always help each other. Although politicians may desire to control 
the media, the media does not want to be their messengers: The media sees its role 




attack their negligence and inability. The media sometimes ruthlessly attack 
politicians for their political and private scandals.  
Larry Sabato suggests that there have been three stages in the 
relationship between the media and politics in the United States. First, the 
relationship was cozy from 1941 to 1966.  The media was relatively docile in its 
treatment of politicians and reported what politicians wanted to tell. If reporters 
found information that politicians did not tell, the audience would not be informed 
of the news. Sabato believed the media was a "lapdogs" of politicians. Next, the 
relationship became more antagonistic from 1966 to 1974. During this period, 
Sabato suggests that the media acted as a "watchdog" of the government. The 
pinnacle of the medias function as a guardian of a free society was the 
Watergate. The "watchdog" journalism, however, has transformed into "junkyard-
dog" journalism since the 1980s. In the age of "junkyard-dog" journalism, Sabato 
argues that the U.S. media often relies on rumor and gossip or focuses on 
irrelevant subjects, such as womanizing, instead of significant matters such as a 
politicians questionable dealings with major defense suppliers. According to 
Sabato, the medias vivacious reporting is similar to piranhas during a feeding 
frenzy. Such practices have eroded journalism's credibility with the public, and 
actually trust in the media has reached a low ebb since the1980s (Sabato 1993).  
Scott Flanagan (1991, 1996) finds the Japanese media to have less 
influence on voting behavior than in the United States, due to strict regulation of 
political advertising. However, Flanagan reveals the significant role of the media 




Although media exposure to politics has no direct effects, he claims it has 
stronger indirect effects on political participation than any other important 
variables, including parochial values, socioeconomic status, and political 
knowledge. Flanagan finds media exposure is associated with increasing political 
interest and issue awareness, with more psychological involvement and political 
knowledge, and, through these, greater political participation. 
Kabashima (1990, 2007) further argues that the media in Japan plays a 
significant role in politics. Referring to the survey data he and his colleagues 
collected, Kabashima discovered that the media is perceived as the most powerful 
but neutral actor compared to other major stakeholders in politics, such as 
political parties, labor unions, citizens groups, and industry. Also, he finds that 
journalists do not have strong partisan preferences. Kabashima concludes that the 
media in Japan functions as the center arena of democracy, and that Japanese 
democracy should be defined as media pluralism. 
  
Subsection 2  The Japanese Medias Anti-militarism and the Media as the Effective 
Opposition 
There are obviously several dissimilarities between the United States and 
Japanese political systems, such as between the Japanese parliamentary system 
versus the American strict separation of powers, and the almost one party rule in 




competitive Japanese political systems, I claim that the Japanese media has served 
as an effective opposition voice that checks the ruling LDP. 
The Japanese medias political stance is, unlike Kabashima suggests, not 
neutral. Although Kabashimas media pluralism theory is intriguing, his 
methodologies to locate media neutrality need more elaboration. Since one of the 
most important norms of journalism is neutrality, a journalist is highly likely to 
respond to survey questions saying that he or she does not have a strong partisan 
preference. This is because their professional norm is not politically biased. Also, 
the media is perceived by other stakeholders as the center of those stakeholders in 
politics simply because other stakeholders are more clearly partisan in nature. We 
can intuitively locate the labors as more liberal than the media; and the leaders in 
industry are more conservative than the media. Additionally, the media is not only 
perceived as being located at the center stage of politics but also the media is 
considered as constituting a pseudo-entity in politics by other stakeholders 
because of its role as medium in politics through which other political 
stakeholders ideologies can be expressed. As Lichter et al, (1986) suggested 
when they conducted interviews and other psychological tests, including the 
Rorschach ink blot tests, we have to use more qualitative methodologies to 
identify journalist ideologies  
Instead of Kabashimas media pluralism theory, I claim that the 
Japanese media organizations have played an effective opposition role in Japanese 
politics after the end of World War II.  This is because the media has provided the 




opposition parties, most of which are liberal, have been weak and politically 
incompetent ever since the end of World War II. The media has stepped into the 
void and advocated progressive views. 
Opposition parties did not offer a viable alternative to the LDP. The Social 
Democratic Party of Japan---now essentially defunct---had been the strongest of 
the post-1945 opposition parties. Yet, even during the 1970s, at the height of its 
presence in politics, the power of the party was regarded as only half that of the 
LDP (Kume et.al., 2004, Chap.5). The media, as mentioned above, has been 
critical against the ruling LDP and been supportive of the weak progressive 
parties because of the anti-war stance of the media. I claim that the media has 
augmented the liberal views of the weak opposition and has become a de facto the 
strongest opposition to the LDP in Japanese politics. 
The media has supported the policies of the progressive opposition parties 
because the media and parties share their anti-militarism. Both journalist A and 
Komine suggest that during the period of the Cold War, the media was favorable 
to the socialist bloc and idealized China and North Korea. In contrast, the media 
was not favored in the United States and Japanese government as well. According 
to Komine, this is because the U.S.-Japan military alliance may heighten the 
possibility of becoming involving in another war. Also, almost all the 
interviewees agree that that the media have been unfavorable in their reporting on 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party because the LDP has kept a strong 
relationship with the United States and has supported and strengthened the U.S.-




opposition parties, most notably the now greatly weakened Democratic Socialist 
Party of Japan. Also, several interviewees, such as Komine and Fukuo, claim that 
the media, especially the Asahi, are regarded as having a progressive attitude and 
antigovernment stance. The core of the Japanese medias political preference is 
their anti-war viewpoints.   
Kabashimas theory that the media is a neutral entity may also be 
explained by the complicated relations between the LDP and progressive 
journalists. The medias role as the de facto strongest opposition to the LDP in 
Japanese politics functioned in an interesting way. It is interesting that the media 
may have a cozy relationship with the LDP. Therefore, the medias stance may 
appear to be neutral from the views of conservative political leaders at least in 
surveys. Ofer Feldman (1993) analyzes the interaction between Diet members of 
both houses and political reporters, mainly those of the national daily newspapers 
and concludes that in the era of the Liberal Democratic Partys predominant party 
rule, a symbiotic relationship existed between the two groups. Reporters and 
politicians had to rely upon one another to do their jobs, and their interdependence 
produced a high degree of cooperation and sympathy. Media organizations 
commit large resources to political news, although they are heavily oriented (and 
biased) towards the governing coalition; opposition parties seem to receive much 
less attention. Reporters work mainly through press clubs attached to each 
ministry, party or faction. The relationships, however, do not translate into the 
pro-war stance. Journalist A reiterates that because of anti-militarism, the 




Japan were able to gather important information from LDP officials and 
bureaucrats. However, journalists ideologies have been at more left of center. 
However, there has been a complicated psychological barrier between the LDP 
politicians and journalists, especially, liberal newspapers, such as the Asahi, the 
Mainichi, and the Tokyo, in Japan.  
It is interesting that the media in the United States have been criticized for 
their liberal biases. The medias political ideology is often a matter of debate in 
the United States. Political scientists and communication scholars disagree about 
whether media content is shaped primarily by proponents reflecting the right or 
left side of the ideological spectrum. Scholars like Robert and Linda Lichter and 
Stanley Rothman (1986) have argued that media elites who work for the leading 
news media lean to the political left, relying on sources holding kindred views. 
Scholars like Lance Bennet (1988), Michael Parenti (1986), and Benjamin 
Ginsberg (1986) consider media to be the minions of big business and right-wing 
politicians. They fault the media for using news selection to strengthen white 
middle class values and suppress competing left-wing views. Some critics, such 
as Herman and Chomsky (1988) contend that these choices are made deliberately 
to perpetuate capitalist exploitation of the masses in line with the ideological 
preferences of media owners. According to Herman and Chomsky, far from 
performing a watchdog role, the "free press" serves the needs of those in power. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the Japanese media because of its 
anti-military stance has been informally against the LDP until at least the early 




Ofer Feldman (1996) suggests that the Japanese media, especially newspapers, 
almost all presented almost identical views about political news. Feldman reviews 
studies on Japanese newspapers and claims that some critics go so far as to say 
that the distinctive character of Japanese newspapers is that they have no 
distinctive character (28).  
Many papers were almost identical in how they handled the war, the LDP, 
and progressive parties. In a classic study of the Japanese media, Young C. Kim 
(1981) asserts that the Japanese media, especially the print media, have leftist bias 
in contents. Japanese journalists and their employers, notably the Asahi, have 
desperately tried to maintain their special status and their access to Communist 
society, such as China, at the highest levels. In so doing they have, at times, 
sacrificed their basic mission to seek the news and report them impartially.  
 
Section 6 The Changing Face of Anti-militarism in the Japanese Media: a 
Turning Point in Japanese Democracy 
Since Kim published his study in the early 1980s, there have been 
remarkable changes in the Japanese media. Although anti-military media culture 
in Japan has been very dominant since then, one of the biggest changes is that 
anti-militarism has become less prominent than before. Since the 1980s, the 
Yomiuri has moved itself from the left much more to the right of the ideological 
spectrum. In addition, the politically conservative Nikkei has gained more readers 




Asahi, the Mainichi, and the Tokyo are still on the liberal side of the spectrum, the 
tug-of-war between liberal and conservative media has become more balanced. 
Although the political ideology of the Japanese television networks is less 
obvious than newspapers, several networks lean either more to the left or right 
because major newspapers own certain amount of stocks of the key network 
television stations. TBS (related to the Mainichi) and TV Asahi (related to the 
Asahi) are allegedly more liberal than other networks. Fuji TV (related to the 
Sankei) has more conservative news programming than its counterparts. 
Also, conservative media, such as the Sankei, have gradually become 
more influential. The discussion over re-arming Japan is not taboo for the 
conservative strata in Japan. It is interesting that recent bestseller lists contain 
several books that put an emphasis on patriotism. Interestingly, titles based on 
anti-militarism are on the lists as well. Journalist E suggests, I believe the vast 
majority of Japanese want to keep this peace forever. Nonetheless, some portion 
of Japanese citizens feel that the article nine has gradually grown out of date. This 
is because the Constitution does not clearly refer to the right of self-defense. 
Every time the Self-Defense Forces need to go abroad to engage in Peace 
Keeping Operations, the Japanese legislature has to create a law for each 
occasion. 
Westney (1996) also deals with the rise of the conservatives in the 
Japanese media by focusing on the industrial structure of the Japanese media. 
According to Westney, the Japanese media are frequently independently and 




against each other, so that a pluralistic environment was secured for the press. In 
fact, however, newspapers are highly integrated with the established business 
world through non-ownership connections and governmental networks. This 
factor is exemplified by the medias frequent membership in various shingikai 
(government advisory councils). Thus, Westney claims that newspapers appear to 
be an integral part and defender, even supporter, of the established order. National 
newspapers have close connections with and influence over broadcasting. 
Moreover, structural diversity seems to result not in a great variety of information 
and opinion, but in conformity in content.  
Another change is the increasing role of the electronic media. The print 
media, such as newspapers, had been very strong among Japanese media 
organizations. However, several scholars suggest that the strength of television 
has finally surpassed the print media at least, since the1990s. This changing of 
place between the print and electronic media has brought a more important 
ramification to politics: television is not as prominently anti-war as newspapers. 
Japanese electronic media organizations may be more loyal to the press releases 
of the government; thus, they tend to be more conservative than the print media. 
Regarding the contents of the television news, Krauss (1996) conducted 
content analysis of the 7 PM news of NHK, which has the largest viewers among 
major Japanese television news programs.  His content analysis reveals that in 
comparison to news items regarding foreign countries or national defense and the 
economy, NHK tends to devote more news items and time to politics and 




national bureaucracy and new policy or policy change. In comparison to the cable 
and national network news coverage in the United States, NHK devotes greater 
attention to government decisions, proposals, and ceremonies, and this is "one of 
the most important and seemingly distinctive aspects of the content of NHK 
television news compared to American network news" (102).  
Also, the relationship between the media and politics has gradually 
changed as technological innovations progress. Since advances in technology 
have increased outlets for information dissemination, new styles of reporting have 
changed the nature and characters of news. These changes coincide with citizens 
demands to express their opinions and to have their voices heard by political 
leaders. "New media" formats, such as radio and television talk shows, electronic 
town meetings, and computer bulletin boards, provide outlets for the public to 
express their political views in a way that is unprecedented in our history. These 
developments in mass communication and how they influence the ways in which 
politicians and citizens view the political world has become a theme which 
underlies the field of political communication (Neuman 1991, Abramson, 
Arterton and Orren 1988). Using the "new media" has now become an integral 
part of candidates communication strategies in Japanese elections.  
The diffusion of the internet has created a new venue for political communication 
as well. Internet blogs posted by ordinary citizens have power to influence the 
politics. Among those blogs, Kikko no blog made its name known to the 
nationwide of Japan with its scoop of corner-cutting in the construction industry. 




digital media is more conservative than the mainstream media, although the 
degree of conservatism is not blatant.  Kayama defines the change of the public as 
petite nationalism syndrome (Koyama 2005).  
Hiroyasu Komine in my interview suggests that the public is changing its 
attitude about the Constitution and the Self-Defense Forces: if the Constitution 
had been amended to the extent that it did not prohibit Japan from active 
involvement in war, the medias anti-militarism would have altered a lot. I believe 
the medias perception already has changed a little since the Japanese legislature 
passed the law to allow the Self-Defense Forces to engage in peacekeeping 
operations in foreign lands in the early 1990s. The media, I feel, has become 
lenient to the Self-Defense Forces. 
In support of Komines claim, many Japanese have come to believe that 
the 1946 Constitution may be out of date. According to a survey by the Mainichi 
in April 2007, fifty-one percent of those polled suggested that they support the 
revision of Japans pacifist Constitution. 19 percent of them were against its 
revisions. Many of the respondents claim that the main reason for revisiting the 
Constitution is that some 60 years have passed since it was created. Since 46 
percent said they approved of constitutional revision in a September 2004 poll, 
there seems to be a gradual gain in the number.  
Some scholars, such as Komine, argue that the advent of pro-militarism 
and conservatism in the media may be related to the fact that democracy was 
transplanted to Japan by the United States. According to scholars, Japanese 




traditional roots. Thus, it may still be perceived as foreign and given from an 
outside power in origin and yet even now felt either as under ongoing process of 
internalization of  that given outside tradition or as continuing process of fusion 
and adjustment of both preexisting Japanese internal democratic tradition and 
introduced American democratic tradition for Japanese society. The reforms aim 
at the reduction of Confucian traditions and samurai ethics as well as the loss of 
imperial sovereignty. An example is the emphasis on equality instead of respect 
of seniority and upbringing (ibid.). Hideo Uchiyama, one of the leading political 
scholars in Japan, states:  
 
Since the end of the Pacific War, Japan was democratized as part 
of the occupation policy. All social and political institutions 
underwent a process of reform. Nevertheless, many Japanese have 
become doubtful as to the stability of their western inspired 
democracy. (279) 
 
Uchiyamas observation is supported by recent public opinion polls. 
According to a Gallop poll in 1995, Japanese are much less inclined than 
Americans to express satisfaction with the way democracy is working. While 64 
percent of American respondents are satisfied with their democracy, only 35 
percent of Japanese are content with theirs (Ladd and Bowman 110). In a survey 
by the Asahi, just 14 percent of respondents said they had read the Constitution 




 Many Japanese feel that the concept of democracy itself is "rootless" 
because it is a "borrowed" idea from Americans. For example, under the 
Constitution of 1946, the Japanese judiciary has the power of judicial review just 
as in the U.S.; however, the judicial culture in Japan is more self-restrained, and 
the Supreme Court rarely exercises its power. Traditionally, the Court is 
extremely reluctant to deviate from judicial precedent for fear of upsetting the 
status quo ante and the predictability of governmental policy-making (Itoh 197). 
Also, citizens minds are difficult to change because of their tradition. On the 
occasion of Emperor Hirohitos death in 1989, a CBS / NYT / TBS (Tokyo 
Broadcasting Station) consortium conducted a poll on the Imperial system. 
Surprisingly, 20 percent of the Japanese respondents still expressed allegiance to 
the pre-war idea that the Emperor was a "human God." Moreover, 40 percent of 
persons sixty-five years old and older accepted the Emperors divinity (Ladd and 
Bowman 1996, 105). In sum, the weak support of Japanese democracy appears 
to be caused by the lack of a traditional background in democratic concepts. 
Alex de Tocqueville claimed that religion plays an important role in 
keeping American democratic society from becoming despotic (Tocqueville 
1988). If unchecked by religion, according to him, individualism could lead to a 
"passionate exaggerated love of self" which threatens all forms of public and 
private life (Tocqueville 1988, 506). If we apply this Tocquevillian link between 
organized religion and democracy, the current Japanese society is endangered by 
the threat of political instability and anarchy. According to the World Values 




(37%) of Japanese respondents do. Whereas 67% of Americans believe in "a 
personal God," only small fractions (4%) of Japanese do so. Among Americans 
80 % surveyed had been brought up religiously at home; compared with only 
22% of Japanese (Ladd and Bowman 1996, 93-97).  In post-war Japan, a number 
of influential civil activists such as Makoto Oda are influenced by Karl Marxs 
idea that religion maintains economic oppression. Therefore, these Marxist "spin 
doctors" regard religion as a menace to the society (Herzog 1993, 252-255).    
In the current "Godless" society of Japan, democracy has a fragile basis 
because the religious tie among citizens is weak and their new political system is 
divorced from traditional mores. A social critic, Peter Herzog expresses the same 
concern in his book, Japan's Pseudo-democracy. There are numerous 
instances, he says, in which democratic principles and values have been 
disregarded or distorted in Japanese life (Herzog 1993, 257) and it can hardly 
be maintained that at present democracy is flourishing in Japan (Herzog 
1993,10). He explains that this malfunction of democracy is caused by the big 
difference between the pre-war and post-war political system and discontinuity 
from traditional mores. He asserts: The disparity between the old and new 
dispensation was too acute to allow a smooth transition. It would have been 
overly sanguine to expect a thorough understanding of the new order to emerge 
at once (Herzog 1993, 10). Coincidentally, Paul Tillich, a leading theologian of 
the twentieth century, also stresses that the Japanese political system does not 




 In the case of post-war Japan, democracy was imposed by Americans 
during the occupation period. The idea of democracy appears to lacked roots and 
established in Japanese culture at that time, but Japanese democracy has grown 
its own style after in more than sixty years since its inception. However, in the 
minds of Japanese citizens, Japanese democracy still seems to be fragile because 
of its divorce from traditional mores and the public's weak ties to organized 
religions. The increased demands to amend the 1946 Constitution may be related 
to Japanese doubts about their democratic roots.  Japanese democracy may be 
facing a turning point. 
 
Section 4  Conclusion 
In an attempt to understand the differences of in the reporting about the 
war in Iraq, Chapter nine clarifies differences in the backgrounds of the media of 
Japan and the U.S. along several aspects. Among these factors, this chapter 
stresses the importance of the historical experience of the Japanese media during 
and after World War II. This chapter examines how the concept of war has been 
negatively perceived the by the Japanese media and how the concept has been 
shared and nurtured by the political system. Anti-militarism has been a norm for 
the Japanese media, and I suggest that the media has played an effective role as a 
progressive voice with their anti-war stance. Finally, although the anti-military 
sentiment is still very strong, I claim that the intensity of the progressive stance 




amendment of the 1946 Constitution increased and also Japanese attempts to 






Chapter 9: Analyzing the Reasons for Difference between the 
Two Media (2): Cultural Factors ---Social Construction of 
Different Evilness between the U.S. and Japan   
Chapter nine explores another factor that may have affected the two print 
media organizations different perspectives on the Iraq War: culture. This chapter 
first focuses on the influence of the different religious traditions of the two 
countries: Judeo-Christianity in the United States and a mixture of three religions 
in Japan. The main argument of this chapter is the comparison between American 
and Japanese notion of evilness and how the differences combined with other 
cultural aspects, has affected the views and basic understanding of the 
happenings, including the war in Iraq. The cultural differences about the notion of 
evilness may influence the perspective in two countries journalists. In other 
words, this chapter suggests that the different accounts of the war by the two 
papers can be attributed at least in part to the fact that different realities of 
evilness are socially constructed between the two countries.  
As a basis of this argument, the chapter first explains the theories of social 
construction of reality in detail. Then, I compare religious impacts on citizens 
perceptions of evil acts. The arguments of this subsection are based upon the 




Koreans notion of evilness and apply his findings to the difference between 
Japan and the United States about the concept of the Iraq War. 
 
Section 1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
Research question and hypothesis for this chapter is as follows: 
 
Research Question 2-2:  What was the cause of the differences between the two 
countries medias reporting of the Iraq War? Does a cultural aspect affect media 
content of the two liberal print media?  If so, what kind of cultural aspects may 
affect the different accounts? 
 
Hypothesis 2: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about 
Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the different notion of 
evilness in their societies. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, I will first explain both social 
construction theory and difference of evilness between Western and Asian 
societies. 
 
Section 2  The Theory of Social Construction of Realities 
In order to test this hypothesis, I will first explain both social 




societies. Social construction theory suggests that what we see as real is the 
result of human interaction. Through such interaction, we create certain artifacts, 
objectify them, internalize them and then take these products for granted. These 
institutionalized artifacts become realities, which is the result of construction 
by participants in a particular society. Since the publication of Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmanns The Social Construction of Reality (1967), the term social 
construction has been in the mainstream of the studies of social sciences, 
including studies in political communication.  
 
 
Subsection 1 Stages and Types of Social Constructions 
According to Berger and Luckmann, there are three stages in the social 
construction of reality. The first stage is externalization, in which we create 
artifacts through social interaction. In the second stage, objectivation occurs when 
the artifacts appear to take on a reality of their own and become independent of 
those who created them. Finally, internalization is the stage in which we learn 
such a reality about the artifacts through some form of socialization. 
Language is a quintessential example of artifact constructed by the 
participants in a society. In any given society, people create languages through 
social interaction both in verbal and non-verbal manners. Languages become 
independent of creators when people notice them and start to use them. Further, 




grammar and correct usage. It is interesting that language is also a strong vehicle 
of socialization to all aspects of realities because language continuously 
provides us with necessary objectifications and posits the order in our 
everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 22). Just as pervasive and obvious as 
language, money is an obvious example of a social construction because people 
use money as if it has the constructed value and agree to follow certain rules in its 
use.  
In social construction theory, it should be noted that there are two 
different facts. While the actual conditions and situations are brute facts, 
social institutions or cultural artifacts are called institutional facts. Cultural and 
societal factors are one of the major producers of institutional facts. The two 
kinds of facts are not always identical because brute facts are not 
ontologically dependent on institutional facts, and vice versa. 
The distinction between the two kinds of facts is important in 
understanding less obvious examples of social constructions. These include class, 
race, religion, and sexuality. The concepts of these may be constructed by society 
in such a way that certain types of perception (including a stereotyped view) are 
reinforced, although the brute facts belonging to the concepts are different or 
unchanged. Some of these institutionalized concepts are believed to be arbitrary 
and even made-up by certain social interactions, regardless of the brute facts.  
Race and ethnicity is another typical example in researching social 
construction. Omi and Winant argue that race consciousness is largely a modern 




construction of race categories in the United States is that race is a sociohistorical 
concept, in which racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete 
expression by the specific social relations and historical context. Furthermore, 
they suggest that racial and ethnic categories are significant in that they are 
constructed in a hierarchy from superior to inferior (Omi and Winant 2006). 
In a similar vein, Karen Brodkin illustrates that Jewish people, as well as some 
other immigrants to the United States in the late 19th century, were once seen as 
belonging to an inferior race. Economic and educational advancements, as well 
as others, played an integral role in constructing the immigrants as inferior and 
in later reconstructing them as white and no longer an inferior ethnic group 
(Brodkin 2006). 
Social construction theory may suggest that there are multiple realities 
even for the same brute fact. In other words, realities are different in the eyes 
of each beholder. These multiple realities are considered the Rashomon 
effect, named after a famous movie Rashomon (1950). It is the phenomenon by 
which observers of an event produce a statement bearing substantial differences, 
although they experienced the same incident.  
 
 
Subsection 2 Social Constructions of Hate Crime 
In order to a give further explanation of social construction theory, I will 




1990s (Maeshima 2000). I examined the legislation process of two federal hate 
crime related pieces of legislation: the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 and the 
Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994. The former is the law to 
gather data on hate crimes in 50 states. It requires the Justice Department to 
acquire data on crimes which manifest prejudice based on race, religion, sexual 
orientation, or ethnicity from law enforcement agencies across the country and to 
publish an annual summary of the findings (28 United State Code 534). The latter 
attempts to strengthen penalties when criminals commit federal crimes whose 
motives were based on hate. These were separate legislation, but later this 
measure was enacted into a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994. The provision directed the United States Sentencing 
Commission to provide a sentencing enhancement of not less than 3 offense 
levels for offenses that the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable 
doubt are hate crimes (Public Law 103-222). The two hate crime legislations 
intended to curb frictions among different racial, ethnic, and religious groups. In a 
diverse, multi-cultural society, such as the United States, these laws have the 
potential to act as deterrents against schisms and as a catalyst that will bind people 
together. The two legislations were enacted; however, I argue that the two Acts 
are so ineffective that they have been only symbolic rules to fight against hate 
crimes. Part of the reasons for the complications in actual enforcement of the laws 
is that there is a grave issue yet to be solved before the bills became laws. The 




Hate crime is by its nature socially constructed, but among socially 
constructed concepts, hate is not easy to conceptualize. This is because hate is 
rooted in each individuals feelings and the definition of hatred varies. It is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish a real hate crime, caused by a pure hatred 
toward a particular group, and just law-breaking conduct toward a particular 
person who happens to be part of the group. Thus, prosecutors and law 
enforcement officers encountered difficulties in prosecuting hate crime because of 
the need to identify hate and assess the perpetrators bias or prejudice.  
Another complication is that the nuance of hate is quite different in 
each region of the United States. Interestingly, after the image of a hate crime is 
widely recognized in a particular area, the offense itself becomes more numerous 
in that area. This is because both the citizens and the police became well aware of 
the existence of the nature of hate crime. However, it is noted that the areas where 
the image is not socially established, the same crime is not the object of a 
prosecution or an arrest, or even an investigation. Thus, the data collected by the 
mandate of the Statistics Act are far from accurate. Several states introduced 
various types of state hate crime acts, but it is common that the details about what 
constitutes a hate crime are quite different. 
Comparison between the states in the Northeast and states in the so-
called Deep South gives an explanation for different treatments of hate crime. 
Northeastern states have a larger number of reported hate crimes. The numbers of 
reported hate crimes in 1997 in the states of Massachusetts, Maryland were 497 




race and ethnic relations among their residents. In contrast, the states in the Deep 
South, such as Mississippi or Alabama, reported significantly smaller numbers of 
reported hate crime incidents during the same year. In the same year, Alabama 
and Mississippi also reported zero hate crimes, and Louisiana reported only five. 
Although racial and ethnic tension is much alleviated from what once existed, 
these Southern states used to be a pinnacle of racial inequality. For instance, 
Alabama is the state about which Martin Luther King lamented strong racial 
prejudice in his famous speech in Washington in 1963. In these Southern States, 
hate crime is not sufficiently socially recognized (Maeshima 2000, Federal 
.Bureau of Investigation 1998).  
 
Subsection 3  Social Construction Theory and Political Communication 
Social construction theory is often adopted in the field of political 
communication. Especially, since the 1990s, the social construction of reality has 
attracted growing attention in political communication research (see Tuchman 
1978, Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson 
1992). These studies have focused upon news content as a form through which the 
mass media view and perceive an event or issue, and how they construe realities 
in their production process. Using content analysis as a method, these studies seek 
to analyze the concepts, categories, and ideologies in news selections and 
reporting. They suggest that newsworthiness is not a quality inherent in events, 




constrained by the distribution of the newsmakers in time and space. Gaye 
Tuchman argues that news is perpetually defining and redefining, constituting 
and reconstituting social phenomena (1978, 184). 
Murry Edelman (1988) claims that media news accounts are not simply 
factual presentations. Rather, such accounts represent an interpretation of the 
days political facts, which are interpretations of issues, events, situations, and 
problems as generated by interest groups, government officials, and elected 
representatives among others. According to Edelman, the mass media constructs 
and reconstructs the world of public affairs, and political news is arranged as a 
series of dramatic symbols, such as enemies, leaders, and problems. 
Edelman argues that media accounts evoke a spectacle that is a construction by 
political actors, including media organizations themselves. Political roles, statuses 
and ideologies are given certain meanings in the media spectacle. 
News selection and treatment are not free from values and ideology. 
Analyzing the interaction between media professionals and their sources in 
political and state institutions is crucial for understanding the production of media 
content. Thus, one of the typical ways of analyzing the media's social construction 
of reality is to investigate the sources used in the reporting. Gamson suggests that 
the media are likely to selectively omit several important components of the news, 
and that the absence of certain facts can reveal a story line that favors certain 
interests (such as industrial interests and bureaucratic process) which the media 
are representing (Gamson 1989, 158). Sources are chosen based on suitability 




which reporters find occurrences to be transformed into stories; defines the web 
of facticity that accepts information from legitimated institutions as facts, but 
rejects the facticity of information from other sources. Cohen et al. further point 
out that social reality is a media product of the interaction between objective 
reality and a society's own pragmatic and social needs (Cohen, Adoni, and Bantz 
1990). 
By choosing sources, news media simultaneously conduct processes of 
framing. As defined by Entman (1993), framing essentially involves salience 
and selection. Noting the impact of frames on the public, Entman wrote, Frames 
call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which 
might lead audiences to have different reactions(55). Framing is one of the 
crucial aspects of the medias social construction of reality; therefore, the 
construction and impact of media frames have become major areas of research in 
political communication. Gitlin (1980) introduced the concept of framing to mass 
communication studies in his classic examination of how an American television 
network trivialized a major student political movement during the 1960s. News 
coverage of any social movement can use a variety of framing strategies. The 
news can describe the scope of the social problem, critique alternative proposals 
for coping with the problem, or detail the tactical moves of activists and officials. 
Iyengar (1991) observed that television news frames issues in either an episodic 
or thematic fashion. Episodic news focuses on concrete events and personalities. 




Iyenger, television has a need for simplicity and brevity, and thus, episodic 
framing dominates news coverage.   
Another aspect of framing is making story lines. Through framing, 
political elites, including the media, attempt to simplify a complex issue into 
relatively simple storyline and shape citizens political preferences. These 
storylines are in nature reflected by the elites definition about what a public 
policy issue is about. According to Gamson and Modigliani, through this story 
line making, political elites attempt to direct attention toward a particular aspect 
of a public policy issue and, consequently, away from others. They suggest that 
the same basic story line is repeated in so many different media that many people 
are likely to accept it as a common point of reference (Gamson and Modigliani 
1989; Gamson 1992).  
The concept of social construction is also widely used not only in 
political communication, but also in public policy analysis. Some studies deal 
with social constructions as a notion to categorize political participants, created by 
social or political strata. In Schneider and Ingrams own definition, social 
construction is certain shared characteristics that connote a discrete social group 
of positive or negative connotations (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335). Their 
definition of social construction focuses on the governments policy attention, not 
exclusively on media. According to Schneider and Ingram, this definition of 
social construction gives rise to a four-cell classification scheme for social groups. 
Powerful, positively constructed groups are advantaged; powerful, negatively 




called dependents; and the unfortunate weak and negatively constructed groups 
are labeled as deviants. Advantaged populations have considerable political 
power and are positively constructed as meritorious groups. They include 
scientists, business, veterans, and the elderly. Contenders are groups that are 
powerful, but are constructed as vocal and in some cases greedy strata of society, 
such as Wall Street investors, savings and loan executives, big labor, and gay and 
lesbian activists. Dependents lack political power and are constructed as good 
people. Typical examples are children, mentally and physically disabled or sick 
people. Deviants are in the worst situation, as they lack political power and are 
negatively constructed as undeserving, dangerous, and generally bad people. 
Examples of deviants are criminals, drug dealers, flag-burners, and child-abusers. 
This classification then explains how policies allocate burdens and 
benefits among target populations. Advantaged groups, for example, will 
receive high benefits, low burdens, and control over agendas and policymaking. 
Deviants, on the other hand, get low benefits and high burdens. This four-cell 
classification gives rise to potentially testable hypotheses about policy outcomes 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993). 
 
Section 3 Investigating the Meaning of the Word Evil between Cultures 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the debate over positivism is deeply rooted in 
the difficulties of understanding different cultures. The discussion requires 




cross-cultural investigation involves comparing the same word or concept, it can 
especially pose another complexity. This is because the same word may 
sometimes have different connotations in different cultures, even if its denotative 
meaning is similar. In order to further explore the sensitivity of cultures, this 
section exemplifies different accounts of the notion of evil in the Western world 
and in East Asia, such as Japan.  This section concludes that evilness may be 
one of the most socially constructed concepts between the Western world and 
Japan as well as a very sensitive cultural difference. 
 
Subsection 1 “Evilness in Judeo-Christianity in the United States 
Many textbooks attribute the difference of political culture to beliefs (e.g., 
Almond et.al. 2003, Chap.3). These textbooks suggest that most parts of the 
Western world, including the United States, are areas where the cultural influence 
of Judeo-Christianity is strong. Japan is in the area that is under the influence of 
Buddhism.  
The reality of the cultural influence of religion is not simple in America, 
but there is no doubt that Christianity is the dominant culture in the United States. 
America has been enjoying religious plurality since the birth of the country: The 
first Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares that there is no single state 
religion in the United States and respects free exercise of religion. Religious 
freedom in America has created a wide variety of denominations among 




Lutherans, and Southern Baptists, have exhibited doctrinal and attitudinal 
differences among Protestantism. Unlike conventional wisdom, American 
Catholicism is not monolithic, either. Religious behavior within Roman Catholics 
has been different for each ethnic group, such as Irish and French Canadians, and 
Italians. Also, the American Catholic church has received a significant number of 
new members from Asian and Latin American countries for the past 40 years. 
Along with Protestants and Catholics, Jewish tradition has been very strong, 
especially in the states of New York and Florida or major big cities. Religions of 
Native Americans, Amish and others give more colorful ingredients to American 
religion (Schaefer 2004). Nonetheless, the fact that the United States holds 
diversity in religions does not mean that American religious concepts are 
unconnected to each other: the vast majority of the people obviously believe in 
Judeo-Christianity. According to a data source, a dominant 84.1 percent of 
Americans are Christians. Adding the 1.9 percent of respondents who are Jewish, 
the Judeo-Christian tradition is predominant in the United States. If we exclude 
9.2 percent of respondents who reported being non-religious, less than five 
percent of Americans are non-Judeo-Christian. The ratio of Muslim, Buddhists 
and other religions are 1.5 percent, 0.9 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively 
(Central Information Agency, 2005). Judeo-Christianity has been a virtual 
national religion and arguably affected American culture. 
One of the manifestations of Judeo-Christian culture in the Western 
world, including the United States, is the dichotomous view that exists  between 




culture is rooted in Christianity. In Western culture, practicing Christianity and 
leading a daily life based on the Christian ideal is considered good. Typical 
Christian rules, such as found in the Ten Commandments, teach their believers to 
be good and act according to the will of God. In Christianity, the antonym of 
the word good is, of course, evil. An aberrant act from goodness is believed 
to be an evil deed. Thus, evil is a detestable concept, and an evil deed is an 
act of aberration which must be avoided in the Christian societies (Arellano 
2004). 
In theology, the concepts of evilness and goodness in Christianity are both 
sides of a coin. Tokiyuki Nobuhara, a philosopher and a scholar of theology, 
suggests that evil in Christianity is defined as one who acts as if he/she is God. 
Nobuhara quotes Genesis 3:5 (For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes 
will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.) and explains 
that an evil act is to usurp others to believe a wrong deed a good one. Nobuhara 
also suggests that evilness in Christianity is the opposing concept of goodness, as 
if on opposite sides of a coin. Thus, according to Nobuhara, evil should not be 
tolerated in Christianity.)  
 
Subsection 2 Evilness in Asian Societies 
Concepts about evil may be difficult to translate into Asian cultures. 
Compared with Western ideas, the East Asian concept of evilness does not have 




tradition of polytheism or henotheism. Polytheistic or henotheistic religious 
traditions are widely spread throughout the regions of East Asia. Buddhism and 
Confucianism, the two most widely accepted religious traditions in East Asia, are 
considered very inclusive in their beliefs, as opposed to the mutually-exclusive, 
either-or values of monotheistic tradition (Kunihiro 2006). In addition to the two 
religions, other local polytheistic religious traditions, such as Shintonism in Japan 
and Shamanism in Korea, have provided historically agnostic cultural 
backgrounds. Unlike monotheistic religions, such as Christianity and Islam, 
polytheism acknowledges multiple gods and divinities, and the good acts are 
relative. In polytheistic cultures, the dichotomy between good-versus-evil tends 
to be blurred because peoples belief systems are more likely to accept the 
relativity of evilness (Hawkins 2003; Ooms 1988; Bellah 1957). 
C. Fred Alford (1999) examines Korean society where there is no word 
that equates to the Western term evil. Korean term such as ak or saak mean 
very bad, but they are not what the Western world called evil. Alford 
questions whether there are societies without a sense of "evil" and how such a 
society sees human nature. He searched for answers in Korea by interviewing 
two-hundred and fifty Koreans, including thirteen Korean Americans. The 
interviewees consisted of a wide range of citizens, chosen from economic, 
political, religious, and demographic cross-sections of Korea. The questions asked 
in the interviews are about their views on evilness, the self, and globalization. He 
also asked college students to write an essay about the same questions. Alford 




actually found that a nonexistence of evil in the perception of Koreans. The 
interviews reveals that his initial hypothesis that "evil would be divided into 
different areas of life governed by different religious principles" (89) was 
rejected.  
Alford argues that Koreans regard evil not as a moral category but as an 
intellectual one. Alford explains his views: "I do not imagine that I have 
explained the Korean view of evil. Rather, I have mapped its absence. This map is 
fundamentally a Western overlay, showing where the East does not match the 
West. It is all I could do, all any Westerner can do, I believe. The trick is to know 
it" (7). Alford also discovers the Koreans sentiment that evil results from the 
creation of dualisms, oppositions between people and ideas, and that the content 
of the Korean view of evil is "the fear of absolute otherness and difference" (12). 
Interestingly, this fear is not the fear of the other as the Western views it, but the 
Korean version of the fear is "the fear of becoming other to oneself"(12). Alford 
also finds in the mind of Koreans that the real evil is "the evil that cannot be 
spoken: unrelatedness, the dread of absolute alienation and unconnectedness, pure 
loneliness, absolute difference" (11).  
Alford concludes that evil cannot exist in Korea because Koreans have 
created a universe in which there is no place for it. . . . the Korean ak and choe are 
not really about evil at all (89).The absence of evil is explained by Koreans 
sentiment toward themselves and social relationship with others. Alford maintains 
that in Korean such values as chong (affection), han (suffering), and kibum 




relationship is itself the standpoint of judgment(94) for Koreans. At the same 
time, Koreans have a concept of uri (we) which shows loose boundaries between 
the self and the group-self. Similar to this point is that what Koreans fear most is 
isolation from the group-self and social values associated with it. Alford argues 
that Koreans are very anxious about domination by individuals other than 
themselves because it is against their social relationships.  
Since the interviews were conducted immediately before and after the 
economic collapse of December 1997, Alford also found an intriguing fact that 
related to Koreans account for evil. Alford discovered that Koreans responses to 
globalization matched Westerners views about evil. Alford argues that 
globalization threatens to create a world in which Koreans no longer recognize 
themselves, in which Koreans are other to themselves"(12). Globalization 
(segyehawa) to Koreans is evil because it is for Koreans a great failure of the 
economy which also isolates individuals from close social relationships. 
Globalization represents the dangers of atomization, isolation, fragmentation and 
loss, turning Koreans into strangers in their own world (145). Thus, Alford 
suggests that globalization is what Koreans most fear, becoming alien to 
themselves, living in a world of pure otherness (155).  
 
Subsection 3 “Evilness in the Mixture of Three Religions in Japan 
The Japanese society may share very similar views on evilness with 




This is because of the cultural resemblance between Korea and Japan. Just like 
Korea, eclectic mixtures of religion co-exist in Japan as well. For Japanese 
people, the good-versus-evil dichotomy is sometimes blurred, compared with 
Western nations whose dominant cultural root is in Christianity, and the word 
evil is quite a relative and nuanced term. However, Japanese cultural traditions 
have created different notions of evilness among their mixture of religions. 
Unlike the United States, one of the complications to understanding the in 
the Japanese sense of religion is that there is no single dominant religious 
tradition. Buddhism has a strong influence in Japan, but Japanese sense of religion 
has not been molded by the teachings of Buddha only. Japanese religious 
traditions are an eclectic mixture of Buddhism, Shintoism (or Shinto), and 
Confucianism.  
In addition to the fact that no single religion is exclusively pervasive in 
Japan, but it is also true that Japanese religious traditions may appear as a form of 
cultural manner, sometimes without involving any religious rituals. As discussed 
above, a vast majority of the citizens in Japan suggest that they do not have 
beliefs in any particular organized religions. While 78.8 percent of the people in 
the United States reply that they believe in organized religions, only 37.8 percent 
in Japan do so (Ukai et.al 2007, 49).  
Nonetheless, many scholars suggest that Japanese citizens are as religious 
as Westerners, such as Americans, and conduct rituals based on their beliefs 
without being aware of what the beliefs are. Buddhism, Shintoism, and 




sense of religion, there is not much of a dichotomous relationship between good 
and evil. Goodness and evilness have a relative relation in Japanese religious 
tradition, compared with Christianity. 
Among the three religions, Shintoism has a strong influence on the 
Japanese concept of evilness because its main principle deals with evilness in the 
Japanese sense. Shintoism (or Shinto) is the indigenous religion of Japan and 
involves the worship of spirits known as kami. Shintoism has no founder and no 
official scripture, except books about collections of ancient legends. In the beliefs 
of Shintoism, there is an equivalent of good and evil dichotomy in Christianity: 
Shintoism put an emphasis on the distinction between hare (cleanness) and ke 
(filth), and ke (filth) is supposed to be purified (Tanaka 2007). 
Evilness in Buddhism may be a more nuanced term. A Buddhist should 
not create the illusion of permanence because everything is transitory. Thus, 
enlightenment in Buddhist life will be achieved by non-attachment to things and 
equanimity. The stage of enlightenment in Buddhism is called emptiness, which 
may be equivalent to goodness in Christianity and purity in Shintoism. 
Emptiness in Buddhism does not connote futility. Instead, emptiness is a very 
positive word with the sense of non-attachment to a worldly existence. Reversely, 
the antonym of emptiness in Buddhism is a wondering mind which has no sense 
of achievement. There are many denominations in Buddhism and many terms are 
attached to the antonym of emptiness, but one of the most famous one is called 




unnecessary kills animated lives, including human beings, animals and even 
vegetations (Suzuki 1994). Thus, an evil act is to resort violence. 
Another Buddhist denomination does not only have the dichotomy 
between the evil and the good dichotomy, but also embraces it.  It is interesting 
that some denominations of Buddhism in Japan even welcome evilness. Shinran, 
founder of Pure Land Buddhism (Jyodo Shinshu) in the13th century, suggested 
that an evil human being should be saved by praying. Shinran believes that the 
persons who are benefited most by Amida-nyorai (Buddhist main deity), are evil 
persons. According to Shinran, Amida-nyorai is so benevolent that evil persons, 
such as those who committed crimes, can be saved, as well as good persons who 
are naturally protected by Amida-nyorai (Hirota 2000).  Pure Land Buddhism has 
been a strong influence in Japan, and most recently, Itsuki Hiroyuki, a popular 
novelist, wrote a best selling book about Shinrans ideas (Itsuki 2005). The book 
was translated into English and sold in the United States (Itsuki 2006). 
Confucianism was partially developed as a strategy for political leaders.  
Since the development of Confucianism is different from Shintonism and 
Buddhism, both of which is a religion for common citizens, the notion of evilness 
in Confucianism is quite unique. Confucianism puts an emphasis on the notion of 
rei (ritual; rei in Japanese and Korean, li in Chinese), and the action against rei is 
regarded as an evil deed in Confucianism. 
Rei has a broad significance and can mean everything from etiquette to 
protocol to principle, but the core of li is the rationality. If a leader takes a 




One of the most famous scholars of Confucianism, Herbert Fingarette (1972) 
claims for Confucius, rei is not only the catalogue of our ceremonial duties, but 
descriptive and normative of all of the actions we perform in our interpersonal 
relations as well. Observing table manners, using correct forms of address and 
wearing proper clothing are all forms of practicing rei, as is a minister following 
the right protocol in raising a petition to the ruler, or a ruler going through the 
appropriate steps of consulting his ministers before enacting a new policy. Thus 
not only does it establish an order of priority and authority, thus enforcing the 
social hierarchy, but also provides a way of communication and negotiating 
between people of different stations.    
 
Section 4 Evilness in the war in Iraq: Cultural Comparison between the U.S. and 
Japan   
Based upon the different concept of evilness between the U.S., a Christian 
society, and Japan, I claim that evilness as it relates to the Iraq War may be 
socially constructed and different. 
There are many discussions about the influence of culture on recent 
important incidents in the world, including the 9-11 attacks and the Iraq War. The 
central theme of these debates about the U.S. invasion into Iraq is it that it was 
partially motivated by the religious difference between Christianity and Islam. 
These discussions often ask explanations from past works of political culture. 




Civilization by Samuel Huntington and Jihad vs. McWorld by Benjamin Barber. 
The former focuses on cultural difference among nations and suggests that the 
post Cold War era is an era of conflict among five civilizations (Western, 
Orthodox, Latin America, Muslim, Hindu, China, Japan, and Africa). The latter 
deals with struggles between ever-increasing globalization of American culture 
and economy (McWorld) and the passion to fight against it (Jihad). Both 
bestsellers directly and indirectly discussed the cultural discrepancies of religious 
norms between Christianity and Islam.  
One of the most respected Japanese religious scholars, Tetsuo Yamaori 
frequently suggests that the monotheistic nature in both Christianity and Islam 
may create dichotomous us vs. them stereotypes. Yamaori claims that the 
dichotomy between good and evil in the U.S. and Iraq government may be a part 
of the reason behind the Iraq War (e.g. Yamaori 2004, Chap.7; Yamaori and Ishii 
2007).  
Whether Yamaoris suggestion is accurate or not, the rhetoric of the U.S. 
government especially during the run-up period to the Iraq War is dominated by a 
good-evil dichotomy. During this period, the oppressive Saddam Hussein regime 
and terrorists were considered evildoers, and the citizens of the United States 
personifications of goodness. As in Christianity, there was a clear dichotomy 
between the good and the evil: both situated at completely opposite sides.  
The dichotomous view about the Iraq War was most represented by 
President Bushs remarks in the State of the Union Speech in 2002 (January 29, 




first refers to oppressive states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and their 
terrorist allies calling them an axis of evil, which arm to threaten the peace of 
the world.  Bush also elucidates as follows: 
 
Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would 
splinter in fear and selfishness.  They were as wrong as they are evil. The 
American people have responded magnificently, with courage and 
compassion, strength and resolve.  As I have met the heroes, hugged the 
families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of 
the American people.... None of us would ever wish the evil that was done 
on September the 11th.  Yet after America was attacked, it was as if our 
entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves.  We were 
reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our 
country, and to history.  We began to think less of the goods we can 
accumulate, and more about the good we can do. 
 
President Bushs speech has similarities with sermons in Christianity. Bush 
further delivers views on the cultural importance of being good.  
 
This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity -- a moment 
we must seize to change our culture.  Through the gathering momentum of 
millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can 




this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting 
peace.... The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would 
return to normal.  In some ways, it has.  In others, it never will.  Those of us 
who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them.  
We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it 
must be opposed.  Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one 
country, mourning together and facing danger together.  Deep in the 
American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism.  And 
many have discovered again that even in tragedy -- especially in tragedy -- 
God is near.   
 
Nobuhara suggested in an interview that the American invasion into Iraq 
may reflect the view of a dichotomy between us vs. them. The U.S. government 
has committed an evil deed in the sense that the war has been killing many 
citizens and U.S. soldiers. However, the invasion has been rationalized by the U.S. 
government, with the argument that it wants to save the Western civilization by 
ousting the Hussein regimen and securing oil source in Iraq. Nobuhara claims that 
the President Bushs memorial speech in Washington National Cathedral soon 
after the 9-11 incidents was so significant partly because it had strong biblical 
connotations, and partly because it was delivered at the most significant Christian 
sanctuary.  
As opposed to Bushs speech, Japanese culture usually does not accept 




intercultural communication, suggested in an interview that the emphasis on 
cleanness and pureness, both of which are the most basic principles of 
Shintoism, affect Japanese views of the Iraq War. According to Nakamura, 
cleanness in Shinto connotes pureness in mind. For example, when a person 
helps others, the important point in Shintoism is not only the action of him/her, 
but the intention of the actor. Being altruistic to help others without intending to 
receive his/ her rewards by doing so represents pureness and cleanness in 
Shintoism. Reversely, the scheme to frame someone is impure and filthy 
action. Nakamura claims that that the action of the U.S. invasion into Iraq is, in a 
Shinto sense, very filthy because the intention to initiate the war is not pure at 
all: the U.S. attack of Iraq is a scheme that was partially motivated by interest in 
oil. Nakamura notes that no matter how the U.S. government logically presents 
their version of official reasons the start of the war (e.g., disarming Iraqs weapon 
of mass destruction and liberating Iraqi citizens), the intention to invade is still 
impure. Nakamura suggests: I believe there may be other factors, such as 
securing oil source, in the U.S. decision to attack Iraq. Thus, many Japanese feel 
the U.S. invasion was filthy in the Shinto sense. 
Nakamura further suggests that the above-mentioned Shinto mentality 
has clearly affected the portrayals of the Japanese press about the war in Iraq. 
Therefore, Nakamura claims that the Japanese media, including the Asahi, 
doubted the U.S. action from the beginning and have been very negative about the 
Iraq War and its aftereffects. Nobuhara also agrees with Nakamuras view on the 




Nobuhara goes further to explain that the Japanese media may believe that the 
filthy U.S. intentions to invade Iraq must be purified.  
Several interviewees agree that there was a Shinto influence on Japanese 
view about the Iraq War. Journalist B claims: although we are mostly unaware of 
the fact, filthiness in Shinto is underlying in our mind every time we cover 
stories. The U.S. actions in Iraq were not pure at all, especially the U.S. has a 
strong interest in oil in the Middle East. Hiroyasu Komine, a political scientist, 
suggested in an interview that another Japanese tradition may be intertwined with 
Shinto tradition. Komine notes: Japanese has a tradition to prefer losers than a 
strong winner (hangan biiki), the media may treat the U.S. much worse than it 
should be in reality. In addition to this, I guess we have a natural sense of Shinto 
about which side is pure or filthy.  
Along with Shintoism, Buddhism appears to have a certain influence on 
the attitude of Japanese press about the Iraq War. One of the main tenents of 
Buddhism is its non-violence. Non-violence of Buddhism comes from its 
acceptance of relativity: there are others whom we cannot understand, but the 
importance lies on acknowledging existence of discrepancies and agreeing onto 
co-existence. Resorting to violence is not the solution. Even the current world has 
enough amount full of pain, therefore, acceptance of others is one way to easy 
the pain (King 1990).  Yamaori further suggests that Buddhism may be a good 
solution to avoid such stereotypes because of its non-violence and acceptance of 




Iraq War are the stereotypes in monotheism such as Christianity and Islam and 
their good versus evil mentality (Yamaori 2004 ). 
Nobuhara suggested in his interview that the American invasion into Iraq 
may be equal to an act of mumyo. As discussed above, mumyo refers to a 
wondering mind that controls and unnecessary kills. Mumyo provides a karma so 
that one cannot escape from past deeds.  Nobuhara claimed that the Japanese 
press referred to the aftermath of the war even before the beginning of the war: 
the bad actions in the Iraq War will haunt America as karma into the next 
generation. 
Although Journalist A may be skeptical about the Shinto influence, he 
strongly agrees about the Buddhist interpretation of the Iraq War. Journalist A 
claims: I am not sure how other journalists think, but I personally do not 
distinguish things between pure and filthy when I report news. Nonetheless, I 
believe in Buddhist non-violence. One of the most basic approaches of my report 
is, similar to my idea of anti-war, non-violent solutions to conflict. Whenever I 
report on some conflicts---whether they are domestic or international, I attempt to 
frame news to say that violence should not be the solution.  
Another Japanese religion, Confucianism may strongly condition 
Japanese view of the Iraq War. One of the most important lessons in 
Confucianism is to keep harmony and order. For the purpose of realizing a 
harmonious situation, Confucianism put an emphasis on the procedure and a rule 
to govern a political system. The procedure and the rule are supposed to be 




strategies to govern. Asian political leaders have used its status quo approach and 
attempted to govern their countries (de Bary 2000).  The U.S. invasion into Iraq 
was completely against the Confucian ideal of harmony. The decision to start the 
war was very ideological and an unruly action. Thus, Nakamura suggests that in 
the Confucius sense, the war is not permissible.  
It seems that this sense also provides the basis for Japanese journalism. 
Several Japanese journalists I interviewed agreed to the notion of the Confucian 
ideal and were critical against the U.S. decision to start the Iraq War. Journalist C 
claims: I guess the Confucian tradition is so invisible that I was not aware of it. 
But, if I refer to Asian ideas, such as the ideals of Confucianism. President Bushs 
decision to invade Iraq was very juvenile. If he had been more prudent, there 
would not have such as large number of deaths away U.S. soldiers after the end of 
the initial combat. Journalist A refers to the general mindsets of Japanese 
journalists about the Iraq War: Japanese journalists tend to be anti-war. This is 
partly because most of us are Buddhists whose most important lesson is non-
violence, partly because we are Confucian who believe a harmonious world is 
desirable. Contrary to our views, U.S. policies about Iraq have appeared to be 
very self-centered and unwise. Journalist D also agrees with other journalists: I 
believe the procedure and process to negotiate is important in Confucianism.  In 
the Iraq War, the U.S. governments negotiations were not refined. The Bush 
administration should have talked more effectively with both Saddam Hussein 




As discussed above, evilness may be one of the most socially 
constructed concepts in the Western world and Japan as well as a very sensitive 
part of their cultural differences. Also, different views about the Iraq War between 
the U.S. and Japan may be derived from their different conceptions of evilness. 
Japanese religious notions are not unrelated to the anti-war sentiment. As 
discussed in Chapter nine, warfare has been negatively viewed by the public in 
Japan since World War II. War has become a socially constructed taboo in the 
post-War period of Japan. Buddhist ideals resurged and became very influential 
immediately after the defeat of World War II. John Dower (1999) finds a parallel 
between the idea of Shinran, the founder of the True Pure Land Sect, the most 
popular Buddhist denomination, and the zeitgeist of World War II.  According to 
Dower, Japan and Japanese embraced their own defeat and desperately 
transcended themselves by accepting the anti-war sentiment (496-503). Similar to 
Dower, Journalist E stresses the influence of Buddhism in the Japanese public 
after World War II: Every religion advocates the importance of loving others. I 
suppose, however, in many religions the love reaches usually only to the believers 
of the religions or toward all humans. One of the most important points of 
Buddhism is the mercy to all lives, including not only human beings, but also 
animals and vegetations. This benevolence may be something to do with the anti-
militarism in Japan.   
Some of the Asahis articles analyzed in this work are clearly influenced 
by Japanese religious values.  The Asahi frequently argues in their articles about 




the paper accepted Yamaoris suggestions. A typical story about the criticism is 
the limitation of the monotheism found in the editorial on January 1, 2003. This 
editorial is about the news that the animated film, Spirited Away, by Hayao 
Miyazaki won the Golden Bear Award at the Berlin Film Festival.  
After explaining the plot of the film that a girl was abducted to another 
world and found that myriad gods /monsters are living their lives with their crude 
nature, the editorial explains the importance of accepting the weakness and 
loneliness of the monsters: In much of the world, there are many other monsters, 
filled with contradictions and sorrows, causing trouble to other people. But, they 
cannot be controlled simply by force or by hatred. That seems to be the message 
we can take from Spirited Away. Much has been made of a clash of civilizations 
in the context of the clashes of the monotheistic religions of Islam, Judaism and 
Christianity. These religions hold that their god is absolute. The editorial quoted 
Takeshi Umehara, a famous philosopher, and claims that what the world needs 
now is a polytheistic ideology that believes that gods are everywhere-in the 
forests and in the mountains. The editorial further argues: Japanese, with an 
ancient legacy of polytheism, encountered tragedies from trying to set up, as it 
were, a monotheistic religious state after the Meiji Period. It seems Japan needs to 
take advantage of that bitter lesson- to make good use of the spirit of myriad gods. 
We need to look squarely at the harsh reality of the world around us. In doing so, 
however, we need to keep a level-headed, flexible perspective. 
During the Iraq War, the Japanese citizens are repeatedly reminded of the 




well as public may be attributed to cultural differences, particularly the religious 
ones. This cultural reason may be combined with the historical experiences that 
have made anti-militarism very dominant in Japan. In this way, the notion of 
evilness in Japan may be social constructed. 
Section 5 Conclusion 
One of the main arguments in this section is that both American and 
Japanese senses of evilness derive from their own religious traditions. Thus, the 
actions or notions against their religious beliefs are considered evil in both the 
Western world and Japan. Nonetheless, the evilness between the Western world 
and Japan is different because actions that their religious traditions regard as 
evil may not always overlap. The two countries have different notions of 
evilness, molded by different religious traditions. More importantly, this 
chapter argues that because of the different notions of evilness are central to 
media coverage of the Iraq War. I conclude that the notion of evilness is 
socially constructed in the two countries and that this notion may affect the 
portrayals of journalists both in Japan and in the United States. Finally, I conclude 




Chapter 10: Analyzing the Reasons for Difference between 
the Two Media (3): Difference of Public Opinion 
Chapter ten explores another factor that may affect the two print media 
organizations different perspectives about the Iraq War: public opinion 
formation. More specifically, this chapter investigates interrelationships among 
the public policy process, public opinion and news media coverage about the war 
in Iraq. I use statistical methods to analyze the congruence between the trends of 
news about the war and changes in public opinion. Special attention is paid to the 
Japanese medias negativity toward American Iraq policies. 
Although this chapter addresses the second and third research questions 
of this dissertation, the chapter uses a separate research design from that 
employed in other parts of this work. The separate research design requires more 
detailed research questions and hypotheses than those used above. In order to 
generate more specific research questions and more operational hypotheses to 
test, this chapter first examines previous studies that have been conducted on the 
relationship between public opinion and the media. 
The research question is whether a leading newspapers negativity on 
particular issues affects the views of citizens. Based on this research question, 
four hypotheses are tested, and three are confirmed. First, poll data concerning the 
Japanese sentiments about the United States worsens when the ratio of negative 
stories about U.S. policies the Asahi carries becomes higher. Second, the Asahis 




public support for the Koizumi Cabinet. Third, there is moderate congruence 
between the New York Times unfavorable coverage of the U.S. governmental 
policies on Iraq and U.S. presidential approval ratings. In contrast to these, one 
hypothesis is rejected: the Asahis negative contents toward United States policies 
over Iraq do not have much affect on the popularity of the Koizumi Cabinet in 
Japan, except for the period during which the Cabinet pronounced its strong 
support for the actions of the United States in the Iraq War. This study further 
discovers that the U.S. presidential approval ratings during the year of 2004 have 
a certain congruence with Japanese sentiments about the United States.  
 
Section 1 Public Opinion, the Media and the Policy Process 
This chapter at first briefly reviews the political science literature 
addressing the connections among public opinion and the media. The notion that 
public opinion conditions pubic policy is appealing. Democratic theory 
presupposes that citizens will make informed choices about the issues of the day. 
Citizens expect their views to be considered in public policy because their 
political leaders are chosen to represent and serve the interest of their 
constituencies. Several scholars, however, believe that this premise of democratic 
theory does not hold well. These scholars assume that people do not possess even 
the most elementary knowledge about politics. In his class study, The American 
People and Foreign Policy (1960), Gabriel Almond argues that public opinion is 




Vulnerable opinions especially exist in the lower social strata that feel powerless. 
Unlike the premise of democratic theory, Almond concludes that public reaction 
to foreign policy is moody, rather than thoughtful. The mood may vary from 
indifference to fatalism to anger, but it is almost always a "superficial and 
fluctuating response."(9) More recent studies, however, discover a certain 
rationality to public sentiments. Shapiro and Page (1992) discover that public 
attitudes change, but even in the short run they are less erratic than often 
presumed. Page and Shapiro find that American collective public opinion about 
issues ranging from racial equality to the MX missile, welfare to abortion are 
remarkably coherent, notwithstanding fluctuations in the opinions of individuals. 
Their research also indicates that changes in public attitudes are quite reasonable 
instead of being volatile and meaningless and should not be attributed to shifts in 
mood. 
To those who are involved in politics, public opinion polls have a huge 
impact on the initiation of new policies. Thus, political leaders have attempted to 
influence the public and generate a wider support. All of these actions are to exert 
their political agenda. Samuel Kernell calls this strategy going public (Kernell 
1997). According to Kernell, going public is a presidential strategy when he 
promotes himself and his policies among Washington elites by appealing to the 
American public for support (1). Kernell argues that the popularity of presidential 
initiatives is linked to public evaluation of the president himself. Kernell finds 
that presidents have gradually replaced the earlier bargaining style with going 




unprecedented amount of travel outside of Washington, illustrate the process and 
serve as a basis to compare Clinton's style with those of his recent predecessors. 
According to Kernell, this public leadership strategy is necessary because modern 
presidential-congressional relations have become very tense. Congress has been in 
an era of individualized pluralism where members of Congress are essentially 
free agents that can be persuaded to ignore traditional institutional attachments in 
favor of public pressure from constituents and interest groups.  
Besides Kernell, a number of scholars have focused on the use of 
presidential electronic communication as a political tool to overcome 
congressional opposition (e.g. Tulis 1987; Lowi 1985). Instead of trying to 
negotiate with congressional leaders, these scholars also suggest that presidents 
now appeal to the country by going public using electronic media, such as 
television. If the president is popular, the public is likely to rally around him, 
making it difficult for the Congress to deny approval. Even before presidents go 
public, the possibility of such action may persuade members of Congress to 
succumb to presidential wishes.  
Because of the political leaders role of going public, several scholars 
have analyzed the rhetoric of political executives, primarily at the presidential 
level (Hart 1984, Edelman 1988). The interest in this has been based on the 
assumption that presidential messages are potent political stimuli because they 
emanate from the top official of the country. The power or lack of power of the 




view, one needs to know the senders' political role and orientation to accurately 
interpret message meanings. 
The popularity of political leaders, however, is not a constant. Every U.S. 
president and Japanese prime minister has seen his approval ratings wax and wane 
in public opinion polling for several reasons. Many scholars of public opinion 
claim that peoples views are closely linked to the public policy process. Public 
opinion is, therefore, a referendum of their political leaders performance in 
public policy (Ostrom and Simon 1985, Mackuen 1983, Lewis-Beck 1988). Some 
scholars even found that the public is swayed, in some cases purposefully 
manipulated, by the public policies their political leaders created. Brace and 
Hinckley (1992) find a danger of the so-called public relations presidency. Brace 
and Hinckley address the democratic implications of the proliferation of opinion 
polls in relation to the executive branch. Specifically, they analyzed how the 
presidents daily activities affect their subsequent approval ratings and pondered 
the strength of the democratic linkage between American presidents and citizens. 
According to Brace and Hinckley, the presidents major domestic policy 
addresses and foreign travel are curiously timed to accord with month-to-month 
changes in approval ratings (55). The use of military force abroad, foreign policy 
addresses, and international rally points (dramatic, or dramatized events that 
include but are not limited to the use of force) are more likely to occur in the 
immediate aftermath of negative, dramatic domestic events (e.g., white House 
scandals) or amid worsening economic conditions. The authors suggest that these 




presidents approval ratings that would otherwise follow such negative events. 
The problem with all this, Brace and Hinckley explain, is that decisions and 
actions based on what is popular are not necessarily in the best interest of the 
nation; they may even conflict with what the public actually wants. Thus, the 
scholars conclusion is that modern presidents concerned about their popularity 
may find that the polls control them more than they control the polls. Democracy 
is not well served in either case. Brace and Hinckley conclude that we should 
lower our expectations regarding the level of support an incumbent president 
would receive. 
Studies of policy process models stress the role of public opinion and the 
media. One of the famous models that deal with public opinion is the punctuated 
equilibrium model proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Baumgartner and 
Jones claim that in the agenda setting stage of public policymaking, issue changes 
may occur through two distinctly different, yet not mutually exclusive processes. 
One is an incremental change, the other is a dramatic one. Baumgartner and Jones 
suggest that the balance of political power between groups of interests remains 
relatively stable over long periods of time; however, the balance is punctuated by 
relatively sudden shifts in public opinion on particular policy problems. The shifts 
are created first by greater media attention to an issue. Media attention to issues 
can grow when small but compelling or influential groups of people tell of 
problems with a policy to which members of the policy community do not 
effectively respond. When the equilibrium of policy process is punctuated by 




by a particular policy community breaks down. Public opinion and the media 
coverage on particular issues are the key to the break down of the equilibrium 
in the policy process and of the policy monopoly of the established policy 
community. 
As Baumgartner and Jones suggest, both public opinion and the media 
are important actors that form and change the process of public policy. Also, the 
media is generally assumed to be an important factor in shaping public opinion. 
Thus, the medias agenda-setting role has become an area of increasing interest in 
political communication studies. At the same time, the contents of the media are 
presumed to be reflected by public opinion. To some scholars, such as Walter 
Lippmann, the media is tantamount to public opinion (Lippmann 1922, 1997). 
Arguably, the influence of the media on the policy process is enormous. Thus, the 
medias portrayal of the Iraq War---the topic that this study deals with---is 
potentially a very important factor shaping public opinion and the political 
agenda.  
As discussed in chapter two, columnist Paul Krugman suggests an 
intriguing argument in the New York Times (Krugman 2003). Krugman believes 
that the division between the United States and Europe on the Iraq War was partly 
created by different public opinion. According to Krugman, the difference in 
public sentiments was formed by different portrayals of the media between 
America and Europe. He provides two possible theories for the great trans-
Atlantic media divide. One idea is that European media presented the news about 




organizations became shameless cheerleaders for American governmental actions 
in Iraq. It is not the purpose for this work to examine the validity of the two 
theories, but the basic tenent of Krugmans theories is very persuasive: the media 
may affect public opinion and vice versa. 
Arguably, the Iraq War is not a popular battle in international media 
around the world partly because the cause of the conflict itself is controversial and 
partly because the U.S. policies toward Iraq did not receive the full-fledged 
support of the United Nations. According to critics, the Bush administration 
hastily started to attack Iraq without obtaining clear evidence about Saddam 
Husseins plot to make Weapons of Mass Destruction. Since Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in Iraq were not found even after the initial combat, public distrust of 
U.S. Iraq policy has grown. Further, the alleged connections between Al Qaeda 
and Iraq turned out to be incomplete and unreliable. Thus, many critics around the 
world suggest that the war was actually a purposeful act of invasion into Iraq. 
Also, prior to the war, so-called, neo-conservation strata (the neo-con) both inside 
and outside of the Bush administration clearly suggested an aggressive military 
policy toward Iraq in order to secure the national interests of the United States. 
This has created the conspiracy-theory-type argument that the Bush 
administration intentionally started the war in order to secure its Middle-East 





Section 2 Research Design 
Based upon the above-mentioned literature reviews, specific research 
questions and testable hypotheses are formed. Two major assumptions for these 
studies are: (1) that the media provide information that affects the formation of 
public opinions; and (2) that the media has the power of agenda-setting among the 
public. Several pools of data are gathered for testing the hypotheses. The major 
research questions and hypothesis addressed in this chapter are as follows:  
 
Research Question 2-3:  What was the possible cause of the differences between 
the two countries media? Was the role of public opinion a major factor? 
 
Research Question 3: What are the ramifications of the differences in media 
content?  Especially how much is public opinion in both the United States and 
Japan influenced by differences in media content?  
 
Hypothesis 3: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about 
Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the differences of support for 
the war by their publics.  
 
Since the type of analysis of this chapter is quantitative in nature, more 
specific research questions and more operational hypotheses than those presented 
in earlier chapters are needed. The more detailed research questions and 





Subsection 1 More Specific Research Questions 
As some of the most renowned and most representative media in Japan 
and the United States, the Asahi and the New York Times may affect the views of 
people. The research question is whether a leading newspapers negativity on 
particular issues affects the views of citizens. The underlying concern is that the 
differences of the portrayals of the war may create different public opinion. 
Specifically, there are four questions. First, how do the Asahis negative 
stories of U.S.-Iraq policies affect the views of the Japanese public about the 
United States? The second and third questions are whether the Asahis negative 
treatments of the U.S. and Japanese policies on Iraq influenced public support for 
the Koizumi Cabinet? Fourth how do the New York Times negative articles about 
U.S. policies on Iraq sway public support for the Bush presidency?  
 
Subsection 2 More Operational Hypotheses 
Corresponding to the above-mentioned research questions, four 
hypotheses can be designated. First, it is hypothesized that the Asahis negative 
treatment of U.S. policy may generate negative public view on the United States. 
Second, it is assumed that the negative treatment of U.S. policy on Iraq by the 
Asahi may cause a lack of public support for the Koizumi Cabinet. Third, the 




ratings of his cabinet. Fourth, it is also supposed that unhelpful coverage of U.S. 
Iraq policies by the New York Times may influence support for President Bush.   
 
The four hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the Asahi, the 
smaller is the number of Japanese who feel favorable to the United States.  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the Asahi, the 
smaller is the number of Japanese who feel supportive of the Koizumi Cabinet. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the Asahi, the 




The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the New York 







Subsection 3 Data 
Along with content analysis, several pools of public opinion data were 
gathered for this analysis. The following five types of data that were used for 
examining the hypotheses: a) content analysis of the New York Times around the 
period of the Iraq War, b) content analysis of the Asahi around the period of the 
Iraq War, c) Japanese public opinion about the United States, d) Japanese Cabinet 
approval ratings, and e) U.S. Presidential approval ratings. In all of the above, the 
timeline of analysis is from Oct. 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. 
 
(1) Japanese Public Opinion Poll  
This chapter uses the two pools of data gathered by The Jiji Press (Jiji 
Tsushin sha) in Japan. The Jiji Press is the second largest wire service company 
in Japan after the Kyodo News Service. The first data is about the public approval 
ratings for the Koizumi Cabinet. The Jiji Press conducts the survey on the second 
Saturday in every month. During the period of analysis, the highest point is 56 
(November 2002) and the lowest point is 36(December 2004). Throughout Prime 
Minister Koizumis term, his Cabinet received a very warm welcome by the 
Japanese. When Koizumi took office in the spring of 2001, his Cabinets 
popularity was more than 70 points. The Koizumi Cabinet is the second most 
popular Cabinet (average 48.8 point) among the 19 past Cabinets from 1960. 




popularity (average 59 point), Hosokawas term was short-lived (8 months). Since 
the Koizumi Cabinet lasted the third longest (65 months) in history, Prime 
Minister Koizumis popularity is remarkable. (Hirama 2004, Maeda 2005)  
The second poll is about the Japanese sentiment toward the United 
States. Since this poll is unique in character, there is a need for a detailed 
explanation. The Jiji Press has been conducting a public opinion poll about 
favorable and unfavorable feelings towards foreign countries. Japanese sentiment 
about the United States is a portion of this poll. The poll has only two questions. 
One asks a respondent to pick three countries that he/she feels favorable toward 
among ten countries that are on a prepared list. The other asks the respondent to 
choose three unfavorable countries among the same ten countries. The ten 
countries include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Switzerland, India, China, the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic 
Peoples Republic of Korea. The polls are conducted monthly by face-to-face 
interviews between Jiji representatives and 2,000 respondents randomly selected 
from every prefecture in Japan. The data is summarized by the percent of 
respondents who pick a particular country as a favorable or unfavorable 
country. Since the original poll, which was started in 1960 with a brief 
termination in the spring of 1970, the cumulative data is a good indicator about 
Japanese sentiment toward particular countries.  
This study focuses on the percent of respondents who chose the United 
States either as a favorable or unfavorable country.  During the period of 




recorded in July 2003 (43 points) and the lowest point was witnessed in October 
2004 (31 points). In contrast, the month of May 2004 (15 points) recorded the 
highest percentage of the respondents who had an unfavorable image toward the 
United States, and the month of December 2002 had the least unfavorable rating 
toward the United States among Japanese.  
During this research period, the United States was the second most 
favored country after Switzerland. Unlike the United States, many Japanese do 
not regularly receive much news about Switzerland. Thus, one may wonder why 
that country is more favored than the United States about which there is an 
inundation of information about in the media. Since the polls do not ask 
respondents about the reason for their choice, it is assumed that the peaceful 
image of the mountainous country may have contributed to the good image of 
Switzerland. Katumi Muroya, who did research about the Jiji poll data during the 
past 45 years (from June 1960 to May 2005), claims that the Japanese favorable 
image of Switzerland in part comes from its politics of permanent neutrality 
(Muroya 2005). Muroya also finds that the 45-year average point of Japanese 
favorability to the United States is 31. Thus, it is considered that Japanese 
sentiment toward the United States during the period of this study is considered 
relatively favorable. 
 
(2) The U.S. Presidential Approval Rating  
This study uses data from the Pew Research Center for the People and 




non-partisan research institute and has conducted a wide range of public opinion 
polls. During the period of analysis, the highest approval rating was 74 (April 9, 
2003) and the lowest was 43 (April 1-4, 2004). Prior to the period of research, 
President Bushs popularity recorded its highest point soon after the 9-11 
incidents (86 point, September 21-25, 2001). After that, his popularity gradually 
declined as time passed.  
 
Section 3 Results 
This section discusses the results of the tests of the four hypotheses. 
Although hypothesis 2 is not verified, hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 are confirmed. 
Additionally, this section explains the implications of the results in the public 
policy process, and the possible limitation of this research.  
Among the four tests, hypothesis 1 is relatively clearly proven. The poll 
data about the Japanese sentiments about the United States deteriorates as the 
ratio of negative stories of U.S. policies the Asahi carries becomes higher (Figure 
2). The correlation coefficient between them is -.77 and is statistically significant. 
Figure 2 indicates that there is a clear relationship between the amount of negative 
coverage of the Iraq War and the decline in the positive image of the United 
States among Japanese. The more the Iraq War receives negative treatment by the 
Asahi, the less the Japanese feel favorable to the United States. Four periods need 
to be paid attention to. First, toward the time the Iraq War started (the end of 




sentiments toward the United States corresponded to the change. Second, the 
media became less negative during the short period around the time when the 
actual battle ended in the early part of May 2003. 
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about the US Policies of
Iraq (percent)
 
The data of favorability also improved by a few points during this period. Third, 
both Japanese sentiment toward the United States and the Asahis treatment of 
U.S. policy toward Iraq turned substantively sour soon after the end of the actual 
battle. Fourth, both data were temporally ameliorated in January 2004. Fifth, the 
former ratings returned until they hit bottom in October 2004. The data of 
November 2004 shows a slight surge, but still it is very small in number.  
The test results of Hypothesis 2 and 3 exhibit interesting discord. Figure 
3 suggests that the monthly approval ratings of the Koizumi Cabinet during the 
period of study are relatively stable. The Asahis negative coverage toward U.S. 




throughout the period of analysis. The Asahis negative content toward United 
States policies about Iraq do not have a large impact upon the popularity of the 
Koizumi Cabinet in Japan. The correlation coefficient between them is -.11 and is 
not statistically significant enough. Thus, hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
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In contrast to this result, the Asahis oppositional treatments of the Japanese 
governments Iraq policies present a moderate negative congruence with public 
support for the Koizumi Cabinet (Figure 4). The Asahis negativity toward the 
Japanese governments Iraq policies has been consistent except for two brief 
periods (April to June 2003, April to May 2004). The stable curve in the data is 




reverse sides of the same coin: the Asahis small surges in negativity correlate 
with imperceptible increases in Cabinet popularity. In addition, from May 2004 to 
the end of 2004, both approval ratings of the Koizumi Cabinet and the Asahis 
affirmative stories of its Iraq policies display slow-paced drops in number. 
Therefore, it appears that there is certain congruence between the ratings and the 
papers portrayals of Japanese policies about Iraq. The correlation coefficient 
between them is -.64, which is statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 3 is 
confirmed. 
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Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed. There is a moderate negative relationship between 
the New York Times negative coverage of the U.S. governments Iraq policies 




between them is -.62 and is statistically significant. Except for a few periods, the 
coverage of the paper becomes increasingly negative toward the U.S. 
governments policies on Iraq. By the same token, presidential approval ratings 
manifest a gradual drop until the end of 2004.  
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Furthermore, there is one interesting tendency that is revealed when we 
look at the data during the year 2004 (Figure 6). The trends in Japanese 
sentiments about the United States display similar rises and falls with presidential 




Figure 6: Japanese Sentim ent toward the US and the
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Section 4 Implications of the Results in the Policy Process 
Next, this chapter addresses the so what? question: Why is it important 
that two representative print media organizations in Japan and the United States 
portray different realities about the Iraq War? And how does the difference 
affect governments and citizens in each country and the international community? 
The difference in the media portrayals about the same issues matters because it 
creates different reactions from the public and about the issue, which eventually 
affects the public policy process.  
This chapter responds to these questions mainly by arguing the media's 
agenda-setting functions. The media is generally assumed to be an important 




presumed to be reflected by public opinion. The media is arguably tantamount to 
public opinion. Also, the influence of the media on the policy process is 
enormous. To those who are involved in politics, public opinion polls are very 
influential in determining how to initiate new policies. Thus, the difference in 
portrayal of the war could have a potentially very important influence on the 
shaping of public opinion and the political agenda.  
Since the media is an intermediary between the public and the political 
regime, the public policies generated by their political leaders play an important 
role in altering public opinion. Public opinion is a referendum of their political 
leaders performance in public policy as well as an indication of how another 
countrys policy is internationally accepted. This chapter finds that there is a 
strong connection between the media agenda and citizens attitudes toward their 
governments, as well as governments overseas. 
The media, public opinion and the policy process are fighting for the 
political agenda. Cohen (1963) asserts that the media do not tell us what to think, 
but what to think about. Shaw and McCombs (1972) first tested the agenda-
setting principle during the 1968 presidential campaign and provided evidence 
that the agenda of issues communicated by the media became the agenda of issues 
salient to voters. The agenda-setting function of the media is widely accepted in 
political communication research.   
One of the most notable policy process models addressing agenda-setting 
is John Kindons policy window model. Kingdon synthesizes elements of 




and Public Policies (1984, 2003). Kingdon argues that issues gain agenda status, 
and alternative solutions are selected, when elements of three streams come 
together. One stream encompasses the state of politics and public opinion (the 
politics stream). A second stream contains the potential solutions to a problem 
(the policy stream). The last stream is the problem stream which occupies the 
attention of government officials who want to generate public policy proposals to 
ameliorate the problem. These streams usually run independently until something 
happens to cause two or more of the streams to meet in a policy window. This 
policy window provides a possibility of policy change. In Kingdons agenda-
setting model, the media is portrayed as a sometimes powerful outsider, although 
the media is not a direct participant inside of government. This is because how the 
media covers an event and what they cover (and do not cover) may have a direct 
bearing on the saliency of an issue. Nonetheless, Kingdon finds in his interviews 
with policy participants that the importance of the media may vary from one type 
of policy participant to another, and concludes that the media have much less 
effect on governmental policy agendas than he had anticipated. (Kingdon 2003, 
57-61). Kingdon argues that three streams are crucial to form a policy change. 
The results of this chapters hypotheses testing also suggest the interplay 
among the media, public opinion, and the policy process regarding agenda-
setting. First of all, the above-mentioned hypothesis testing discovered that policy 
and public opinion is closely related. This confirms the previous studies of public 
opinion explained in the literature review section. In hypothesis 1 testing, both 




took a turn for the worse every time some Iraq policy was developed. In the 
beginning of the Iraq War (March 2003), the discussion of the Iraqi Special Law 
in Japan (June to July 2003), and the first arrival of the Japanese Self Defense 
Forces to Iraq (February 2004) are the events that altered the past trends 
negatively. Also, several developments further made both data decline. These 
developments include the capture of the first three Japanese civilians in Iraq 
(April 2004) and the murder of the first captured Japanese civilian (October 
2004). Conversely, the end of the actual battle in the Iraq War (May 2003) lifted 
numbers in both data. 
Regarding hypothesis 2, it is assumed that the Asahis negative treatment 
about the U.S. Iraq policies may be only a small factor for the public to evaluate 
the Koizumi Cabinet. As discussed before, the Koizumi Cabinet had been very 
popular, and there are several other big factors, such as economic conditions, that 
may have made a larger contribution to the approval ratings. Although hypothesis 
2 is rejected, there are two occasions in which we can find a certain relationship 
between the Asahis negative coverage about the U.S. policies toward Iraq and the 
approval ratings of the Koizumi Cabinet. One occasion was when the Koizumi 
Cabinet pronounced its strong support for the U.S. decision to start the Iraq War 
(March 2003), the other is the time of the passage of the Iraqi Special Law in 
Japan (July 2003). Both occasions are related to Japanese policies in Iraq. Also, in 
testing hypothesis 3, two periods (April to June 2003, April to May 2004) display 
a moderate increase in the Koizumi Cabinets popularity, during which the 




are considered recovery periods after important negative policies were declared in 
public (pronouncing support for the U.S. invasion into Iraq and the first SDF 
dispatch to Iraq). 
Also, in the test of hypothesis 4, a few periods of recovery in presidential 
approval rating are related to several changes in U.S. policies. One of those 
periods is the summer of 2004, when the Bush administration seriously warned 
the public about the imminent danger of Al Qaeda terrorism and raised the 
terrorism warning label up to Orange, the second most dangerous level. The 
Administration at that time also explained the possible targets and detailed ways 
to attack the targets with bombing by a suicidal attack of pick-up tracks. Secretary 
of Homeland Security Thomas Ridge named September 2004 as a National 
Preparedness Month for terrorism. Although these warnings turned out to be a 
false alarm, the presidential approval rating during the period temporally lifted. 
Since the Bush administration was allegedly very tactful about public relations, 
there were some discussions about whether the terrorism warning incident was a 
sort of public manipulation to raise the presidential approval ratings. Whether this 
was an intentional manipulation is not certain; analysts agree that the summer of 
2004 is a typical rally period for the population who faced a danger in their 
country and had a desire to support their political leader (Maeshima 2004)  
Additionally, this study found that there is some similarity between 
Japanese public sentiment toward the United States and U.S. presidential approval 
ratings (Figure 6). The correlation coefficient between them is .70 and is 




thus, there is a possibility that the two data displayed similar changes over time. If 
this is the case, U.S. presidential policies affect the citizens even outside of the 
United States. Also, it is assumed that this correlation may be caused by the 
internationalization of media content because the Japanese media organizations 
usually receive news of presidential ratings from the U.S. media. The U.S. media 
because of its reach undoubtedly has international influence, and to some extent 
must also affect public sentiment across the Pacific. Since television images are 
so powerful, public opinion outside of the United States can also be influenced by 
U.S. reporting. This study confirms this so-called CNN effect. The effect is due 
to the development of popular 24-hour international television news channels 
which have had a major impact on the international understanding of the policies 
of both the United States and other countries (Livingston 1997).      
Media effects are, however, sometimes cancelled out by other factors. In 
Japan, there is only a relatively small amount of news about U.S. presidents; 
therefore, for example, news about changes in the presidential ratings may have a 
big impact. By contrast, Japanese media consumers are inundated daily with 
information about the president and his policies. That may be the part of the 
reason why the CNN effect happened in Japan, but the influence of news stories 





Section 5  Possible Limitations of the Tests 
Although the author believes that the hypotheses tests are valid in their 
methodology, there are possibly some limitations in all four tests. The hypotheses 
tests 2, 3, and 4, for example, involve media portraits of policies and their 
influence on political leaders approval ratings. The ratings seem to be, however, 
an amalgam of several influences, and there are other factors that can contribute 
to the ratings. Previous studies suggest that there are several components that 
condition these ratings. Two of those components are the time constraint and the 
economic situation. Time appears to be a very important factor. Presidential and 
prime minister approval is characterized by a gradual and steady erosion over the 
course of a presidential term, and while events and developments may temporarily 
delay or even reverse this decline over the short-term, it cannot be forestalled 
indefinitely (Cronin 1980, Stimson 1976, Maeda 2005). Economic circumstances 
also can be powerful conditioning factors. While prime ministers and presidents 
can make marginal adjustments, they cannot overcome endemic problems or 
worldwide economic trends (Lewis-Beck 1988, Maeda 2005). Also, scholars find 
that there is a certain congruence between the approval ratings of the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party and the approval ratings of the Prime Ministers 
Cabinets (Maeda 2005).   
Also, the nature of the content analysis methodology is not perfectly free 
from some biases by the coder, the author himself. No matter how objective the 
coder attempts to be in his treatment of the text, there is a possibility that he might 




U.S. citizen, his perspectives may not be neutral toward the U.S. or Japanese 
governments position. Although the author believes himself to be non-partisan, 
there is some possibility that he is influenced by a particular political ideology.  
In addition, one can argue that the choice of papers may create some 
bias. One of the basic methods of comparative politics is to compare similar 
political systems and actors. The reason why the author selected the New York 
Times and the Asahi is that both are arguably the most respected newspaper in 
their countries, and also they are considered politically liberal. Nevertheless, the 
author cannot deny the fact that comparative content analysis of more 
conservative print media, such as the Sankei in Japan and the Washington Times 
in the United States might generate different results.  
As for the choice of the media, this research limits its comparison to only 
print media for the sake of analysis. The importance of electronic media in recent 
years is stronger than ever before. In the modern era, television has penetrated 
into our daily lives more than newspapers. In addition, the diffusion of the 
internet, especially the impact of blogs, has altered the traditional political 
communication system. The author would like to conduct a similar analysis of 
these electronic media in the future. 
Finally, I must argue whether the two papers can represent the whole 
media of the two countries. There are many media outlets both in the United 
States and Japan. Electronic media, such as television and radio, are virtually 
saturated in both countries. Also, there are many traditional print media, such as 




notably internet has become a mainstream source of information. Internet 
provides not only the supplement information of those traditional media 
organizations, but also a powerful source of alternative news stories.   
Among those different kinds of media outlets, I believe The New York 
Times and the Asahi are the best possible samples. First, the two liberal news 
papers are arguably most respected and influential in their own countries. As for 
the New York Times, the Columbia Journalism Review ranks Americas best 
newspapers (Cummings and Wise 2001, 221). There is no equivalent study about 
the Japanese media; however, I believe the Asahi may rank the top. The New York 
Times is widely read by decision-makers of the United States, and so is the Asahi. 
Although they are not the top circulation in each country (the New York Time is 
the fourth largest in daily circulation, and the Asahi is the second), they are often 
believed to representatives of the whole media of each country.  
Next, they are the most important agenda-setter for other media. For 
journalists who cover the national or international political news in the United 
States, the New York Times is one of the first newspapers to read in the morning 
among other major papers. Newspaper and television reporters in the U.S. find 
out the latest information in the New York Times to receive updated information. 
The New York Times position on a particular political issue may set the agenda 
among those journalists. The Asahi also has a strong agenda-setting power for 
other journalists. An important morning ritual for many Japanese journalists is to 
compare other news media organizations coverage. I myself compared rival 




Always, the first paper to look at was the Asahi. This is because the Asahis tone 
of the articles for a particular social or political issue often resonated well with the 
public.  
Finally, because of the growing power of the internet, the two liberal 
media organizations have extended their influence. The New York Times and the 
Asahi were on of the frontier of newspapers that went digital during the 1990s. 
Among newspaper websites, these two papers sites are leaders in their respective 
country.  
Although these are the reasons I believe why the two papers are the best 
representatives of print media in both the U.S. and Japan, there are of course 
many other important media organizations. There are literally thousands of media 
outlets, if major internet sites are included. A study just focusing on these two 
papers has its weaknesses. Still, there are many reasons why the comparison can 
be justified for comparative research on the relationship between the media and  
public opinion.  
While it is difficult to know for sure that the media was shaping public 
opinion rather than public opinion shaping the media or vise versa (the chicken 
and egg problem), this is a perennial debate in the literature. My tentative 
conclusion is that it is difficult to figure out which influences which. This is 
because public opinion is formed over a long period in which public opinion 
influences the media and the media defines public opinion. This part of the 





Section 6 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the role of public opinion in creating different 
accounts of the Iraq War by the two media. It may be logical to surmise that 
differences of public opinion between the United States and Japan may be one of 
the significant causes for the different portraits of the war by the two media. This 
is because any media organization is supposed to mirror the opinion of strata of its 
society. Since both the Asahi and the New York Times are among the largest 
newspapers in Japan and the United States, the articles in both papers reflect the 
public in Japan and the United States, respectively. Further, the governments 
positions on Iraq affect public opinion and the contents of the media both in the 
United States and Japan. 
Using the data derived from content analysis, the four hypotheses were 
tested in this chapter. These hypotheses were created to investigate the connection 
between public opinion and the portrayals of leading media organizations. Since 
the media is an intermediary between the public and politics, public policies are 
important determinants of the change of public views about their political leaders. 
Of the three accepted hypotheses, it is especially intriguing that the Asahis 
treatment of U.S. Iraq policies appears to be related to Japanese sentiments about 
the United States. As discussed, the Japanese views of the United States perhaps 
reflected, and possibly originated in the views of U.S. citizens because the U.S. 
presidential approval rating and the Japanese feeling toward the United States 
demonstrate some congruence. This interrelationship may be caused by the CNN 




Both Primer Koizumi and President Bushs approval ratings alter after 
portrayals of their Iraq policies by their leading liberal print media changed. 
These results indicate that the media have strong impacts on the public image of 
political leaders. Nevertheless, this finding must be tempered as there are not 
strong relations between the Asahis coverage of U.S. Iraq policies and public 




Chapter 11: Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: discussing the significance of 
this dissertation and of its contributions to political communication studies and 
exploring possible future directions of study. Specifically, I will ponder four 
possible directions for further analysis: adding analyses of different media 
sources, comparing between the results of this work and analyses of news 
contents of other wars, altering the time frame of analysis, and paying attention to 
more specific topics, such as how cultural and political stereotypes might affect 
reporting on the Iraq War. Finally, after discussing the possible limitations of this 
research, I will conclude this chapter.  
Both objectives speak to the question I raised in the beginning of this 
work: why was the same issue sometimes portrayed quite differently by the media 
in Japan and the United States?  
Along with discussing the different accounts of the Iraq War as they 
appeared in the Asahi and the New York Times, this work showed that the medias 
impact is significant in shaping public policy and the political agenda. It also 
molded public opinion. This was true both in the United States and Japan. 
Another important finding of this work is that there are historical and cultural 
reasons why Japanese media organizations, including the Asahi, hold anti-war 
standpoints. I will show in this conclusion that some of the reasons discussed in 
earlier chapters for the Asahis anti-militarism can be generalized to other cases, 




media organizations pick up particular stories and report them with particular 
frames.  
 
Section 1 Empirical Contributions of This Work 
One of the most significant contributions of this dissertation to the 
literature of political communication is that the work systematically analyzed the 
news contents about the Iraq War between the Asahi and the New York Times. 
Most political communication studies conducted to date on the Iraq War are 
concerned with the situation within a particular country (chiefly within the United 
States). There are only a few studies about the media and politics in the Iraq War 
that take a comparative perspective (Aday, et.al.2005, Dimitrova et.al.2005), but 
even these studies tend to exclude East Asian media content. This dissertation 
therefore fills an empirical gap. In this respect, I believe this dissertation is at the 
frontier of comparative media studies on the war between the United States and 
Japan.  
Second, this dissertation also adopted multiple methodologies. The 
contents of the two leading liberal papers in each country were investigated by 
both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods. Also, I conducted 
several interviews to explore the findings in the content analysis. 
The results of the quantitative content analysis suggested that the two print 
media indeed portrayed the war differently. First, this study quantitatively found 




differences in their choice of main topics. The main topics of the Iraq War also 
varied in the periods covered by this analysis. During the run-up period to the war 
(from October 1, 2002 to March 19, 2003), the role of the United Nations and the 
U.S. decisions about Iraq were dominant in both papers. However, the Asahi put 
more focus on the role of the United Nations while the majority of the stories 
appearing in the New York Times addressed U.S. decisions about Iraq. The 
differences between the two papers perspectives were more clearly manifested 
during the period of actual battle (from March 21 to May 1, 2003). The Asahi 
covered a wider and more diverse range of topicssuch as civilian casualties and 
anti-war protests than the New York Times. The New York Times tended to focus 
its coverage on the view of the war as found in the United States. After the end of 
the actual battle in Iraq (May 1, 2003), the Asahi and the New York Times featured 
a far greater number of different topics and key concepts. In the case of both 
papers, the largest portion of the articles covered information and events related to 
their own countries involvement in Iraq. Also, the study found different patterns 
in how both papers treated U.S. policies in Iraq. The Asahi was strongly negative 
throughout the period of analysis; the New York Times was initially supportive 
and stayed supportive until the end of the actual official battle (May 1, 2003), but 
as time progressed, the New York Times gradually became more critical toward 
U.S. governments policies and performance in Iraq.  
This study qualitatively analyzed the basic trends found in Iraq related 
coverage by the two liberal media and supported the quantitative findings. Stories 




the Asahi provided different realities even though they are reporting the same 
events, especially related to UN weapons inspections as well as their reactions 
toward their respective governments activities. Compared with the Asahi, the 
New York Times was less critical toward U.S. policies in and toward Iraq. 
Analyses of editorials between the two major print media organizations during the 
period of actual combat also revealed that different understandings of the concept 
evil existed in the two media. While the New York Times treated the oppressive 
Saddam Hussein regime and terrorists as evildoers, the Asahi portrayed the 
United States as the big evil doerthe instigator of an unjustified war. Further, 
my content analysis of the articles written by journalists who were embedded with 
coalition forces operating on the ground, and thus were covering the war from the 
same inside position, revealed that the two leading newspapers articles were 
similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and in their focus on daily 
activities in the field. Nonetheless, there were significant disparities in their 
formats and the degree of sympathy they showed to the coalition forces. 
Third, this work crystallized that there was an interplay among the 
media, public policy, and public opinion in relation to the Iraq War and the 
formulation of related policies. This finding addresses the so what? question 
about the main topic of this dissertation: Why it is important to understand the 
reasons behind why two representative print media organizations in Japan and the 
United States portrayed different realities about the Iraq War? This work found 
that the media had a significant impact on the shaping of public policy and the 




public opinion by reporting about the war and Iraq-related policies. This work 
found that there was clear congruence between the medias content and public 
opinion polls. Of particular note, both Prime Minister Koizumi and President 
Bushs approval ratings altered after the liberal print medias portrayals of their 
Iraq policies changed in tone and content. Those results indicate that the media 
has a strong impact on the public image of their political leaders. Also, it revealed 
that there were some connections between governments war-related policies and 
surges and falls of public support for their governments. In addition, an intriguing 
finding of this study is that the Japanese medias treatments of U.S. Iraq policies 
appear to affect Japanese sentiments about the United States. This may be caused 
by the CNN effect, meaning that the Japanese public is influenced by the media 
outside of Japan. As an example discussed in chapter ten, Japanese media 
organizations typically receive news of presidential ratings from the U.S. media. 
The U.S. media may have an international influence, which affects public 
sentiment across the Pacific. 
Fourth, this dissertation discovered that different historical experiences 
and political cultures influenced the lenses used by journalists. It was assumed in 
this dissertation that the views created by journalists influenced public views 
about the world. The cultures of anti-militarism and the strong anti-war 
sentiments held by Japanese originated from Japans defeat in World War II. 
Despite the passage of 60 years of time; those feelings remain firm in the news 
organizations in Japan. This work examined how the concept of war has been 




shared and nurtured by the political system. Anti-militarism was a norm for the 
Japanese media for many decades. The media in Japan as a whole was visibly 
anti-war until at least the 1980s (Kim 1981). The anti-war perspective of the 
media is reflected in (or has been reflective of) public sentiments; anti-militarism 
has become a zeitgeist in post World War II Japan. Because of these cultural and 
historical reasons, Japanese media organizations have negatively portrayed all 
warfare, including the war in Iraq. Even during the war in Afghanistan, the tones 
of Japanese media were very negative toward the U.S. retaliation to Taliban. 
During the time of the war, I went back and force between the United States and 
Japan. I was surprised at the degree of negativity in Japanese coverage about the 
U.S. actions---this is my casual observations, though. 
To understand the reasons why this has been the case, it can be helpful to 
apply a more general theory about the characteristics of political communication. 
In particular, there are several factors that influence how a media organization 
picks up a particular story and reports it with a particular frame. First, media 
organizations live within the political cultures of the country to which they 
belong. The different views of warfare that have become a part of the political 
cultures of the U.S. and Japan may affect the content of media reporting on war. 
As argued in this work, since Japan experienced massive damage and lost a large 
number of civilians during World War II, anti-militarism became one of the 
biggest components of the countrys post-World War II political culture. Also, the 
Japanese public has very mixed sentiments regarding the Self-Defense Forces 




Japan should more actively participate in international affairs using the SDF. But, 
these surveys suggest that most respondents feel that the contribution should be 
restricted to non-military purposes, such as peace-keeping operations in foreign 
lands. Those who believe that the SDF should be transformed into a full-fledge 
military, and that Japan should actively be re-armed are very much limited in 
number (The Mainichi 2007). By contrast, the United States has not experienced a 
major attack by foreign countries except the Pearl Harbor attack, and in slightly 
different contexts, during the war for Independence against Britain and the 9-11 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. As a 
military superpower, the United States has been involved in many, if not most, 
major wars. In some wars, most notably, the Vietnam War, the U.S. military 
incurred severe damage. The U.S. military suffered heavy casualties and many 
soldiers went missing in action. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. public became 
strongly anti-war, but the sentiment was not as strong as that of Japanese. 
Although some strata of society in the United States strongly manifest anti-
military sentiments, their numbers are relatively small (Ladd and Bowman 1996). 
Japanese anti-military political culture served as a backdrop to media coverage of 
the Iraq war and may be behind the strong anti-war framing used in creating news 
stories by Japanese journalists. The New York Times, on the other hand, was more 
supportive of U.S. policies in Iraq, at least until the initial invasion.   
Second, but related to the first point, public opinion had a strong impact 
on the medias reporting. As found in chapter ten, President Bushs support 




treatments about Iraq issues. The initial high support for President Bush may 
partly accounted for by the nationalistic zeal created by the 9-11 attacks. As time 
went by, however, support faded. The same was the case with the New York 
Times level of positiveness in their treatment of U.S. policies toward Iraq. 
Chapter ten further revealed that there were certain relations between the public 
support of Prime Minster Koizumi and the level of negativity in the Asahis 
treatment of the Iraq War, when the Japanese governments Iraq War policies 
were under discussion. As these examples suggest, the medias reporting can not 
ignore the mood of the public.   
Third, the governments policies and positions related to a particular 
issue may influence the contents of the media. Past history tells us that 
government policies for a particular issue may directly affect media coverage in 
some extreme cases, such as when the government severely controls media 
reporting. As discussed in Chapter 9, the Japanese government during World War 
II put their journalists under draconian controls that governed how they could 
report on Japanese politics and the war. Although this is an extreme example, 
governmental policies often provide a basic framework within which a journalist 
reports on a particular issue. For example, there was a clear difference in the 
governmental policies towards Iraq between the United States and Japan. The 
United States is the main actor in this war and must deal with the wars aftermath. 
It goes without saying that the American media recognized the importance of the 




detail about U.S. government policies pertaining to Iraq as well as human interest 
stories about U.S. soldiers and their families.  
In comparison, Japanese involvement in the war was very limited. The 
Japanese SDF did not participate in the invasion and only finally joined the allied 
forces in the fall of 2004 to help the Iraq rebuilding efforts. The main reason why 
the Japanese government did not send the SDF was that the 1946 Constitution 
prohibits Japanese re-armament and abandons the right to engagement in war as 
well as the holding of weapons for the reason of invading a foreign country. 
Because of the Constitution, as well as public anti-war sentiments, the Japanese 
governments role in the Iraq War has been very limited. As analyzed in the 
previous chapters, to the Japanese media, the Iraq War was news from a far away 
land. Since only a fraction of Japanese citizens (mostly the SDF forces) were 
involved in the war, there were not many Iraq-related human interest stories in the 
Japanese media. Instead, the Japanese medias coverage tended to focus on U.S. 
policies and their effects on the international community. As such, the larger 
political context behind a particular policy often provides a basic background that 
influences what reporters focus on.   
Fourth, the media have organizational reasons for why a particular issue 
is favored, and another is not. First, the organizations ideological standpoint may 
affect which issues are picked as well as the frames in the stories. In this study, 
the Asahi is more progressive than the New York Times in terms of its views on 
warfare; thus, the paper was more negative toward U.S. policies towards Iraq. A 




The study suggests that The Sankei tends to select more negative stories about 
China and North Korea because of the papers conservative positions. In contrast, 
the more liberal the Asahi paid more attention to social welfare issues than the 
other three newspapers (Ishikawa 2007). Second, a media organizations level of 
commitment to a particular issue will affect the content of its coverage. During 
the Iraq War, the U.S. military allowed only three Japanese media organizations 
to embed with the forces in Iraq: the Asahi, NHK and the Nippon Television. 
Except for the Asahi, no Japanese print media was permitted to report from the 
actual battle ground. Unlike their Japanese counterparts, the U.S. media 
organizations were allowed to send a far larger number of their reporters to the 
battleground. It is natural that the more journalists there are to cover a particular 
issue from different angles, the more diverse their stories will be. This does not, 
however, necessarily mean per se that American press coverage was more diverse 
than Japanese. Since U.S. media organizations were allowed to send a far larger 
number of their reporters to the battleground, they were in a better position to 
report various stories about the troops with whom they were embedded. Their 
focus was, however, closer to that of the coalition forces. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the New York Times stories written by embedded journalists were very 





Section 2 Theoretical Contributions of This Work 
There are several theoretical contributions that can be from the results of 
this work. First, a countrys political communication system is significantly 
affected by its history. Each society creates an idiosyncratic political 
communication system based on its own history and media culture, a product of 
its history. This work confirmed that anti-military sentiments created by Japans 
involvement and huge loss in World War II affect the content of the media even 
now. In contrast, while the United States has experienced wartime causalities in 
World War II, it has not suffered a similar catastrophic damage like that 
experienced by Japan on its homeland because the wars the United States has 
been engaged in have been fought overseas. The role of history has molded both 
political communication systems. 
Indeed, Japanese experiences during World War II have had long lasting 
effects. They became the fundamental underpinnings of the medias views on 
international politics in the post-World War II era, and shaped the medias 
progressive role in political society. Media culture in Japan has been strongly 
affected by the wartime experience. The war taught the Japanese public to 
mistrust the use of armies to solve problems. Interestingly, as anti-war sentiment 
was reproduced and held by even subsequent generations, the medias 
progressive roles are still very present in society. As Berger (1998) suggests, 
anti-militarism has been very strong in Japanese society in the post World War 
II period. Berger claims that there has been consistent opposition to 




for national defense. Berger also emphasizes the effects of the American 
occupation as the origin of antimilitarism.  
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) made several efforts to demilitarize Japan. The reforms 
included five key areas: emancipation of women, permitting the unionization of 
labor, liberalizing education, creating a judicial system that put a high esteem on 
human rights, and dismantling zaibatsu (conglomerates). These reforms 
successfully transformed a militaristic political regime into a democracy.  
Interestingly, the ways of demilitarization and democratization of Japan 
by the U.S. occupation forces were top-down and not sufficiently democratic. 
Since MacArthur was not happy with the original constitutional plan presented 
by the Japanese government, SCAP staff prepared a more liberal draft. That 
became the 1946 Constitution in which Article Nine explicitly denounced the 
right to war. It was not clear whether Article Nine was MacArthurs idea or it 
was proposed by Japanese officials who might have thought denouncing war 
was both good for Japan and SCAP. Either way, strong top-down decision-
making was SCAPs way of reforming militaristic and undemocratic Japan.  
SCAP also paid attention to the content of the Japanese media. One of 
those efforts was to censor the content of all magazines, books and newspapers. 
Militaristic or undemocratic descriptions in the media were severely censored 
by the U.S. occupation forces (Eto 1989). In this way, notions of democracy and 





Post war democratization is a logical consequence for the Japanese public 
as well. The public welcomed the reform and joined the democratization 
bandwagon that was being pulled by the U.S.; the public was weary of war and 
came to detest the wartime militaristic regimes that imposed government-led 
oppressive policies on Japanese citizens (Dower 1999). The fact that the 1946 
Constitution remained in force in Japan and has never been amended, despite 
having been heavily influenced by Americans (and many argue drafted by them) 
indicates just how strongly the public embraced both democracy and a peaceful 
political regime.  
As the U.S. occupation became more legitimate in Japan, the public 
started to aspire to their goals for a democratic political regime that would not 
resort to military might to win its interests. This was, I believe, the origin of 
anti-militarism in Japan.  
This background information is helpful for understanding why the 
Japanese public was outraged when there was a sudden shift in the emphasis of 
U.S. occupation policies from demilitarization to the limited rearming of Japan 
after the inception of the Cold War (beginning around 1947). The public was 
opposed to the U.S. Occupations policy reversal, often known as the reverse 
course; this suggests that by that time already a feeling of anti-militarism was 
commonly shared by the public. The strong public opposition against the United 
States was mainly because the Japanese public felt betrayed by the United 
States, the great liberator from past militarism. Indeed, the Japanese public has 




The United States since the beginning of the Cold War has been pushing 
Japan in stages to rebuild its self-defense forces and to turn these into a 
functioning military, in essence to create a normal state again out of Japan. 
While the Japanese government has shown strong loyalty to the United States 
on this questionundoubtedly because of Japans national security concerns as 
it is completely dependent up on the post-war alliance with the U.S. for its 
protection. In sharp contrast to the position of the Japanese government, in the 
eyes of the Japanese media, the U.S. has become an ambivalent figure. While 
the U.S. was revered as a symbol of democracy and seen as important because 
of its interdependent economy with Japan, the U.S. has been one of the most 
jingoistic regimes among industrialized states in the world. Some fear that the 
U.S. could pull Japan into a traumatic wartime situation. 
Although the U.S. has successfully implanted a sense of guilt and Japan 
has responded by developing a national sense of shame about its role in the war, 
Japan internalized the guilt and shame in an interesting way. The guilt and 
shame were directed more toward domestic than international concerns. The 
Japanese public has started to recreate the memory that they were the victim of 
the war, instead of the fact that Japan was an aggressor against other Asian 
countries. The Japanese media has played a major role in this recreation of war 
memory. As one interviewee suggested in Chapter 8, every summer around 
August, the Japanese media reminds its listeners, readers, and viewers how 




to the massive bombings of Tokyo and other major cities by United States 
forces. 
Second, media and public opinion cannot be separated. One of the 
problems pointed out in chapter 10 is that it is difficult to distinguish whether 
the media affected public opinion or vice versa. This is a perennial puzzle that 
social scientists grapple with, but that is almost impossible to solve. This is 
because both are so intertwined, and as Walter Lippman (1922) argues in his 
class study, public opinion is the synonym of the media. 
One of the basic assumptions of this chapter is that the media has a strong 
impact on public opinion. This is a debated subject. The medias impact on 
public opinion polls, for example, is a major field of study in political 
communication. Yet, while some scholars believe that exposure to the mass 
media could have a strong influence on the views of the public, others question 
this (Owen 1991). Historically, there have been three main directions that 
arguments have taken: 
First, until at least the mid-1940s, the media was believed to have had 
magic bullets that could penetrate audiences minds and control public 
opinion. Over the next decades, these strong effects were brought into question 
by several electoral studies. These studies found that the media affect was not as 
strong as the magic bullets that were painted by earlier scholars. They instead 
argued that the media reinforces preferences that were obtained and nurtured by 
audiences before media contact occurred (Berelson et al. 1954). Then, in the 




scholars found that the media has a clear effect of agenda-setting of the issues 
discussed among the public (Shaw and McCombs 1972). In addition to those 
agenda-setting studies, scholars have investigated the medias power to frame 
news. That is, because the media covers news stories with particular framings, 
the public is affected by the medias portrayal of the news (Gamson 1989).   
More recently, in contrast to studies that focused on the limited effect of 
the media, scholars again have focused attention on the medias impact on 
public opinion and argued that it is large. The consensus among scholars is that 
the media has a strong impact in setting agendas, although the medias power is 
not large enough to fundamentally alter peoples minds.  
Regarding the medias influence on public opinion, the media arguably 
may be becoming less influential in U.S. elections.1 One of the more interesting 
recent electoral campaign strategies of candidates in the United States is to try 
to bypass the traditional media and directly appeal to the public. This is because 
campaign managers believe that the media does not tell well what the 
candidates want to tell to the public. Especially, Republican candidates believe 
that the medias liberal biases sometimes hinder their electioneering. In the 
2004 election, Karl Rove, the media advisor for George W. Bush also tried to 
bypass the media by having Bush meet as many of his constituencies face-to-
face as possible. This was done in order to solidify potential voters support. 
This approach is called a ground war as opposed to the air wars that emphasize 
the opportunities to appear in the media in the campaign (Kohut 2006). In 
                                                




ground wars, it is assumed that public opinion is not affected by the media. 
Although the ground war strategy may solidify faithful supporters, the number 
of people whom a candidate or his campaign supporters can contact is very 
limited. The ground war strategy may be a supplement of the regular airwars 
in which the media can reach a large number of populations and create interface 
between the candidate and voters. Thus, the medias impact in the U.S. political 
campaign cannot be negated. 
     These arguments of media effects however, may ignore one fundamental 
question. Studies that attempt to find a media influence on public opinion do not 
discuss much about public opinions impact on the media. There is an obvious 
reason for this. Public opinion and media information are so co-mingled that it 
is difficult to distinguish which influences which. There is theoretically the 
possibility of exploring which factor is the first to influence the other by using 
time series analysis. The problem with this method, however, is that since 
public opinion on particular issues is in some cases molded over a long period 
of time, it is not always practical to use the statistical method.   
It is difficult to distinguish whether the media influences the public 
opinion or vice versa. Although I admit that chapter 10 my work obviously has 
this chicken-and-egg problem, this may be inherent to the question being 
researched. There appears to be a bi-directional influence. Japanese negativity 
toward U.S. policies about Iraq appears to be influenced by public opinion at the 




Third, this work confirmed that there may not be such a thing as 
completely objective media coverage because the media cannot exist 
independent of its societal background. As discussed previously, different 
portrayals of the Iraq War between the Asahi and the New York Times suggest 
that historical and social factors influenced the stories.  
The debates over the philosophies of social science in Chapter 2 are good 
references to argue the medias objectivity. Winch (1964) claims that we should 
not view a society through our own pre-set standards of judgment. Instead, 
Winch suggests that the best way to avoid misunderstanding a society is to try 
to approach the society from the inside and to establish rational criteria that are 
specific to that culture. Winch discusses the mystical practices of the Azande, a 
"primitive" people living in central Africa and claims that it is not fair to judge 
Azande society by labeling their belief in the existence of witches as false, 
magical medicine is illusionary, and oracles are ineffective. Winch argues that 
the reason why a Western scholar, such as Evans-Pritchard, regards Azande 
magic as irrelevant is that the scholar draws his explanations from his own 
culture. Winch also emphasizes that social science has a different conception of 
reality from that of Azande believers in magic. 
The medias coverage during the Iraq War may be akin to Zande magic. 
The media has its own context of reporting in its own society. This context, 
however, may be difficult to be perceived by another country. While anti-
militarism has been a widely accepted culture in Japanese media organizations, 




actions that have been molded by its own society. Thus, it may be difficult to 
see whether the media can be objective to controversial issues, such as 
warfare. The difference between the New York Times and the Asahi is a good 
example that the media cannot see a fact objectively because a journalist 
views an event through our own pre-set standards of judgment. 
Similar observation of my analysis is found by Cohen, Levy, Roeh, and 
Gurevitich (1996).They dealt with the concept of global newsroom in which 
coordination among broadcast organizations across national boundaries takes 
place. They examined such an organization as Eurovision in its supplies and 
demands of the news. Decision-making in Eurovision is not centralized, but it is 
up to individual news service in each European country. Interestingly, the 
authors found that there is a consensus on the top stories, but individual national 
news services decide how to deliver the news. The authors found that the 
importance of the news is socially constructed by its own country. 
 
Section 3 The Most Puzzling Question: The Medias Unfavorable Coverage Given 
the Good U.S.-Japan Relationship 
Finally, I want discuss the most puzzling question raised by the results of 
this work. The political and economic proximity between the United States and 
Japan did not translate into favorable coverage for U.S. policies on Iraq. Why did 
the Asahis portrayals of U.S. policies about the Iraq War not reflect the good 




journalists, both from the U.S. and Japanese media organizations, must have seen 
similar events in the battlefield  
Indeed, the United States and Japan have a very close relationship. In terms 
of national security, Japan cannot survive without the U.S. military presence in 
East Asia. Because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has been protected by 
the military umbrella of the United States. Also, the Koizumi cabinet (2001-2006) 
was known to be pro-U.S. and declared that the U.S.-Japan relationship is the 
most important in its foreign policy. The Japanese government has supported the 
Bush Administrations war on terrorism from the very beginning. Although the 
Japanese Constitutions Article Nine prohibits the Self Defense Forces from 
engaging in combat, the Japanese government sent the SDF to Afghanistan and 
Iraq for peacekeeping operations. As of July 2007, Japans Self Defense Forces 
are stationed in a compound in Samawa, Iraq, as part of President Bushs 
coalition of the willing. 
The two countries have close economic ties as well. Arguably, the Japanese 
government has been able to put resources into economic development because 
the government did not have the need to fully remilitarize Japan due to the 
military protection of the United States (Krauss 1992, MacDougall 1988). The 
United States has for a long time been the biggest international trade partner for 
Japan (although Chinas trade with Japan for the first time in 2004 exceeded that 
of the United States, and the total amount of exports and imports between Japan 




Still, U.S.-Japan economic ties are still very viable. According to the trade 
statistics compiled by the Treasury Ministry of Japan, the trade between Japan 
and the United States consists of one-fifth of the total amount of the international 
trade of Japan (Treasury Ministry of Japan, 2007). Also, there have not been 
many discussions over unfair trade practices from Japan although Japans trade 
surplus with the United States is at record levels. Moreover, these two economic 
colossi are becoming ever more integrated in the financial, manufacturing and 
high-tech sectors. The future of the economic relations between the two countries 
is likely to continue to be strong. 
Because of its political, military and economic ties, it is logical to imagine 
that the media in the two countries may be quite similar in their content. In fact, 
the Japanese government supported the United States in its decision to go to war. 
Why then was there such different media coverage of the war? As this work 
revealed that there was a huge discrepancy between the Japanese governments 
position on the Iraq War and the Asahi coverage. Contrary to expectations, the 
Asahis coverage of the Iraq War from the beginning was very antagonistic 
toward the U.S. position. 
There are several explanations for the difference. First, as chapter 8 
discussed, anti-militarism is commonly shared by Japanese media organizations. 
Among other media organizations, the Asahi is arguably most politically liberal 
and dovish. Cultural factors, such as religion, also have contributed to the 




Second, the relationship between the media and the Japanese government is 
sometimes very antagonistic. While the Liberal Democratic Party has for a long 
time held a majority in the lower house of the Japanese parliament (in fact, since 
the partys formation in 1955---except for a few years immediately after the 1993 
party realignment, there has not been a strong opposition party. Critics suggest 
that the media has played the opposition partys role because the media has 
critically checked the policies the LDP-led government and filled the void by the 
lack of a major opposition party (Kabashima, et al. 2007). Among the Japanese 
media, the Asahi is usually very critical toward LDP policies. Since the LDP-led 
government supported the U.S. Iraq War policies, and the Asahi tends to be both 
anti-militaristic and critical of LDP policies, it is in fact not that surprising that the 
paper portrayed negatively the U.S. invasion into Iraq.  
Third, another interpretation is that the Japanese media is not the outlier 
among the media of the world. American Iraq War policies have been criticized 
by media organizations in many parts of the world (Dimitrova et al. 2005). 
Arguably, the Japanese media may not be an exception. It may be the U.S. media 
that was the exception. 
Regarding the articles from embedded journalist, my dissertation may 
generate a hypothesis. The Asahi articles were critical toward the U.S. policies 
over Iraq throughout the period of analysis. This includes the articles written by 
Nojima, an embedded journalist from the Asahi. However, it is worthwhile to note 
that Nojimas articles during his embedding with soldiers were not as blatantly 




the Asahi are ambivalent toward the U.S. forces: Although he felt a strong sense 
of distance to the forces at other times, he was sometimes sympathetic with the 
troop in which he was embedded. Although his case may be an isolated case, it 
certainly generates a hypothesis that personal contacts with American soldiers (or 
any Americans or the U.S. society in general) may reduce the preconceptions 
toward the United States: The more time a Japanese journalist is personally 
involved with U.S. society, the less likely it is that his or her articles will be anti-
American. 
This hypothesis shares a similar perspective to the contact hypothesis 
used in political psychology. The contact hypothesis maintains that contact 
between groups under optimal conditions reduce intergroup prejudice. The 
hypothesis presents a rationale for social integration and interracial harmony 
between different racial groups in the United States, especially the white and the 
blacks (Allport 1954). However, there is a completely opposite hypothesis for 
intergroup contact. Conflict hypothesis suggests that contact between intergroups 
aggravates prejudice between groups. Research has had mixed results. Some 
support the contact theory both directly and indirectly, and some support the 
conflict theory (Taylor 2000, Levine and Campbell 1971). Although this study 
does not intend to test these hypotheses, it would be a good future study for some 





Section 4 Future Research 
This study is but a beginning. It opens many possibilities for further 
research. Further analysis will be needed to fill in gaps in my arguments as well as 
to deepen research into this timely and important topic. Specifically, three 
directions that could be taken to broaden the horizon of this study will be 
discussed.  
First, analyzing news contents about the Iraq War from more diverse 
sources would add additional and possibly even more interesting perspectives. 
Second, comparing between the results of this work and the analysis of news 
contents about other wars would be very useful. Third, and in a slightly different 
vein, it would be intriguing to focus on how cultural and political stereotypes are 
manifested in reporting about the Iraq War. I will explain these three possible 
areas for future research in greater detail below.  
First, adding the analysis of a different media organization would expand 
the scope of this research. This work selected the Asahi and the New York Times 
because they are suitable for comparison: both papers are liberal and arguably 
among the most trusted and influential media organizations in their countries. The 
Asahi is the Japanese counterpart of the New York Times, and vice versa. There is, 
however, a possibility that more interesting results might be found if I compared 
different print media, such as between the Asahi and the Washington Times or 
between the Yomiuri and the New York Times. 
For example, comparing news about the Iraq War between conservative 




findings. As briefly explained in Chapters eight and nine, the Japanese media, 
both print and electronic, is dominated by progressive media. Several 
conservative media outlets, however, have gradually arisen during the past twenty 
years. Two of the most prominent examples in the print media are the Yomiuri 
and the Sankei. The Yomiuri was regarded as a fairly liberal newspaper until at 
least the early 1980s (Kim 1981). The paper, however, became less dovish after 
the editorial board was occupied by conservative editors, led by Tsuneo Watanabe 
in the 1980s (Ito et al. 2000). Watanabe, now in the top management position of 
the paper, has been very close to conservative leaders of the Liberal Democratic 
Party, most prominently former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Watanabe 
orchestrated with the LDP leaders ways of altering Japans politico-military 
stance by featuring a number of articles about the idea of amending the Japanese 
Constitution and Japanese remilitarism (Uozumi 2003). The Sankei was 
conservative from its origin, but their conservative stance gradually became even 
more clearly manifested in the mid-1980s when Japan rose up to the position of 
an economic superpower and the role of Japanese international contributions was 
revisited by other countries, such as the United States.  
The same as the case of Japan, conservative media organizations in the 
United States have become gradually more influential since the 1980s. The 
circulation of the Wall Street Journal, one of the most pro-business newspapers, 
has increased, and the Washington Times, founded in 1982 by the conservative 
Unification Church, has transformed itself into one of the main stream media 




U.S. may portray the Iraq War differently from their liberal competitors. 
Analyzing the content between The Sankei and the Washington Times about the 
Iraq War, for example, could be very intriguing.  
Second, along with analyzing the conservative media, adding a few 
additional print media sources could produce more comprehensive research 
findings. In addition to the Asahi, The Sankei, and The Yomiuri, three other 
newspapers (the Mainichi, the Nikkei, and the Tokyo-Chunichi) have circulation 
levels of more than one million. Two of these papers are considered liberal (the 
Mainichi and the Tokyo-Chunichi), and one (the Nikkei) is regarded as more 
conservative than the others. Analyzing the content of the six papers could present 
a more accurate Japanese media portrayal of the Iraq War. As for the United 
States, five print media organizations have more than a million daily copies (the 
Wall Street Journal, the USA Today, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles 
Times). However, other newspapers, such as the Washington Post and the 
Chicago Tribune, are believed to have a significant impact in politics. Thus, 
adding these papers to a comparison would provide a more inclusive picture of 
the U.S. media as a whole. To make this analysis more comprehensive, important 
wire services (Associated Press and Reuters in the United States and Kyodo News 
Service and Jiji Press in Japan) and news magazines (Time and Newsweek in the 
United States and Bungei Shunjyu and Chuo Koron in Japan) could be included. 
This, however, would require a team of researchers. Going even a step further, it 
would be exciting to conduct such a study across a larger number of nations. The 




Along with the Arab view, the work would be more global comparisons if the 
French, German and Russian media were included. The three countries, especially 
France, opposed most strongly the U.S. position on sanctioning Iraq militarily in 
the United Nations dialogues that occurred just before the Iraq War began. These 
kinds of studies are obviously far beyond the ability of a single scholar; they 
would require a coordinated team. As a team of researchers it would be possible 
to make an international comparison about the medias treatment of the Iraq War.   
Thirdly, electronic media, such as television and digital media, such as 
blogs, may demonstrate unique differences with the results of the print media. 
There are several studies about news contents of television and internet pages 
about the Iraq War (e.g., Aday, Livingston and Hebert, 2005; Dimitrova, Kaid, 
Williams, and Trammell 2005). These studies may include some comparative 
viewpoints, but most of them are analyses of U.S. sources. So far, there has been 
no significant study about Japanese television and internet pages about the war in 
Iraq. There is a published diary written by an embedded journalist in the Iraq War 
from the Nippon Television Network (Imaizumi 2003), and this book illustrates 
well the journalists effort to report from the battleground. But there is ample 
room for better understandings about how the war was reported in Japan. 
Second a possible direction of future studies is to compare the results of 
this work with studies about other wars. There are two ways for such a 
comparison. One is to examine articles about each major war by focusing on one 
paper. Analyzing how the New York Times or the Asahi described each major war 




descriptions of each past war. There are several studies about how the media 
reported major warfare (Ishizawa 2005, Kinoshita 2005). Although these studies 
are very intriguing, these are not comprehensive enough to fully explain the 
medias role in each war. It would be worthwhile to conduct such an analysis 
about how news outlets address different wars. 
A third direction of possible future research is to do the same study but 
with slightly altered time frames. This analysis covered from October 1, 2002 to 
December 31, 2004, but the situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since 
this time. As of May of 2007, more than four years had passed since the 
beginning of the Iraq War. Initial combat in the Iraq war started on March 20, 
2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom ended May 1, 2003. Officially, it was a very brief 
war compared with the size of the attack. But it turned out in fact to be but the 
beginning of a very lengthy battle to achieve stability that has yet to be won. It is 
surprising to consider that when the period of Iraqi reconstruction and attempted 
stabilization led by the U.S.-led forces is included, the length of the Iraqi conflict 
is now longer than was the Pacific War (1941-1945). The total number of U.S. 
soldiers causalities stood at more than 3200 as of May 2007. Further, much 
larger numbers of lives have been lost among Iraqi citizens. Adding in the amount 
of the proposed fiscal 2008 budget, the total expense for the war has amounted to 
800 billion dollars, which easily surpasses the 600 billion dollars that was the total 
expense for the Vietnam War (Morimoto 2007). The Iraqi situation is now 
officially a civil war, and more chaos will certainly continue for a certain period. 




revealed that the prewar consensus that Iraq and al- Qaeda had contacts and 
deeper ties were based on dubious or unconfirmed data. With all these conditions 
combined, public opinion in the United States has become more negative about 
the war. It would be useful to include the most up-to-date state of the war in a new 
research project. Doing this might reveal yet more changes in media coverage of 
the war and show differences with the periods discussed in this dissertation.  
A fourth direction would be to focus on the subject of political culture. 
During the course of content analysis, I found that there are several obvious 
cultural stereotypes in the descriptions of both the Asahi and the New York Times. 
For example, the Asahi often expressed the idea that monotheism in Christianity 
was the origin of hatred against other cultures, and most notably Islamic cultures. 
Also, there were some articles in the Japanese press about how Japanese society 
was morally higher than others simply because Japan does not have a full-
fledged military. It seems that the anti-war sentiments that have been nurtured 
since the defeat of World War II may have created this view. Although the Asahi 
repeatedly cautioned to the U.S. that accepting other cultures and views is the first 
step to understanding other societies, the paper itself alienates American culture 
and political history. These alienations may create in Edward Saids term 
othering, which is a concept of ignoring different identities and justifying ones 
own (Said 2003). 
As for the New York Times, there are not many stereotypes related to 
Japan or Japanese that appeared in the articles examined. This is because the 




prominent othering of Arab citizens by the New York Times. As this study has 
found, Iraqi citizen causalities and damages suffered by Iraqis were largely 
ignored by the newspaper, especially during the actual official battle period.   
  
Section 6 Conclusion 
This dissertation confirmed that the Asahi and the New York Times 
treated the Iraq War differently. The chapter also emphasizes the fact that the 
medias impact is significant in shaping the political agenda and public opinion. 
Further, I put an emphasis on the fact that different political communication 
systems, including different historical experiences and political cultures, influence 
the environment in which the media operate. These different backgrounds provide 
idiosyncratic environments and may influence how a media organization portrays 
a particular issue, such as the war in Iraq. 
Since there are only a few comparative political communication studies 
regarding the Iraq War, I am sure that my dissertation expanded the horizons of 
the media studies about war. I believe my dissertation filled in the void because 
there were, as far as I know, no comparative analyses about the Iraq War between 
the Western and the Asian media. Also, the fact that this dissertation used 
multiple methodologies may widen the scope of political communication studies. 
I used both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods as well as 




in the interplay among the media, public policy, and public opinion, as well as 
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